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Coping with Emigration in Baltic and East European 
Countries
The Baltic countries have experienced sustained emigration over the past decade, contributing to population 
decline and a loss of working-age population. The impact of this emigration is felt strongly in the labour 
market, the general economy and in social developments. How can countries deal with the impact of high 
levels of emigration? How to attract back emigrants? How best to benefit from the financial, social and human 
capital developed abroad? The Baltic countries are not alone in addressing these challenges, and this volume 
brings together the recent experience of Poland and Romania, as well as a wide range of OECD countries, in 
developing new policies to cope with emigration.
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Foreword
Emigrants are increasingly seen as a key resource to support long-term economic 
growth in their countries of origin, not only providing remittances but contributing to 
development through investment, exchange, and intensification of networks. The 
worldwide stock of migrants has grown to comprise 3% of the world population,
accounting for more than 232 million people in 2013. The notion of “diaspora” often 
includes descendants of migrants and more generally persons who maintain ties of some 
kind with a specific country of origin in relation to their migration background. This 
makes a broad pool of resources on which countries can draw.
How to gain from emigration is a pressing question in countries which are undergoing 
large emigration. The Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are a prime 
example of countries where recent emigration has drawn the attention of policy makers 
looking to mitigate potential negative impacts of the departure of young and skilled 
emigrants as well as to support economic development. The latter two countries in 
particular saw outflows rise after accession to the European Union and peak during the 
severe recession in which began in 2008. These outflows, which have disproportionately 
involved young people, exacerbate a demographic situation in which Baltic countries face 
a rapidly ageing population and receive few immigrants themselves.
This publication underlines how the diasporas of each Baltic countries is far from 
homogeneous, consisting of individuals with different emigration histories, expectations, 
skills, degrees of attachment to the country of origin and of integration in the destination 
country. Designing policies which respond to such a heterogeneous and rapidly changing 
group is particularly challenging. It requires, as a first step, to have a sufficiently detailed 
and accurate picture of population groups in question, as well as an assessment of future 
labour market and skills needs. This is a prerequisite for providing them with more 
specific and targeted information on economic opportunities.
To shed more light on these issues, the OECD co-organised, with the Latvian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 17 December 2012 a conference on the economic impact 
of emigration, exploring the challenges and policy implications of emigration in the 
Baltic countries. This was the first time that policy makers in the region came together to 
discuss the evidence on emigration and its impact, and to exchange their experience with 
representatives of OECD countries with longer experience of emigration and diaspora 
relations.
This publication compiles the material developed and discussed at the joint seminar. 
It takes stock of the current knowledge of emigration from Central and Eastern Europe, 
including the characteristics of past and present emigrants, their tendency to return or to 
remain abroad, and the economic impact of this movement on the origin country. It is 
well known that remittances from emigrants may act as a buffer during a recession in 
origin countries, but there are other effects on the labour market which are more 
ambiguous, including changes in the skill composition.
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The publication also identifies policy instruments which have been put in place in 
OECD and other countries to engage diasporas. This appears particularly important, as 
recent emigrants are not all likely to return to the Baltic countries, and patriotism alone 
does not seem to be sufficient to keep ties. Even when migrants do not return to start 
businesses or put their knowledge to work in their origin country, there are still other 
means to keep them engaged, financially, scientifically or in entrepreneurial networks.
It was clear from the participants in the conference that there is no single institutional 
recipe for engaging diasporas and benefiting from emigration, but these countries have 
taken important steps to ensure that their citizens abroad are considered in policy 
developments at home. 
It is our hope that this publication will contribute to a better understanding of the 
impact of emigration on countries of origin, and to help structure policies to increase 
positive impact and cushion any negative impact.
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Executive summary
The three Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have seen constant net 
emigration over the past decade. Net emigration over the 2000s was equivalent to almost 
6% of the population in Estonia, 9% in Latvia and 13% in Lithuania. While this served as a 
safety valve in a time of poor employment opportunities and led to high levels of 
remittances, the longer term implications appear less positive: smaller working-age 
population, loss of educated youth, and skills shortages. A substantial diaspora has formed 
abroad, and these countries are starting to develop policies for interacting with these recent 
emigrants, many of whom are not expected to return definitively, to allay the economic and 
social impact of their departure. Other European countries are facing similar circumstances, 
especially Poland and Romania; in Romania, population fell by 7% over the decade largely 
due to emigration. The negative demographic situation in these countries – low fertility and 
ageing populations – exacerbates the impact of emigration. The experience of OECD 
countries with longstanding diasporas points the way to some innovative responses, if not to 
large-scale return.
Key findings
Emigration in these countries rose following their accession to the European Union in 
2004 and again with the economic crisis which began in 2008. Outflows peaked in 2010 in 
the Baltic countries and have not yet fallen back to their pre-crisis levels. Poland, in contrast 
to the other countries, experienced return inflows in 2008-10.
The main countries of destination were the United Kingdom and Ireland for Poles, 
Latvians and Lithuanians. More recently Norway has emerged as a destination. Finland was 
the destination for Estonians; Italy and Spain for Romanians. Most went for employment. 
Germany has attracted more qualified migrants from these countries.
Emigration from the Baltic countries is increasingly comprised of youth, concentrated 
between 20 and 35 years old, of highly educated people and of entire families. Estonia is an 
exception as its emigrants are largely less educated single men. For students, work abroad is 
now a common post-graduation plan. In Baltic countries, emigrants are increasingly 
looking for permanent skilled employment abroad. It was not only the unemployed who 
went abroad to work: many emigrants were employed before they left – three-quarters in 
the case of Latvia. A large share were employed abroad in jobs for which they were 
overqualified – two-thirds of Polish migrants, 
The economic impact of emigration has been notable and mostly negative, especially 
when seen in a long-term perspective. Remittances make a significant contribution – almost 
5% of GDP in Lithuania, for example, and 3% in Romania – and emigration was an 
important safety valve for the slack labour market in times of crisis. Skills shortages are 
starting to be felt in these countries, however, and there is evidence of distortion of the 
wage structure for high and low skilled workers due to disproportionate emigration by 
the latter.
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Those who return tend to be the less educated. Return migrants are more likely to be 
unemployed, although are working enjoy higher wages associated with their foreign 
experience. There is evidence that return migrants are more productive in Romania, and 
have higher rates of entrepreneurship in Poland.
Return policies have met with limited success, especially where underlying economic 
conditions are not favourable, or where the salary differential abroad is substantial. Job fairs 
aimed at emigrants from Romania did not lead to many returns. Polish programmes to bring 
back emigrants were stymied by insufficient planning, by negative economic conditions and 
by the requirement not to favour returnees over non-migrants.
Diaspora policies are developing. Diaspora bonds, used in Israel and India, for example, 
can attract lower cost capital from emigrants and give them a means to contribute to 
economic development when they no longer have family to which to send remittances. 
Political representation, as provided by Portugal and Mexico, is another means of ensuring 
that emigrants stay connected. Diaspora services such as those run by Ireland and Mexico 
advocate for communities abroad, defending their interests. Language and culture support 
are traditional activities that allow for stronger ties with the origin country. Symbolic 
initiatives such as prizes and recognition, or exclusive clubs, can support business networks 
with positive commercial return. 
Conclusion
Emigration continues to affect the labour markets of the Baltic countries and hinders the 
growth in the working-age population. Emigration appears to have become a structural 
feature in these countries and will continue, albeit likely at a lower level than in the crisis 
years, exacerbating emerging skills shortages.
Most recent migrants are unlikely to return soon. Targeted return policies providing 
information to emigrants about changing economic and social conditions in the origin 
country, and allowing employers to reach out to diasporas, may help promote some returns, 
but good opportunities and salary conditions remain determinant.
Networks can foster links with the origin country even if no return occurs. Smaller scale 
fellowships and youth mobility initiatives may be feasible. Economic and trade ties can be 
built on diaspora presence abroad, with more symbolic and emotional contribution than 
financial investment.
Policies to engage diasporas play a key role in ensuring that emigrants maintain ties 
with the origin country. Diaspora engagement is not cost-free, as it requires infrastructure, 
services and better knowledge of the characteristics and intentions of diaspora communities.
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Chapter 1
Emigration from the Baltic States:
Economic impact and policy implications
Godfried Engbersen
Erasmus University Rotterdam
and
Joost Jansen
Erasmus University Rotterdam
This chapter analyses the extent and contexts of Baltic migration flows, and sketches a 
profile of Baltic emigrant populations. The potential economic impact of high negative 
net migration on these countries is addressed, along with relevant findings from Poland 
and Romania. Policy strategies and initiatives taken by Baltic States and other 
emigration countries are presented and discussed. The chapter concludes by identifying 
areas requiring further research in matters pertaining to rising emigration, its economic 
impact and the conditions under which diaspora policies contribute to the economic 
development of home countries.
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Introduction 
Emigration from the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) has rapidly increased 
over the past decades, a phenomenon that has accelerated dramatically since the 
three countries joined the European Union in 2004. This outflow of population is reflected 
in very high negative net migration rates and results in considerable depopulation. The 
governments of the states in question consider this development to be a serious and 
threatening problem. The Latvian Government, together with the OECD, therefore 
organised an international conference, held in Riga on December 17, 2012, to discuss the 
rapidly increasing emigration from the Baltics, its possible economic impact and initiatives 
to guarantee a healthy socio-economic future for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This 
chapter summarises the main findings from the papers presented in this volume. 
Migration flows from the Baltics: The extent of migration and migrant population profiles 
On September 6, 1991 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania regained their independence after 
decades of Soviet occupation. As noted by Hazans (cf. Chapter 4), this historical event led 
to major changes in population composition and increasing emigration, which resulted in 
considerable depopulation and negative annual net migration rates in the three Baltic States. 
Steady economic growth in the three Baltic States at the turn of the 21st century 
caused emigration to decline. Moreover, the costs of emigration were relatively high due 
to the fact that residence and work permits were required by law. In 2004, however, when 
the Baltic States became members of the European Union and free movement of labour 
gradually became possible, net migration again plummeted. In several waves of 
emigration since the beginning of the 21st century, Latvia, for example, lost 9.1% of its 
population (including almost 14% of its labour force) (cf. Chapter 4). 
Very rapid economic growth following EU accession caused emigration rates to drop 
slightly. Unfortunately, however, since 2008 emigration rates rose yet again due to the 
global economic crisis. Lithuania, for example, had the highest negative net migration in 
the European Union in 2008 (OECD, 2010), and in Latvia negative net migration almost 
tripled between 2007 and 2008. Table 1.1 presents a more detailed overview of inflows 
and outflows of population in the three Baltic States. The immigration and emigration 
data in Table 1.1., from Eurostat, differs from national data reported elsewhere in this 
volume (from Statistics Estonia and Statistics Latvia, e.g.), raising the question of cross-
country comparability. 
Table 1.1. Number of long-term migrants (length of stay > 1 year) to and from the Baltic States, by year 
 
Source: Eurostat (2012), data accessed from datasets migr_emi1ctz and migr_imm1ctz. 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Estonia
Emigrants 1 784 2 175 2 038 3 073 2 927 4 610 5 527 4 384 4 406 4 658 5 294 6 214
Immigrants  35  241  575  967 1 097 1 436 2 234 3 741 3 671 3 884 2 810 3 709
Net migration -1 749 -1 934 -1 463 -2 106 -1 830 -3 174 -3 293 - 643 - 735 - 774 -2 484 -2 505
Latvia
Emigrants 7 131 6 602 3 262 2 210 2 744 2 450 5 252 4 183 6 007 7 388 10 702 30 380
Immigrants 1 627 1 443 1 428 1 364 1 665 1 886 2 801 3 541 3 465 2 688 2 364 7 253
Net migration -5 504 -5 159 -1 834 - 846 -1 079 - 564 -2 451 - 642 -2 542 -4 700 -8 338 -23 127
Lithuania
Emigrants 2 616 7 253 7 086 11 032 15 165 15 571 12 602 13 853 17 015 21 970 83 157 53 863
Immigrants 1 510 4 694 5 110 4 728 5 553 6 789 7 745 8 609 9 297 6 487 5 213 15 685
Net migration -1 106 -2 559 -1 976 -6 304 -9 612 -8 782 -4 857 -5 244 -7 718 -15 483 -77 944 -38 178
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The desire to leave the Baltic countries is strongly related to economic decline and 
rising unemployment. OECD data (2012) reveal that young men of working age have a 
higher propensity to emigrate in the presence of unemployment and cutbacks on social 
welfare, both conditions which are found in the Baltic countries. Destinations vary 
according to economic opportunities, legal barriers and geographic and linguistic 
proximity. Finland is the most popular country of destination among emigrants from 
Estonia. Latvian and Lithuanian emigrants mainly go to the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Ireland, Norway and Germany (cf. Chapter 3). 
The profile of the labour migrant population is crucial to the understanding of the 
economic impact of emigration on the country of origin. Four ideal-typical patterns of 
contemporary labour migration within the European Union (especially from Central and 
Eastern Europe to Western Europe) can be identified (Eade et al., 2007; Düvell and 
Vogel, 2006; Grabowska-Lusinska and Okolski, 2009; Engbersen et al., 2013). These 
four patterns are derived from two dimensions of migration and integration, i.e., i) the 
degree of labour migrants’ attachment to their country of origin; and ii) the degree of their 
attachment to their destination country. These attachments can be “weak” or “strong” (see 
Figure 1.1). The four patterns can also be consecutive (Engbersen et al., 2013), so that 
temporary migration can lead to transnational and ultimately to settlement migration, but 
this process does not necessarily apply to every individual labour migrant. Contemporary 
labour migration is not only diverse, but also dynamic and changeable (Friberg, 2012). 
Figure 1.1. Patterns of labour migration from Central and Eastern Europe after EU enlargement 
 
Source: Engbersen, G. et al. (2013), “On the Differentiated Attachments of Migrants from Central and Eastern Europe. 
A Typology of Labour Migration”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 39, No. 6, pp. 959-981, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.765663. 
Migration patterns from the Baltic States also come in various types. The profile of 
Latvian emigrants, for instance, has changed significantly in recent years (cf. Chapter 4). 
The percentage of Latvian emigrants with higher education has been steadily increasing 
(24% are university graduates), and they are more oriented towards long-term or even 
permanent migration together with their families (only 23% plan to return to Latvia 
within five years). Students have the highest propensity to emigrate among Latvians. This 
pattern can therefore be characterised as either transnational or settlement migration. 
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Latvian emigrants are decreasingly tied to their country of origin and increasingly tied to 
their country of destination.
The average Estonian emigrant is a male blue-collar worker aged 15-34 who moves to 
Finland to work in the construction sector (cf. Chapter 4; Anniste, 2012). The profile best 
matches that of a circular migrant: a labour migrant who works abroad on a temporary 
basis because of unfavourable labour circumstances in his country of origin. According to 
Kaska (cf. Chapter 2), the probability of return migration is high during the first 
five years after arrival, and decreases steadily thereafter.
Lithuanian emigrants are mainly people of working age. In 2011, young people aged 
20-34 years formed more than half (55.4%) of all emigrants (compared with 46.6% in 
2008) (cf. Chapter 3). According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
(2011), emigration from Lithuania predominantly involves educated individuals, of which 
over 50% completed at least upper secondary vocational education. Also, the emigration 
of families, whose probability of returning is lower, is increasingly frequent in Lithuania. 
The pattern of Lithuanian emigration therefore resembles the Latvian pattern, in that 
emigrants tend to be oriented towards a long-term or even permanent stay abroad. 
Different migration patterns result in different economic outcomes and thus require 
differentiated policy approaches. Long-term migrants have relatively weak ties with their 
countries of origin compared to, circular migrants, for example. Policies targeting 
permanent emigrants may aim at maintaining (cultural) links with the country of origin or 
setting up business networks with successful entrepreneurs working abroad, while 
programmes targeting temporary emigrants may provide them with specific labour 
market information and consultation on their return.
The economic impact of emigration on the Baltic States, Poland and Romania
This section draws on current research on the possible impact of emigration on Baltic 
economies, including documents and discussion at the international conference on “The 
Economic Impact of Emigration in Latvia and the Other Baltic Countries: Challenges and 
Policy Implications” (co-organised by the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
OECD in Riga on 17 December 2012).
The case of Latvian emigration is discussed by Hazans (cf. Chapter 4). Emigration 
from Latvia is increasing rapidly and is considered by Latvian policy makers to be an 
urgent problem. As in the case of Estonia and Lithuania, Latvian emigration is closely 
related to fluctuations in economic conditions and to external factors such as 
EU accession. The Latvian economy grew steadily during the years before the economic 
crisis, which caused emigration to decline. In the years following the outbreak of the 
economic crisis, the outflow of population rapidly increased. Economic decline, rising 
unemployment and increasing social insecurity are common reasons for Latvian young 
adults (mostly students and those with post-secondary education) to leave their country.
An important finding concerns emigrants’ intended length of stay abroad 
(cf. Chapter 4): a recent survey shows that an increasing number of Latvian emigrants are 
oriented towards long-term or even permanent emigration. This is likely to result in the
weakening of ties with their country of origin, and to carry implications for diaspora 
policies should Baltic governments wish to mobilise financial resources and human 
capital abroad. Policy makers must take into account that the longer emigrants intend to 
stay abroad, the less probable their return, and the less inclined they would be to transfer 
skills and to invest in Latvia. This calls for the development of appropriate policy 
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programmes, such as those aimed at maintaining cultural links. Kaska (cf. Chapter 2)
discusses recent trends and the economic impact of emigration from Estonia. Here too, as 
in other Baltic States, emigration occurred in waves: in 1991, when Estonia regained its 
independence; in 2004, when it joined the European Union; and after 2008, when the 
economic crisis hit the country. Studies show that currently, Estonian emigrants tend to 
be young male blue-collar workers. Finland is the most popular destination among 
Estonian emigrants.
Due to the lack of adequate data regarding the extent and patterns of Estonian 
emigration, it is unclear whether such emigration can directly affect the composition of 
Estonia’s labour market and reduce unemployment. Data is insufficient also with respect 
to the composition, or profile, of the population of emigrants (e.g., in terms of their 
occupations and intended length of stay abroad). Furthermore, insights are needed into 
the potential benefits of emigration in terms of remittances and human capital flowing 
back into the country of origin. Estonia has yet to determine how to channel its significant 
flow of remittances to make the necessary investments for the benefit of the country’s
economic development.
6LSDYLþLHQơ and 6WDQNǌQLHQơ (cf. Chapter 3) elaborate on the socio-economic impact 
of emigration from Lithuania. The country tops the list of European countries with high 
negative net migration. Emigration trends seem to be correlated with economic 
developments. As in the case of Estonia, most emigrants from Lithuania are young 
workers. A worsening economic climate leads (almost directly) to an increase in 
emigration. Vice versa, the socio-economic effects of such emigration on Lithuania 
remains to be studied.
The large-scale emigration has certainly had a dampening effect on Lithuanian 
unemployment: all other things being equal, unemployment in Lithuania would have been 
higher had it not been for such large numbers of emigrants (cf. Chapter 3). An analysis of 
the association between emigration and labour market structure in Lithuania should, 
however, take other factors into account as well. Demographic factors, for instance, such 
as an exceptionally large cohort of young workers entering the labour market, could 
obfuscate the influence of emigration.
As for migrants’ remittances, 6LSDYLþLHQơ and 6WDQNǌQLHnơ (cf. Chapter 3) note that 
these are important to individuals and families in Lithuania, inasmuch as they cushion the 
consequences of the economic crisis and compensate for financial problems due to 
drastically reduced incomes. The impact of remittance flows on Lithuanian economic 
development and investments, however, has thus far not been evaluated. There is an 
urgent need for a systematic evaluation based on realistic data (Pawson and Tilly, 2008).
Mereuta (2012) discusses the case of Romanian emigration, analysing how 
emigration can influence economic development. Romania is Europe’s largest source of 
migrants. Most Romanian long-term migrants live in Italy or in Spain. According to this 
paper, Romanian emigration has had multiple positive effects on its domestic economic 
situation: lower unemployment rates, for example, and decreased pressure on social 
protection budgets. Nevertheless, there have also been negative effects, such as labour 
shortages, skill gaps and even depopulated areas. Table 1.2 provides a synopsis of 
potential economic effects on sending countries.
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Table 1.2. Overview of the economic effects of labour migration on Romania 
 
Source: Mereuta, C. (2012), “Mobilising Migrant’s Skills and Recourses – The Case of Romania”, Paper prepared for the 
international conference on “The Economic Impact of Emigration in Latvia and the Other Baltic Countries: Challenges and 
Policy Implications”, co-organised by the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the OECD, 17 December 2012, Riga. 
Poor data on emigration patterns in Romania have hindered research into the actual 
impact of emigration from Romania on its economy. For instance, net migration has 
decreased over the past few years, yet no convincing explanations are given for this 
development. Hence, the putative positive effects of emigration on the Romanian 
economy (e.g. lower unemployment, decreased pressure on social protection budgets) 
may be the outcome of other processes. Precise data regarding the Romanian emigration 
pattern and its causes is needed for an in-depth analysis of its economic impact. 
Kaczmarczyk (cf. Chapter 5) considers the case of Polish returnees and their labour 
market performance after returning to their country of origin. Poland, like Romania and 
the Baltic States, can be characterised as a country of emigration. Here too, emigration 
rocketed when Poland acceded to the European Union in 2004. Every year, large numbers 
of young emigrants leave the country in search of a job abroad, especially in Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands. Since Polish migration is often 
“fluid” (temporary), however, there is also a significant flow of reverse migrants 
(Engbersen, 2012). The economic crisis is expected to magnify the scale of return 
migration. 
Poland encourages migrants to return to their home country, so that their financial 
capital and foreign work experience can be mobilised for the benefit of national socio-
economic development. Kaczmarczyk (cf. Chapter 5) reveals, however, that return 
migrants were more exposed than non-migrants to the risk of unemployment. He shows 
that a migration background influences labour market performance in a negative way, and 
thus almost no skill transfer takes place. 
In the Polish case, the presumed advantages of luring return migrants back home in 
order to mobilise their human capital turn out to be doubtful (cf. Chapter 5). The absence 
of skill transfer is mainly due to the fact that the majority of Polish emigrants work 
abroad in jobs that do not match their qualifications. The case of Polish emigration 
questions the common belief that there is a positive association between emigration on 
one hand and the transfer of human capital on the other. 
Positive effects Negative effects
Lower unemployment rates Negative demographic trends (ageing, lack of 
territorial cohesion)
Decreased pressure on social protection 
budgets
Unbalanced distribution of the available 
workforce by sector and geographical area
Remittances support the improvement of 
living standards
Business losses due to wage pressure 
(especially prior to 2008) and reduced 
production
Workers abroad facilitate skill transfer and 
growth 
Brain drain (loss of investment in education 
and training, lower competitiveness)
A threat to the sustainability of social protection 
systems (pension, medical care)
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In pursuit of successful diaspora policies: Baltic initiatives and experiences from 
other sending countries
The ambiguous potential of remittances
Migration economics teaches that emigration can in time result in economic and 
social development in sending countries, partly thanks to remittances sent back by 
emigrants. Remittances have the potential to increase overall income and maybe even 
improve living standards (e.g. better education, health care) (De Haas, 2007). This 
economic and social development may eventually lead to declining population outflows. 
A key question is whether or not emigration from the Baltic States leads to increasing 
remittance flows and thus contributes to economic development and social improvement. 
All three Baltic States actively try to strengthen ties with their emigrants by developing 
various policies, in order to “to mobilise the financial resources and human capital of the 
diaspora” (OECD, 2012). Baltic governments try to maximise the potential positive 
effects of emigration. According to the OECD (2012), remittances have indeed grown 
into a substantial source of gross domestic income over the last decade. In Lithuania for 
example, remittance flows now account for over USD 3 billions (which is almost 5%) of 
Lithuania’s gross domestic product (GDP). In Estonia and Latvia remittance flows have 
also grown substantially over the past ten years, and currently amount to 2% and 3% of 
GDP, respectively. In times of economic crisis, remittances have the potential to partly 
compensate for the loss of GDP, as in the case of Latvia (cf. Chapter 4).The magnitude of
these capital flows as well as their economic and social impact, remain ambiguous, 
however. The aggregate numbers do not tell us where exactly the remittances are flowing 
to, how they are invested or how they contribute to national development. De Haas 
(2007) states that: “Notwithstanding their often considerable blessings for individuals, 
households and communities, migration and remittances are no panacea for solving more 
structural development problems.” Consequently, emigration from, and remittances to
Baltic States are both strategies to overcome unfavourable economic conditions in the 
migrants’ country of origin. No doubt, remittances have the potential to grant individuals 
and households a stable income in times of economic misery. The challenge for the 
governments of the Baltic States is to channel remittances and mobilise the financial 
resources of the diaspora for the sake of national development.
So-called “diaspora bonds” are one useful response (Handjiski, 2012). The issuance 
of these bonds enables countries to tap into the savings of emigrants as a stable and 
relatively cheap source of finance for structural investments. Baltic States may be able to 
channel remittances and savings and mobilise the financial resources of the diaspora. The 
experiences of India and Israel, countries which have raised USD 35-40 billion using 
these bonds (Ketkar and Ratha, 2007), may be useful.
As long as the political and economic conditions in sending countries remain 
unfavourable, policies to channel remittances will be difficult to develop. Remittances are 
in fact a strategy to overcome these unfavourable conditions, which is why individuals 
tend to support their own family members, rather than invest. The chapters which follow 
in this publication underline that until governments succeed in improving social and 
economic conditions, remittances will most likely not be allocated to investment in the 
Baltic States.
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The development of successful diaspora policies 
The chapters in this volume emphasize that there is much to be gained from 
emigration, especially by mobilising the skills and human capital of return emigrants, and 
by increasing the economic impact of remittances. For the development of successful 
diaspora policies, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania can build on a body of existing academic 
research and international experience. The International Organization for Migration 
(IOM, 2006), for instance, has found that policy success in engaging with diasporas 
depends on the ability to deal with their complex and heterogeneous nature. The IOM 
also developed a diaspora policy roadmap summarising the key stages of diaspora policy 
making.
The issue of migration and development, and of successful diaspora policies has 
regained substantial interest in academia, governments and international agencies over the 
past few years (De Haas, 2006). Initial pessimism concerning the effects of emigration 
(e.g. “brain drain”) gave way to a widespread optimistic belief regarding the development 
and poverty-reducing potential of remittances (De Haas, 2006; Adams and Page, 2005; 
World Bank, 2006). A tremendous increase in remittance flows to emigration countries 
has strengthened this belief among policy makers (Carling, 2008a).
Despite this optimism, the real economic impact of large-scale emigration on home 
countries is complex and rather heterogeneous, varying across different emigration 
patterns and diaspora policies implemented. The fundamental question, therefore, should 
be, how do different migration policy environments affect the association between 
emigration and development outcomes (De Haas, 2006, p. 13). In addition, the 
IOM (2006) points to an urgent need to clearly define the role of governmental diaspora 
policies in mobilising diasporas to further economic development in home countries.
Because of the substantial increase in remittance flows, virtually all diaspora policy 
makers aim to enhance the development impact of this financial resource. To do so, they 
can, for example, aim to increase the volume of current remittance flows, or choose to 
stimulate the direct investment of remittances (which, as previously noted, is very 
difficult) (Carling, 2008a). Underlying these different policy strategies, however, there 
are three central issues that can either make or break diaspora policies on remittances, and 
thus need to be thought through in advance.
Firstly, policies that explicitly target and favour emigrants should be avoided, as they 
are liable to create tensions between migrants and non-migrants and thus undermine the 
development benefits of migration. Secondly, policy makers need to consider the question 
of remittance ownership. The relationship between senders remitting money and receivers 
in home countries is often tense and complex, as the financial transaction creates an 
obligation for receivers, and senders do not have accurate information on how the money 
is spent. Policies thus have to respect the private nature of remittances. Lastly, there’s the 
issue of the long-term sustainability of remittance flows. As migration gradually becomes 
permanent, remittance flows tend to decrease due to looser attachments to the country of 
origin. Therefore, precise information on migration patterns and on the determinants of 
migrant remittances is crucial for the development of successful remittance policies 
(Carling, 2008a and 2008b).
Crucial to the success of diaspora policies is the ability to foster co-operation between 
local (including government) initiatives and different diaspora groups, and to build on 
already existing initiatives (IOM, 2006; De Haas, 2006; Newland and Patrick, 2004). It is 
important to acknowledge that fruitful diaspora and development projects often come 
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from within diasporas and that state-led initiatives should co-operate with such existing 
projects. Exemplars of successful initiatives originating in the diaspora are spontaneous 
movements and associations. For instance, the French-Moroccan Association Migrations 
et Développement is a grassroots organisation that successfully committed itself to release 
the development potential of Moroccan emigration in the country of origin. It has 
implemented numerous effective development projects in over 400 Moroccan villages 
and is now consulted by the Moroccan Government on future development projects 
(De Haas, 2006). The African Foundation for Development (AFFORD, founded in the 
United Kingdom) provides another example of an influential non-governmental 
organisation that successfully seeks to engage the African diaspora in initiatives to 
promote economic development in Africa through various activities, such as negotiating 
with international financial companies to provide a cheap remittance transfer services to 
migrants (ibid.).
Successful diaspora policies around the world
The safest and most effective approach to develop diaspora policies is thus to build on 
and support such successful existing initiatives (cf. also Newland and Patrick, 2004). 
Historically, countries like Israel, Mexico, Scotland and Ireland have large populations of 
emigrants living abroad, and a vast experience in the development of diaspora policies, 
from which much can be learned. 
The Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has initiated the so-called “Irish 
Abroad Unit” (Gardner, 2012). This is a unit within the Department that co-ordinates the 
provision of financial support to voluntary and Irish community organisations engaged in 
the delivery of services to (vulnerable) Irish communities abroad (www.dfa.ie). Its 
mission is to maintain and strengthen links between Ireland and existing Irish 
communities overseas. By supporting these existing Irish communities abroad, the 
Department fully acknowledges its role as facilitator rather than sole-implementer of 
diaspora engagement.
The Mexican diaspora is one of the largest diasporas worldwide, with over 12 million 
native Mexicans living abroad. It is also the most concentrated diaspora: approximately 
95% of the Mexicans abroad live in the United States (Diaz de Leon, 2012). Since many 
Mexican emigrants have no intention to return to Mexico, the Institute for Mexicans 
Abroad (a decentralised unit of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs) aims not only to 
develop links between migrants and their country of origin, but also to promote the 
integration and empowerment of migrants in their country of destination and increase 
their quality of life (e.g. in terms of education and health care). Through a decentralised, 
local and communal approach, often in close co-operation with US public institutions, 
Mexican consulates carry out effective policies to improve the living conditions of 
migrants and their families, and hence strengthen links between Mexico and its diaspora.
Birthright Israel is a private organisation (funded by the Government of Israel, Jewish 
communities around the world and committed philanthropists) that sponsors trips to Israel 
for Jewish young adults. The organisation aims to “change the course of Jewish history 
and ensure the continuity of the Jewish people by strengthening Jewish identity, Jewish 
communities, and solidarity with Israel via an educational trip to Israel for Jewish young 
adults around the world” (www.birthrightisrael.com). More than 400 000 participants 
have taken the trip to Israel (50 000 annually), of whom over 30% went back to Israel 
within a five-year period. Moreover, participants are 46% more likely than their 
counterparts to feel very much connected to Israel (Schnytzer, 2012; Saxe et al., 2011).
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With over 4 million citizens living abroad, Portugal tries to maintain links with its 
emigrant population and engage them through active political participation. Portuguese 
citizens living abroad have the right to vote for the President of the Portuguese Republic, 
as well as for the Portuguese Parliament, where four seats are reserved for their 
representatives (Da Fonseca, 2012). To participate in these elections, Portuguese citizens 
must be registered with the Portuguese consulate and vote in person. In this way, Portugal 
encourages its diaspora members to remain closely attached to their country of origin.
Working in close collaboration with the Scottish Government and other private 
partners, Scottish Enterprise manages an International Business Network named 
“GlobalScot” with the objective of “harnessing the drive, ambition and talent of high 
profile, successful Scots (and those with an affinity with Scotland) who are committed to 
advancing Scotland’s economic success” (Reid, 2012). These may not necessarily be 
Scottish, but are nominated on the basis of affinity or mutual interest. Since its launch in 
2001, the network has attracted over 650 senior level members throughout the world. 
Members of the GlobalScot network are based in markets that are important for Scottish 
companies to access, and have become important sources of investment in the Scottish 
economy. Finland has also developed specific diaspora programmes, such as the Centre 
for International Mobility (CIMO), established in 1991 (Vehkanen, 2012). This 
organisation, operating under the Finnish ministry of Education and Culture, aims to 
promote the teaching of Finnish language and culture. Whereas the bulk of funds for the 
CIMO comes from the Finnish Government, about 70% of the annual expenditure is 
drawn from external sources (e.g. the European Commission and the Nordic Council of 
Ministers, www.cimo.fi). Since its launch, about 25 000 people took part in CIMO’s 
programmes at more than 100 universities in over 30 countries around the world.
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have also started to develop policies aiming to 
maximise the positive impact of their respective diasporas. The Estonian Government 
encourages emigrants to return through the so-called “return support” (cf. Chapter 2). 
Estonia is trying to lure back long-time emigrants (who have not lived in Estonia for at 
least ten years) by paying them up to EUR 2 000 per adult, but it is unclear how return 
support can contribute to maximising the positive economic effects of emigration, 
considering the Estonian migration pattern. An additional Estonian project targeting 
emigrants is the portal “Talents back home!”, providing emigrants with strategic 
information about job opportunities in the country. The portal was developed by the 
Estonia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Gornischeff, 2012).The co-ordination and 
implementation of Lithuanian diaspora policies fall within the responsibilities of the 
Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The objective of such policies is to strengthen the 
relationship between Lithuania and its diaspora. Therefore, in 2011, the “Global 
Lithuania” programme was launched. Its main goals are: 1) to encourage the maintenance 
of Lithuanian identity; 2) to promote involvement in the life of Lithuania; 3) to support 
public diplomacy efforts; 4) to transform the “brain drain” into “brain circulation”; and 
5) to strengthen communication (Damusis, 2012). Generally speaking, the programme 
aims at maintaining links with its community abroad, and therefore matches the reality of 
Lithuanian diaspora, largely composed of educated individuals oriented towards 
permanent emigration along with their families.
The Latvian Government has established a return migration policy “to support those 
Latvian nationals and their families who live abroad, who consider the possibility or have 
already decided to return and work in Latvia or those who wish to establish their own 
enterprise or develop business network with Latvia” (Platonova, 2012). Recognising the 
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heterogeneous nature of migration patterns, they offer different sorts of practical help to 
various types of emigrants who wish to return to Latvia.
Conclusion
The governments of the three Baltic States consider their high emigration to be a 
serious problem. On the other hand, they also see emigration as a potential resource to 
support long-term economic growth. Through various programmes they are actively 
trying to mobilise the financial resources and human capital of the diaspora. Baltic States 
do not have to start from scratch developing effective programmes to engage diasporas 
for the purpose of national economic development. They can build on a large body of 
knowledge and previous experience from other institutions and countries.
To a large extent, the economic and social situation in the country of origin and the 
characteristics of the migrants themselves (age, level of education, family status, long- or 
short-term stay abroad) determine the feasibility of diaspora programmes.
The forces driving recent emigration from the Baltic States are different from those of 
the past, and pose specific challenges. Emigration is strongly related to declining 
economic opportunities and worsening socio-economic conditions. The emigrant 
population is consequently evolving in terms of age, education, family status etc. In order 
to develop realistic diaspora policies, accurate information about the nature and profile of 
recent emigration from the Baltic countries is necessary. Fortunately, such information is 
becoming increasingly available.
Programmes and initiatives that encourage emigrants to return are difficult to 
implement. To some extent, there is a need to provide general information about the 
labour market situation in the home country. The average emigrant is a young, medium-
skilled male, but there is also wide heterogeneity, and students, professionals, circular 
migrants all have different needs. For those who return, initiatives for labour market 
reintegration need to reflect these needs. Policies should not unfairly favour emigrants 
over non-emigrants. This, of course, does not rule out language support and skill 
recognition for returning emigrants and their families.
Government policies aim at mobilising the human capital and financial resources of 
the diaspora. The Latvian case shows that the propensity among university-educated 
Latvians to emigrate permanently increases during times of economic decline. Therefore, 
not only the probability of investment through remittances, but also the transferability of 
human capital as a result of emigration should be questioned. This underscores the need 
for precise data on migration patterns.
Kaczmarczyk’s (cf. Chapter 5) example of young Polish emigrants who, after 
returning to Poland, are more likely than their peers to end up unemployed, shows that 
“mobilising human capital” is easier said than done. Emigration from the Baltics involves 
a substantial number of young and low-skilled workers who, like many of their Polish 
counterparts, will therefore probably fill low-skilled positions upon their return. Hence, a 
skill transfer is unlikely to occur. Since many of the emigrants will not return, the 
diasporas of countries in the region are expected to grow. This can be positive, especially 
if they stay attached to the country of origin. However, maintaining links with the 
diaspora requires ongoing investment. Business networks require continuous 
maintenance; political involvement requires infrastructure; identifying and networking 
professionals requires effort; language training requires ongoing support to teachers, 
students, and schools. Systematic evaluation of these investments should be taken into 
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account in assessing policy impact. State-led and grassroots initiatives each have a role to 
play. Employers develop initiatives in matching the skills of returning migrants to labour 
market needs, and business networks play a role in attracting investments and leveraging 
human and financial capital to promote economic growth, opening markets and fostering 
innovation. State institutions need to be able to evolve to meet changing economic 
circumstances and flows of emigration.
1. EMIGRATION FROM THE BALTIC STATES: ECONOMIC IMPACT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS – 25
COPING WITH EMIGRATION IN BALTIC AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES © OECD 2013
References
Adams, R. and J. Page (2003), “International Migration, Remittances and Poverty in 
Developing Countries”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 3179, 
December.
Anniste, K., T. Tammaru, E. Pungas and T. Paas (2012), “Dynamics of Educational 
Differences in Emigration from Estonia to the Old EU Member States”, NORFACE 
Migration Discussion Paper, No. 2012-17.
Carling, J. (2008a), “Interrogating Remittances: Core Questions for Deeper Insight and 
Better Policies”, in S. Castles and R.D. Wise (eds), Migration and Development: 
Perspectives from the South, International Organization for Migration, Geneva, 
pp. 43-64.
Carling, J. (2008b), “The Determinants of Migrant Remittances”, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 581-598.
Da Fonseca, E. (2012), “Political Representation of Nationals Abroad”, Presentation at 
the international conference on “The Economic Impact of Emigration in Latvia and 
the Other Baltic Countries: Challenges and Policy Implications”, co-organised by the 
Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the OECD, 17 December 2012, Riga.
Damusis, G. (2012), “Global Lithuania: From challenge to opportunity”, Presentation at 
the international conference on “The Economic Impact of Emigration in Latvia and 
the Other Baltic Countries: Challenges and Policy Implications”, co-organised by the 
Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the OECD, 17 December 2012, Riga.
De Haas, H. (2007), “Remittances, Migration and Social Development: A Conceptual 
Review of Literature”, Social Policy and Development Programme Paper, No. 34, 
UNRISD, Geneva.
De Haas, H. (2006), “Engaging Diasporas. How Governments and Development 
Agencies Can Support Diaspora Involvement in the Development of Origin Countries. 
A study for Oxfam Novib”, accessible online at www.heindehaas.com/
Publications/de%20Haas%202006%20-%20Engaging%20Diasporas.pdf.
Düvell, F. and D. Vogel (2006), “Polish Migrants: Tensions Between Sociological 
Typologies and State Categories”, in A. Triandafyllidou (ed.), Contemporary Polish 
Migration in Europe. Complex Patterns of Movement and Settlement, Edwin Mellen 
Press, Lewiston, United States, pp. 267-289.
Eade, J., S. Drinkwater and M. Garapich (2007), “Class and Ethnicity: Polish Migrant 
Workers in London. Full Research Report. ESRC End of Award Report. RES-000-22-
1294”, Economic and Social Research Council, Swindon.
26 – 1. EMIGRATION FROM THE BALTIC STATES: ECONOMIC IMPACT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
COPING WITH EMIGRATION IN BALTIC AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES © OECD 2013
Engbersen, G. (2012), “Migration Transitions in an Era of Liquid Migration. Reflections 
on Fassmann & Reeger”, in M. Okólski (ed.), Europe: The Continent of Immigrants: 
Trends, Structures and Policy Implications, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 
pp. 91-105.
Engbersen, G., A. Leerkes, I. Grabowska-Lusinska, E. Snel and J. Burgers (2013), “On 
the Differentiated Attachments of Migrants from Central and Eastern Europe. 
A Typology of Labour Migration”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 39, 
N° 6, pp. 959-981, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.765663.
Friberg, J.H. (2013), “The Stages of Migration. From Going Abroad to Settling Down: 
Post-accession Polish Workers in Norway”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
(forthcoming).
Gardner, K. (2012), “Diaspora Partnerships: An Irish Experience”, Presentation at the 
international conference on “The Economic Impact of Emigration in Latvia and the 
Other Baltic Countries: Challenges and Policy Implications”, co-organised by the 
Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the OECD, 17 December 2012, Riga.
Gornischeff, P. (2012), “Quo Vadis Estonian Talen? Talents Back Home. Lessons 
Learned”, Presentation at the international conference on “The Economic Impact of 
Emigration in Latvia and the Other Baltic Countries: Challenges and Policy 
Implications”, co-organised by the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the OECD, 
17 December 2012, Riga.
Grabowska-Lusinska, I. and M. Okólski (2009), Emigracja Ostatnia?, Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw.
Handjiski, B. (2012), “Remittance Trends, Diaspora Bonds and Remittance-Backed 
Securities”, Presentation at the international conference on “The Economic Impact of 
Emigration in Latvia and the Other Baltic Countries: Challenges and Policy 
Implications”, co-organised by the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the OECD, 
17 December 2012, Riga.
IOM – International Organization for Migration (2011), “Migration Profile: Lithuania”, 
accessible online at www.iom.lt/documents/Migration_profile_EN.pdf.
IOM (2006), “Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners for Home and Destination 
Countries: Challenges for Policymakers”, IOM, Genera, accessible online at 
www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/se
rial_publications/mrs26%20interior.pdf.
Ketkar, S.L. and D. Ratha (2006), “Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic 
Implications of Remittances and Migration. Development Finance Via Diaspora 
Bonds Track Record and Potential”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper,
No. 4311, Washington, DC.
Mereuta, C. (2012), “Mobilising Migrant’s Skills and Recourses – The Case of 
Romania”, Paper prepared for the international conference on “The Economic Impact 
of Emigration in Latvia and the Other Baltic Countries: Challenges and Policy 
Implications”, co-organised by the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the OECD, 
17 December 2012, Riga. 
Newland, K. and P. Erin (2004), “Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty 
Reduction in their Countries of Origin”, A Scoping Study by the Migration Policy 
Institute for the Department of International Development.
1. EMIGRATION FROM THE BALTIC STATES: ECONOMIC IMPACT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS – 27
COPING WITH EMIGRATION IN BALTIC AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES © OECD 2013
OECD (2012), Connecting with Migrants: A Global Profile of Diasporas, OECD 
Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264177949-en.
Platonova, I. (2012), “Supporting Measures to Foster Return Migration”, Presentation at 
the international conference on “The Economic Impact of Emigration in Latvia and 
the Other Baltic Countries: Challenges and Policy Implications”, co-organised by the 
Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the OECD, 17 December 2012, Riga.
Reid, J. (2012), “GlobalScot: An International Business Network”, Presentation at the 
international conference on “The Economic Impact of Emigration in Latvia and the 
Other Baltic Countries: Challenges and Policy Implications”, co-organised by the 
Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the OECD, 17 December 2012, Riga.
Saxe, L. et al. (2011), “Jewish Futures Project. The Impact of Taglit-Birthright Israel”, 
accessible online at www.birthrightisrael.com/TaglitBirthrightIsraelStory/Research/
Documents/Jewish.Futures.02.08.11.pdf.
Schnytzer, T. (2012), “Birthright Israel”, Presentation at the international conference on 
“The Economic Impact of Emigration in Latvia and the Other Baltic Countries: 
Challenges and Policy Implications”, co-organised by the Latvian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the OECD, 17 December 2012, Riga.
Vehkanen, M. (2012), “Finnish Language and Culture”, Presentation at the international 
conference on “The Economic Impact of Emigration in Latvia and the Other Baltic 
Countries: Challenges and Policy Implications”, co-organised by the Latvian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the OECD, 17 December 2012, Riga.

2. EMIGATION FROM ESTONIA: RECENT TRENDS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT – 29
COPING WITH EMIGRATION IN BALTIC AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES © OECD 2013
Chapter 2
Emigration from Estonia:
Recent trends and economic impact
Veronika Kaska
This chapter analyses the general demographic trends causing concern in Estonia:
decreasing population and increasing emigration flows, especially among those of 
working age. The implications of accession to the European Union and the gradual 
opening of European labour markets are assessed, in terms of the characteristics of 
emigrants. The profile of emigrants is explored (age, education, etc.). Possible economic 
implications of emigration are discussed, in light of data limitations. Government policy 
in the area is described, as well as specific initiatives to favour return.
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Introduction
The total population in Estonia has diminished by almost 7% over the past 15 years due 
to low birth rates and negative net migration. The Estonian population is ageing; the share of 
children and young adults has dropped dramatically during the past decade (OECD, 2011).
In recent years, heated public debate has occurred over whether emigration
constitutes a problem for Estonia and if so, to what extent. Debate may also be fuelled by 
a lack of reliable statistical data necessary to assess emigration and its effects. One 
question is whether the impact is due to emigration itself, or to the fact that people do not
come back. For example, a 2009 youth conference of the Estonian Co-operation 
Assembly considered the latter, rather than the former, as constituting a problem (Tamm, 
2009). Emigration has also emerged as a political issue in Estonia, since the Estonian 
Centrist Party, in their 2011 election campaign,1 cited high unemployment and people 
(especially doctors) going abroad to find work.
This chapter looks at the trends in emigration from Estonia and uses available data to 
sketch the profile of the average emigrant. The chapter will also give a brief overview of 
the measures taken to encourage the return Estonian migrants. Finally, the author draws
conclusions regarding the economic impact of emigration on Estonia.
General data on emigration from Estonia
Having regained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Estonia 
became a country of emigration, as relocation to Western European countries became 
easier. Since then, Estonia has experienced two significant waves of emigration, the first in 
the 1990s and the second in the 2000s. Emigration from Estonia to the older EU member 
states2 increased in the 2000s compared to the 1990s (Pungas et al., 2012). This chapter 
focuses on the second wage of emigration, concentrating on data from 2004 on. This date is 
also used because the collection of migration data by Statistics Estonia became more 
systematic following the entry into force in 2002 of a law regulating resident registration 
(Anniste, 2009). Nonetheless, data on emigration are still incomplete, as people do not 
always deregister in Estonia when moving to another country. This is a common 
phenomenon in most emigration countries (Anniste et al., 2012).
A much-anticipated census was carried out in Estonia between 31 December 2011 
and 31 March 2012 (Statistics Estonia, 2011). The results of the census confirmed what 
was already widely assumed and in line with general demographic trends affecting most 
countries in Europe.
The trends confirmed by the census are declining population (especially in the age the 
group 15-64, namely working age), declining births, and an increase in the number of 
older people. Figure 2.1 illustrates Estonia’s population, based on the 2011 census data. A 
total of 1 294 236 residents were counted, down from 1 370 052 in 2000. Moreover, 
according to Statistics Estonia, preliminary data show that the estimated size of the 
population in Estonia on 1 January 2013 was 1 286 540 (and has thus decreased by 
another 0.6%). The decline observed was mainly attributed to increases in emigration and 
deaths. In 2012, 10 871 persons emigrated, 4 657 more than the previous year. During the 
same period, 4 416 persons immigrated to Estonia. Thus, in 2012 Estonia recorded the 
highest negative net migration since the year 2000 (6 455) (Statistics Estonia, 2013).
A country’s population increases as a result of births or immigration, and decreases 
due to deaths or emigration (Narusk, 2012). The aforementioned trends, coupled with the 
fact that Estonia is increasingly an emigration country, may well explain the 5.5% decline 
in the size of the country’s population between 2000 and 2011.
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Figure 2.1. Estonian population pyramid, 2000 vs. 2012
Source: Statistics Estonia.
Population decline between 2000 and 2011 was in fact greater than that estimated by
Statistics Estonia, according to which, during the intercensual period, Estonia’s 
population decreased by 54 333 persons, with 32 409 persons lost due to negative natural 
increase and 22 024 persons lost due to negative net migration. The main reasons for the 
difference between the census figures and the Statistics Estonia estimates are unregistered 
migration and census non-compliance. It is estimated that about 2.1% of permanent 
residents were not enumerated in the 2011 census for various reasons (Narusk, 2012). The 
census did reveal however, that 30 444 residents (2.4% of the total population) have left 
Estonia and moved abroad (ibid.). This number includes both registered and unregistered 
migration. Unfortunately, these are not exact figures, due to limits in census coverage, but 
they do provide a better indication of the magnitude of emigration (ibid.). Available data 
(Figure 2.2) shows that migration to and from Estonia is not large. Still, net migration has 
remained negative throughout the past eight years, and 2011 emigration data show that 
the annual number of people who emigrate corresponds to close to 0.5% of the total 
population of Estonia.
Figure 2.2. Migration to and from Estonia, 2004-11
Source: Statistics Estonia.
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Emigrant population profile
Due to reasons explained above, the available data on emigration are ambiguous. 
Nonetheless, a few recent studies provide a good basis for putting together an emigrant 
population profile.
The Bank of Estonia has analysed the structure of the emigrant population on the 
basis of a survey (Randveer and Rõõm, 2009) carried out in January 2008. The survey 
targeted company managers and its aim was to collect information on work-related 
migration to and from Estonia in 2007. The methodological approach to data collection 
adopted in this study, namely the administration of questionnaires to company managers, 
is new, and has the limitation that the sample is restricted to employed persons. The 
survey focussed mainly on emigration patterns: Which types of workers emigrate from 
Estonia? Are they predominantly young people? What is their average level of education? 
Are they mostly men or women, native Estonians or people of other nationalities? The 
survey covered a significant part of the Estonian labour force. The companies that 
participated in the survey employed 54 500 people, corresponding to approximately 9% 
of Estonian wage earners (ibid.).
International experience reveals that the likelihood of emigration is higher among 
individuals that are young, male and have higher education. Studies analysing 
immigration from new3 to old EU member states to the old member states of the 
European Union have confirmed that indeed younger people are more likely to move than 
older people (Randveer and Rõõm, 2009). A World Bank report (2006) however, argues 
that the migration of younger people decreases in the presence of restrictions on 
immigration (e.g. requirements of tertiary education or substantial work experience).
The gradual lifting of restrictions on immigration after Estonia joined the European 
Union in 2004 affected the structure of the Estonian emigrant population as well.
The Bank of Estonia survey found that the average migrant from Estonia is a young 
person (between 15-34 years of age), a blue-collar worker and male. Results also 
indicated that the tendency to emigrate was strongest among construction sector 
employees (Randveer and Rõõm, 2009).
The findings were in line with those of another survey, on migration intentions and 
behaviour among Estonian residents, conducted in 2010 on behalf of the Ministry of 
Social Affairs. This survey found that working in another country tends to attract people 
aged 15-24. The preferred jobs abroad were predominantly less skilled, and included the 
following occupations, in order of preference: construction worker, other elementary 
worker, cleaner and room attendant, customer service assistant, or chauffeur and bus 
driver. The preferred sectors of employment abroad were construction, transport and 
storing and processing industry. Men were three times more likely than women to express 
a definite wish to work abroad in the future (17.5% and 6.5%, respectively), and were 
also more likely to have taken practical steps to that end (Veidemann, 2010).
A study conducted among emigrants from Estonia to Finland confirmed that, 
compared to the general population of Estonia, migrants are significantly younger and 
their educational level is lower. The proportion of university-educated people in the 
emigrant population is much lower than in the general Estonian population, and has 
further decreased since Estonia joined the European Union in 2004 (Anniste et al., 2012).
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These findings are at odds with evidence both from other countries and from earlier 
emigration periods, which overwhelmingly show that the tendency to migrate is greater 
among people with higher education (Randveer and Rõõm, 2009).
This contradiction may be due to the link between restrictions on immigration and the 
age of emigrants, as suggested in the above-mentioned World Bank report. The gradual 
lifting of restrictions on immigration by old member states following Estonian accession to 
the European Union may have increased the proportion of younger and low-skilled 
individuals (characteristics which often coincide) among Estonian emigrants. These 
individuals had not been able to qualify under the labour migration regimes in most 
EU countries prior to accession. Other factors that may have contributed to this 
phenomenon are the demand for immigrant workers in low-skilled occupations in Western 
Europe, and the fact that such workers stood to experience a more substantial relative 
increase in earning after moving abroad (Randveer and Rõõm, 2009; Anniste et al., 2012).
Surveys estimating the emigration potential in the Estonian working-age population 
were also conducted in 2000, 2003 and 2006. Data from these surveys were compared with 
data from the 2010 survey to assess current and future trends. The 2010 survey confirmed 
that, even in times of economic crisis, people view working abroad as a last resort, 
Compared to earlier years, in 2010 the number of people intending to work abroad had 
increased. While in 2006 the share of the working-age population who had considered 
going abroad was 26% and the estimated migration potential 3.9% (about 36 000 people),
in 2010 as many as 38% had considered migration, and the estimated migration potential 
had increased to 8.5% (about 77 000 people). Noteworthy is also the fact that 13% of 
potential migrants would consider leaving their state of residence (or country of origin) 
permanently (Veidemann, 2010). It should be borne in mind, of course, that intentions to 
migrate are more common than migration itself. Estonian emigrants preferred Nordic 
destination countries, particularly Finland, which has remained the main destination country 
for westward migration from Estonia. Previously attractive destinations like Ireland and 
Great Britain have lost their importance. For young people, Australia and the United States 
of America are popular destinations (Veidemann, 2010; Anniste et al., 2012).
It may thus be concluded that the average migrant from Estonia is a male blue-collar 
worker aged 15-34, moving to Finland to work in the construction sector.
Measures to encourage return
Analyses of international migration have recognised that return migration is a central 
issue in understanding the implications of the international mobility of workers for the 
origin country. More than 30% of migrants return to their home country within two 
decades, and many of them go abroad to enhance their skills (Mayr and Peri, 2009).
Similarly, there is evidence that a large portion of recent migration from new to old 
EU member states is temporary in nature (Randveer and Rõõm, 2009). This may be due 
to the motives behind the decision to migrate, the most prevalent of which is the wish to 
earn a higher salary (Veidemann, 2010). This push factor means that many migrants are 
undeterred by the prospect of working in a job which does not match their qualifications, 
as long as they are earning more than they were in their origin country. The frequent 
consequence is the deskilling of migrant workers (Anniste et al., 2012).
One survey conducted among Estonians in Finland showed that the probability of 
return is especially high during the first five years after arrival and decreases steadily 
thereafter. The probability of return was greater for those offered employment in Estonia 
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in a more prestigious occupation. Unemployment often increases the probability of 
migrant return, but in the case of Estonian migrants in Finland, the inclination of the 
unemployed to leave Finland was much lower than that of the employed, possibly due to 
better welfare benefits in the host state. Interestingly, the level of education was not 
associated with the intention to return. Adults were generally more motivated to improve 
their education once in the country of destination, even if studying was not the primary 
goal of their departure from Estonia. No association was found between migrants’
intentions to return and their occupational category or income (Pungas et al., 2012).
Considering phenomena such as the risk of deskilling, or the potential for upskilling 
abroad, emigration countries are clearly interested in encouraging migrants to move back 
home.
In 2008, Estonian citizens made up 48% of immigrants to Estonia, a share of 
nationals among immigrants second only to Poland (75%) and Lithuania (68%) (Oblak 
Flander, 2011). The number of Estonian nationals fell slightly in 2009 and 2010, but 
peaked in 2011, when returning nationals constituted over 50% of immigrants to Estonia 
(see Figure 2.3).
The incumbent Government of the Republic of Estonia, a coalition government formed 
by the Reform Party and the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, agreed upon a Coalition 
Programme for the years 2011-15.4 While widely acknowledging population decline and 
increasing emigration as problems, the programme does not contain specific measures to 
contrast emigration or lure Estonian migrants back home. Instead, it aims to make Estonia a 
better place to live by increasing the quality of life and stimulating the creation of a living 
environment with the intended result of increasing life expectancy and births.5
Although the Coalition Programme does not include specific measures to be 
implemented, a population policy is in force, as defined in “The Principles of Estonian 
Population Policy for 2009-13”.6 This document discusses the importance of measures to 
encourage return migration, including: informing people of Estonian descent living 
outside of Estonia about the possibilities of studying in Estonia, and of returning to 
Estonia (including eligibility for counsel and financial aid), the acquisition and restoration 
of Estonian citizenship and the facilitation of re-integration.
Figure 2.3. Immigrants to Estonia, by nationality, and the share of Estonian nationals among immigrants
to Estonia, 2004-11
Source: Statistics Estonia.
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The state also emphasizes the importance of developing and maintaining cultural 
relations with Estonian communities abroad. The government has therefore adopted the 
Compatriots’ Programme in 2003 (including a website7) to co-ordinate the work of 
different ministries in supporting Estonian communities abroad as the carriers of cultural 
identity. 
Two measures have been implemented in order to encourage return migration to 
Estonia. The first, return support, has been in place since 2004 and has aided in the return 
of 636 people. The second was a two-year project to attract highly educated Estonians 
back, which resulted in the return of 27 individuals. Though both measures have the same 
aim, the target groups of these two measures are quite different.
Return support
An established measure for motivating Estonians all over the world to move back to 
Estonia is financial and other kinds of “return support”. Return support is provided by the 
Integration and Migration Foundation Our People.8
The foundation was originally established by the Republic of Estonia in 19989 and is 
currently managed by the Ministry of Culture.10 Its statutory purpose11 is to initiate and 
support activities related to immigration and emigration, including common activities 
involving both Estonians and non-Estonians, aimed at facilitating the integration of
non-Estonians into Estonian society. The foundation also counsels people returning to or 
leaving Estonia on migration issues, and offers them financial support, if necessary, in 
case of return migration, emigration or expulsion. Under the Constitution of the Republic 
of Estonia, every ethnic Estonian and Estonian citizen has the right to settle in Estonia. 
The terms “ethnic Estonian” and “Estonian citizen” have different meanings. Ethnicity is 
primarily a matter of self-definition. Possible objective criteria for establishing ethnicity 
can be knowledge of the Estonian language or direct descent from an ethnic Estonian, but 
these characteristics do not define someone unequivocally as an Estonian.12 This means 
that the target population of return support is quite large.
Integration and Migration Foundation “Our People” supports return migration to 
Estonia by paying relocation support (up to EUR 2 000 per adult) to ethnic Estonians and 
Estonian citizens who have resided abroad for at least ten years or were born there.
Application for return support can be submitted only after entry into the Population 
Register of Estonia, but no later than six months after resettling in Estonia. An entry in 
the Population Register is made if a person is an Estonian citizen or holds a valid 
residence permit (for non-EU citizens) or right (for EU citizens and their family 
members).13
Eligibility criteria for return support are:
x emigration from Estonia at least ten years ago or birth in a foreign country
x the person has retained ties with the Estonian culture or wishes to join it
x the person requires financial aid due to his or her financial or social background
x in the course of the programme it has been noted that the main reasons for returning 
to Estonia are family reunification and better living and work prospects (Kaska, 
2010).
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As shown in Table 2.1, the number of returning Estonians applying for support has 
been rather constant during the last eight years. An exceptionally large number of people 
returned in 2007 and 2008, which may be explained by rapid economic growth and the 
subsequent availability of jobs.
Table 2.1. Return support statistics, 2004-11
Source: “Integration and Migration Foundation Our People. Return Support”, available online at 
www.meis.ee/tagasiranne-eng, accessed on 7 November 2012.
Despite the large target group, restrictive criteria limit the number of potential 
applicants for relocation support, especially in light of the fact that the probability of 
return migration decreases after five years abroad (Pungas et al., 2012). To improve the 
efficacy of the programme, it may be worth reassessing the eligibility criteria for return 
support, e.g. shortening the required time abroad to five years. If abuse of the measure is 
feared, then additional post-return residence requirements may be imposed (e.g. 
five years minimum residency in Estonia prior to new relocation, etc.).
“Talents Back Home!”
Another measure to attract those who had emigrated was the two-year project 
“Talents Back Home!” carried out by the Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
as of October 2010 and financed by the European Social Fund.
The aim of the project was to entice students who had gone to study in universities 
abroad, graduates of foreign universities and Estonian citizens who had obtained a 
significant work experience abroad, to come back to Estonia, by offering them work and 
self-realisation in either the private or the public sector.14 Prior research showed that there 
were between 4 000 and 4 500 young Estonians studying abroad, and that about 89% of 
them were ready to return to Estonia if a good offer came along. Timing was especially 
important for the target group, e.g. a job offer in time for graduation or when the children 
reach school age. The main elements cited by respondents as possible reasons to return 
were (Niitra, 2012):
x pay which would guarantee a good standard of living (82.9%)
x challenge (65.3%)
x work environment (64.8%)
x a job with an international dimension (61.1%)
x closeness of family and friends (56.5%)
x begin career at a higher position (39.7%)
x ease of return (23.9%).
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of recipients of 
return support
36 12 40 144 242 42 66 54
Total amount paid (EUR) 25 373 12 591 50 810 128 143 121 911 44 419 51 257 55 070
Average support received 
per applicant (EUR)
705 1 049 1 270 890 504 1 058 777 1 020
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At the beginning of October 2010, the Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
launched an internet portal (www.talendidkoju.ee) where talented young adults studying 
abroad could find information regarding work and internship offers in Estonia, and where 
companies could use the contact network of those studying abroad in order to find 
employees. As early as mid-October 2010 it was reported that interest in the project had 
been greater than anticipated. Soon, 220 highly qualified Estonians from 35 different 
countries had registered at the website and expressed an interest in returning to Estonia 
(Kass, 2010).
The project ended in October 2012, with 27 people having returned to Estonia from 
abroad. The authors of the final report conclude that, considering the difficulty of return, 
the result was good. The offer of a challenging and well-paid job was found to be a
prerequisite for return. A total of 743 people, most of whom hold Master’s or Doctoral 
degrees, uploaded their resumes on the website (Traks, 2012). This suggests that the 
programme attracted the highest educated.
Economic impact
Emigration has become increasingly significant, not only because of its scale but also 
because of the mounting evidence of its impact on development (World Bank, 2006). The 
movement of people and jobs means that the challenge of matching skills and jobs, while 
primarily country specific, also has a global dimension. Migration has implications for 
living standards and productivity at both the sending and the receiving ends, and they can 
transform families and entire communities, for better or for worse (World Bank, 2012). 
Conversely, since the beginning of the global economic crisis in 2007-08, numerous 
forecasts have been made about the potential effects of the crisis and of ensuing recovery 
on migration. These predictions, however, pertained to developing countries where the 
sudden return of large numbers of migrant workers may seriously compromise economic 
stability, due both to an inability of local markets to absorb them, and to the loss of 
remittances previously sent back by the now returning migrants. Interestingly, data from 
the United Kingdom show that, unlike migrants from Africa, Bangladesh and Pakistan, 
Eastern and Central European nationals were relatively unscathed by the rise in 
joblessness due to the economic crisis (IOM, 2011). This may explain the ever increasing 
emigration from Estonia and the stable numbers of returning nationals throughout the 
economic crisis. The finding that migrants who have a job are more likely to have 
intentions to return implies that origin countries stand to gain from intra-European 
migration, while destination countries stand to lose (Mayr and Peri, 2010). These people 
have accumulated foreign work experience that could be an important factor in 
stimulating growth in their countries of origin (Pungas et al., 2012).
Similar positive conclusions were drawn by the Estonian Minister of Economic 
Affairs and Communications, Mr. Juhan Parts, when answering an inquiry by 
six members of the Estonian Parliament, the Riigikogu, on 14 June 2010. The inquiry 
addressed the cost to the Estonian economy of worker migration, and included the 
following questions: How has worker migration influenced the Estonian economy and 
can such emigration threaten the development of the Estonian economy? What measures 
is the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications planning to take in order to 
ensure that top specialists do not leave Estonia? How can the Ministry ensure that those 
who leave Estonia for employment reasons come back to Estonia after the crisis?
The Minister of Economic Affairs and Communications found that the number of 
emigrants is too small to significantly influence Estonia’s wage and employment levels. 
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He added however, that temporary emigration might prove useful in case of high 
unemployment. Positive aspects of temporary emigration are remittances, and the 
enhancement of people’s knowledge and skills. Estonia should therefore not try to 
suppress emigration, but rather try to encourage return through projects like “Talents 
Back Home!”. The influence of permanent migration, on the other hand, is negative, due 
to brain drain, decreasing productivity, and the loss of investments made by the state in 
educating those who end up leaving the country.15
As we have seen, adult Estonian emigrants were more motivated than younger 
emigrants to improve their education once in Finland. Another finding was that the 
willingness to return to Estonia, on the part of individuals who had obtained at least part 
of their education in Finland, decreased considerably as the duration of their stay in 
Finland increased (see note 15). Thus emigration holds promise for the origin country, 
since migrants obtain valuable work experience and may improve their level of education, 
but only if the migrant’s stay in the destination country is temporary, even short-term, in 
nature.
As noted, the emigrant population is mostly made up of young blue-collar male 
workers. The portion of blue-collar workers among emigrants increased in 2010 as 
compared to 2006 (Veidemann, 2010). These workers also represent the biggest share of 
registered unemployed persons in Estonia.16 Unemployment in the third quarter of 2012 
was 9.7% (68 000 persons) (Statistics Estonia, 2012). In the first half of 2012, levels of 
education among the registered unemployed were as follows: 17% with primary 
education, 57% with secondary education, and 29% with vocational secondary or higher 
education (Viilman and Soosaar, 2012). The European Commission has pointed out that 
one of the main challenges for Estonia is an insufficient supply of competent human 
capital. As one-third of the labour force has no professional education, the available skills 
and qualifications do not match labour market needs (European Commission, 2012).
In light of the apparent compatibility between the profile of the migrant population, 
and that of the population of (registered) unemployed people in Estonia, would it thus be 
possible to conclude that emigration is beneficial to the Estonian economy and labour 
market? To some extent perhaps, but due to the relatively small number of migrants, 
according to the Minister of Economic Affairs and Communications, such effect would in 
any event not be significant.
It has been shown that migrants wish to improve their education while in the country 
of destination. Could Estonia then expect to gain a more experienced and qualified labour 
force once the emigrants return? Available data do not provide enough of a scientific 
basis for such a conclusion. In any case, in light of the small emigration flows, it may 
only come true if a majority of those leaving Estonia do in fact improve their level of 
education and do eventually return.
Conclusion
General demographic trends that are causing concern in many countries around the 
world – decreasing population and increasing emigration flows – can also be observed in 
Estonia. These trends are especially evident in the working-age population. Accession to 
the European Union and the gradual opening of European labour markets has meant that 
more Estonians, especially young and low-skilled workers, move abroad, either 
temporarily or permanently. As studies indicate that the average emigrant is a blue-collar 
male, brain drain (the loss of highly qualified individuals) may not constitute a major 
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problem. Data is still insufficient, however, to firmly make such a claim. The Estonian 
diaspora in Finland – Estonian emigrants’ major destination country – has been studied 
thoroughly. These studies provide a good basis for understanding the reasons and nature 
of Estonian emigration to Finland, but their results cannot necessarily be generalised to 
all Estonian emigrants.
While aware of the negative aspects of emigration, especially if permanent, the 
Estonian Government also sees the advantages that can be gained from temporary 
migration – foreign work experience, improved skills and remittances. The government 
does not consider it necessary to stop people from leaving Estonia, but has taken 
measures to encourage the return of Estonian emigrants. Without necessarily attributing 
the fact to the measures in question, it should be noted that much of the immigration to 
Estonia is actually return migration.
At any rate, in the absence of reliable data definite assertions cannot be made
regarding the influence of emigration to Estonia’s economy. The Minister of Economic 
Affairs and Communications considers the number of people emigrating too small to 
have any significant impact on either unemployment or wages. Still, with a population as
small as that of Estonia’s, even the flutter of a butterfly’s wings may have an effect.
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Notes
1. Available on Youtube at www.youtube.com/watch?v=3xFECQcY5L8, accessed on
7 November 2012.
2. Denotes those countries that have been members of the European Union prior to 
2004, i.e. France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, Austria, Italy, 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, Denmark Sweden, Finland, Ireland and the United Kingdom.
3. Denotes those countries that joined the European Union in 2004.
4. The “Coalition Programme of the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union and the Reform 
Party” is available online at https://valitsus.ee/UserFiles/valitsus/et/valitsus/
tegevusprogramm/valitsuse-tegevusprogramm/Valitsusliidu%20programm%202011-
2015.pdf, accessed on 7 November 2012.
5. “Report of the Prime Minister Candidate to the Riigikogu on the Bases of Forming a 
Government”, available online at http://valitsus.ee/et/valitsus/peaminister-ja-
ministrid/andrus-ansip/peaministri-koned-ja-seisukohad/31242/peaministrikandidaadi
-ettekanne-riigikogule-valitsuse-moodustamise-alustest-5-aprill-2011, accessed on 
7 November 2012.
6. “The Principles of Estonian Population Policy 2009-2013”, available online at 
www.valitsus.ee/failid/Rahvastikupoliitika_alused_muudetud.pdf, accessed on 
14 November 2012.
7. Available online at www.eesti.ee/rahvuskaaslased/index.php?lang=en. accessed on
14 November 2012.
8. “Integration and Migration Foundation Our People. Return support”, available online 
at www.meis.ee/tagasiranne-eng, accessed on 7 November 2012.
9. 31 March 1998 Order No. 263 of the Government of the Republic “Establishment of 
the Non-Estonian Integration Foundation”, RT I 1998, 33, 471.
10. 11 June 2009 Order No. 236 of the Government of the Republic “Amendments of 
Orders of the Government of the Republic in Relation to Handing Over Tasks of a 
Minister”, RTL 2009, 48, 700.
11. “Statute of the Integration and Migration Foundation Our People”, Directive No. 303 
of the Minister of Culture, approved on 25 August 2010, available online at 
www.meis.ee/pohikiri, accessed on 14 November 2012.
12. The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, Commented Edition, Second 
supplemented edition (2008), Juura Publishing House, Tallinn.
13. Available online at www.meis.ee/pohikiri, accessed on 14 November 2012.
14. Press Release of the Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, available online at 
www.koda.ee/uudised/pressiteated/kaubandus-toostuskoja-talendid-koju-projekt-
kutsub-noori-eestlasi-kodumaale-toole/, accessed on 14 November 2012.
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15. Shorthand records of the 7th sitting of the 11th Riigikogu, 14 June 2010, available 
online at www.riigikogu.ee/?op=steno&stcommand=stenogramm&day=15&date
=1276517100&pkpkaupa=1&paevakord=6701#pk6701, accessed on 7 November 
2012.
16. Based on data from the Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund 31 October 2012, 
available online at www.tootukassa.ee/index.php?id=13558, accessed on 
14 November 2012.
42 – 2. EMIGATION FROM ESTONIA: RECENT TRENDS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
COPING WITH EMIGRATION IN BALTIC AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES © OECD 2013
References
Anniste, K. (2009), “External Migration of Estonia in 2000-2007”, in T. Tammaru and 
A. Tammur (eds.), Migration, Statistics Estonia, Tallinn.
Anniste, K., T. Tammaru, E. Pungas and T. Paas (2012), “Emigration After 
EU Enlargement: Was There a Brain Drain Effect in the Case of Estonia?”, Faculty of 
Economics and Business Administration Working Paper Series, No. 87, University of 
Tartu, www.mtk.ut.ee/orb.aw/class=file/action=preview/id=1158427/febawb87.htm.
European Commission (2012), “Position of the Commission Services on the 
Development of Partnership Agreement and Programmes in Estonia for the Period 
2014-2020”, Ref. Ares (2012)1283813, 30 October 2012.
IOM – International Organization for Migration (2011), World Migration Report 2011: 
Communicating Effectively About Migration, IOM, Geneva.
Kaska, V. (2010), “Temporary and Circular Migration: Empirical Evidence, Current 
Policy Practice and Future Options in Estonia”, Estonian Academy of Security 
Sciences, Tallinn.
Kass, M. (2010), “Koju pöördumise vastu tunneb huvi oodatust rohkem talente”. 
Postimees online article, www.postimees.ee/326174/koju-poordumise-vastu-tunneb-
huvi-oodatust-rohkem-talente/.
Mayr, K. and G. Peri (2009), “Brain Drain and Brain Return: Theory and Application to 
Eastern-Western Europe”, Department of Economics Vienna Economics Papers,
No. 0907, University of Vienna, www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gperi/publications/
mayr_peri_sept_09.pdf.
Narusk, E. (ed.) (2012), Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics Estonia, No. 4. Statistics Estonia, 
available online at http://www.stat.ee/57666.
Niitra, S. (2010), “Enamik välismaal õppivaid noori tahab Eestisse tagasi”, Tarbija24 
online article, www.tarbija24.ee/323216/enamik-valismaal-oppivaid-noori-tahab-
eestisse-tagasi/.
Oblak Flander, A. (2011), “Immigration to EU Member States Down by 6% and 
Emigration Up by 13% in 2008”, Population and Social Conditions, No. 1, Eurostat, 
Luxembourg.
OECD (2011), Estonia: Towards a Single Government Approach, OECD Public 
Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
9789264104860-en.
Pungas, E., O. Toomet, T. Tammaru and K. Anniste (2012), “Are Better Educated 
Migrants Returning? Evidence from Multi-Dimensional Education Data”, NORFACE 
Migration Discussion Paper, No. 2012-18, www.norface-migration.org/
publ_uploads/NDP_18_12.pdf.
2. EMIGATION FROM ESTONIA: RECENT TRENDS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT – 43
COPING WITH EMIGRATION IN BALTIC AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES © OECD 2013
Randveer, M. and T. Rõõm (2009), “The Structure of Migration in Estonia: Survey-Based 
Evidence”, Working Paper Series, No. 1, Bank of Estonia, www.eestipank.ee/en/
publication/working-papers/2009/martti-randveer-tairi-room-structure-migration-
estonia-survey-based-evidence.
Statistics Estonia (2013), “Press Release No. 9”, 18 January.
Statistics Estonia (2012), “Press Release No. 144”, 14 November.
Statistics Estonia (2011), “Press Release No. 171”, 31 December. 
Tamm, M. (2009), “Eesti probleem pole mitte väljaränne, vaid mitte-tagasitulek”,
Postimees online article, www.postimees.ee/190831/eesti-probleem-pole-mitte-
valjaranne-vaid-mitte-tagasitulek/.
Traks, K. (ed.) (2012), “Talendid koju!”, Projekt tõi Eestisse tagasi 27 inimest, Juhtimine 
online article, www.juhtimine.ee/1010730/talendid-koju-projekt-toi-eestisse-tagasi-
27-inimest/.
Veidemann, B. (2010), “Migration Potential of Working-age Population in Estonia in 
2010”, Series of the Ministry of Social Affairs, No. 8, 
www.sm.ee/fileadmin/meedia/Dokumendid/V2ljaanded/Toimetised/2010/series_2010
8eng.pdf.
Viilman, N. and O. Soosaar (2012), “Tööturu ülevaade”, Eesti Pank, No. 2,
www.eestipank.ee/sites/default/files/publication/20121105_tooturu_ulevaade_2012_2
pa_est.pdf.
World Bank (2012), World Development Report 2013: Jobs, World Bank, Washington, DC.
World Bank (2006), World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next 
Generation, World Bank, Washington, DC.

3. THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF EMIGRATION ON LITHUANIA – 45
COPING WITH EMIGRATION IN BALTIC AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES © OECD 2013
Chapter 3
The social and economic impact of emigration on Lithuania
'U$XGUD6LSDYLþLHQơ
IOM Vilnius Office
and
3URI'U9ODGD6WDQNǌQLHQơ
Lithuanian Social Research Centre
This chapter examines migration flows from Lithuania, historically a country with 
significant emigration. The changing characteristics of this migration since 1990 and 
their relationship to economic conditions in Lithuania and EU accession are examined.
The distinction between declared and undeclared migration is explored. The impact of the 
2008-11 economic crisis on migration is described, including its impact on return 
migration and choice of destination country. The chapter examines the changing 
characteristics of emigrants, in terms of their age and family situation as well as their 
education level and employment status. The effect of remittances is discussed, and the 
chapter concludes with a review of policy responses in Lithuania. 
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Introduction
Socio-economic development and emigration are interrelated and in a relationship of 
reciprocal causality. On the one hand – socio-economic developments and economic 
problems are among the main causes of emigration. On the other, emigration, especially 
mass emigration, as in the Lithuanian case, directly and indirectly influences current and 
future social and economic development, and in many cases encourages further 
emigration. Emigration becomes an essential economic strategy, a main source of income 
for certain portions of the population. The impact of emigration differs depending on the 
period and on whether the national or the individual/family levels are considered. 
Nonetheless, in Lithuania, its potential impact on future social and economic 
development is rarely discussed. There is a widespread faith that return migration – which
has yet to occur in large numbers – will mitigate any negative impact. This chapter 
analyses migration as an integral part of social and economic development in Lithuania,
and the challenges it poses for policy makers.
Emigration: General trends
The Lithuanian population has always been characterised by high emigration rates. 
This was true during the pre-Soviet and Soviet periods, and it is true today.
According to data from the Statistics Lithuania (based on the 2011 census), over the 
past 22 years (1990-2011) 728 700 people emigrated from Lithuania, the equivalent of 
approximately 20% of the Lithuanian population of 1990s. In addition, population losses 
due to migration are accelerating: from 7.5% of the resident population (at the beginning 
of period) in 1990-2000 to 12.9% in 2001-11. Immigration remains low, and has only a 
symbolic compensatory effect. For the past decade Lithuania has had the highest negative 
net migration in the European Union. This situation, sometimes referred to by politicians 
as “evacuation”, has unfortunately not been effectively contrasted.
High emigration rates, sometimes claimed in media debates to be part of the 
“Lithuanian genetic code”, are the result not only of the current social economic situation, 
but also of past migration trends, and they reflect a migration culture formed over the past 
20 years. A brief overview of past migration may thus contribute to a better 
understanding of current situations and problems.
A brief overview of past migrations (1990-2008)
Analysing the phenomenon of emigration from Lithuania over the past decades 
(Figures 3.1 and 3.2) it is possible to identify several stages1 in terms of migration flows, 
models, strategies, and the interrelation between migration and socio-economic 
development.
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Figure 3.1. International migration in Lithuania, 1980-2012
Thousands
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
Figure 3.2. Registered and unregistered emigration from Lithuania, 1990-2012
Thousands
Note: For the years 1990-2000 current emigration statistics have been recalculated based on 2001 census results; for the 
years 2001-11, statistics have been recalculated based on 2011 census data.
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
1989/1990-1993: Repatriation, “de-Sovietisation” (free choice)
The last decade of the 20th century (1989/90-1993) witnessed an essential turn in 
migration trends: due to the opening of borders and other political developments,
emigration replaced immigration. The emigration of that period can be divided into two 
main categories: return migration/repatriation Russians, Belarussians, the Ukrainians) and 
the realisation of emigration potential accumulated during the Soviet period, involving, 
for example, Jews leaving Lithuania and the first tentative signs of Lithuanian emigration 
to the WHVW6LSDYLþLHQơDQG6WDQNǌQLHQơ(PLJUDWLRQGXULQJWKLVSHULRGWHQGHGWR
be long-term/permanent, legal, and declared.
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1992/1993-2003: Emigration as an economic/survival strategy
Since the beginning of the 1990s (1992-93), with the advancement of the market 
economy, new forms of migration emerged. A “petty trade” migration model first 
dominated, with short commercial cross-border visits to purchase and sell small volumes 
of merchandise. Migration turned westward, its geography expanded, long term migration 
gave way to different types of temporary or circular migration, and migration was often 
part of a business strategy. A stud carried out in 1993-6LSDYLþLHQơ)UHMNDet al.,
1998) indicated that during the period in question, the purpose of migration also started 
changing: from choice of residence to important economic (or even survival) strategy. 
Migrants went not to the closest countries, but to the countries where they could earn the 
most (e.g., through informal trading or employment) or where study was likely to provide 
the greatest return (Lietuva, 2004). In those years, over 80% of emigration was 
unregistered (Figure 3.2), and the scale of emigration remained high.
Late 1990s-early 2000s: The gradual shift to labour migration
“Commercial” or “petty trade” migration, which dominated the early 1990s, waned, 
and other forms of migration, such as labour migration, emerged. Research indicates only 
rare cases of migrants creating businesses in Lithuania with capital accumulated through 
working abroad. Labour migration, though still mainly unregistered and often employed 
in destination countries’ “shadow economies”, became better organised, frequently 
characterised by “chain migration” and operating through networks created by earlier 
migrants. Student migration – which in the early 1990s was mainly viewed as a way to 
obtain a visa and move abroad, sometimes for employment – gradually became de facto
migration for study, an investment in the student’s future. Brain drain remains intensive 
6WDQNǌQLHQơ  WKRXJK FDVHV RI GLUHFW ³EUDLQ ZDVWH”, when highly qualified 
scientists and specialists move for unqualified jobs, has diminished. Family reunification 
in destination countries has intensified, which marks the beginning of permanent 
PLJUDWLRQ6LSDYLþLHQơ
Migration models established during this period largely determined further migration
developments after Lithuania’s accession to the European Union. In Lithuania, 
expectations were that many Lithuanians already working in EU countries would acquire 
legal status upon accession. While this did occur, the numbers were not as great as 
forecast, and the shift to legal labour migration still took time to occur.
2004-08: legalisation/freedom of choice
European integration processes and the opening of EU labour markets heavily 
affected Lithuanian emigration, and in fact, EU countries are the most popular 
destinations during this period, with the United Kingdom and Ireland (the first to have 
opened their labour markets) as absolute leaders. The role of formal and informal 
migration networks increased (up to 80% of Lithuanian emigrants indicated that they 
found jobs abroad with the help of already established relatives, friends, etc.). These 
networks sometimes engaged in direct recruitment or even criminal activity – trafficking 
in human beings. Although the main causes of migration remained economic (Table 3.1), 
non-economic reasons such as “professional ambitions”, self-realisation, “adventure”, 
studies etc. became increasingly important, especially among young migrants.
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Table 3.1. Unregistered emigrants, reason for departure, 2001-07
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
Despite changed circumstances and contrary to broadly held expectations in 
Lithuania, a significant part of emigration remained unregistered. However, this was less 
related to immigration restrictions at the destination (as in the previous decade) than to 
other factors, such as a demand for cheap labour in the shadow economy, unrealistic 
expectations when emigrating (moving abroad for immediate economic benefit and 
staying on after failing to “fulfil the plan”), an attempt to retain social benefits or health
insurance in Lithuania, etc. (0DVODXVNDLWơ DQG6WDQNǌQLHQơ, 2007).
Emigration declined after 2005, while return migration, albeit almost symbolic, rose.
The economic crisis and migration (2009-12)
Survival strategy once again?
Unfortunately, those positive developments stopped with the outbreak of the 
economic crisis, which initiated a new unprecedented wave of emigration, turning 
migration once again from an expression of “free choice/freedom of movement” to a 
desperate search for economic opportunities abroad and a “survival strategy”. In 2010 
there was an unprecedented peak – 83 500 Lithuanian inhabitants registered their 
departure from Lithuania. Such a significant increase in the number of registered 
emigrants is in all likelihood attributable mainly to the introduction of a statutory duty for 
all permanent residents of the country to pay compulsory health insurance, a circumstance 
which may well have also encouraged emigrants who had failed to register their departure 
from Lithuania earlier, to do so now. Nevertheless, 2011 and 2012 witness continuous 
high emigration outflows, which may prove to reflect a new, real wave of emigration 
(rather than an artefact due to improved reporting, as had unrealistically been hoped).
In the absence of in-depth research, it is difficult to establish the determinants of 
emigration with any certainty. A preliminary analysis of changes in economic 
development and emigration indicators, however, show an evident correlation between 
emigration trends and unemployment, and between net migration and GDP dynamics 
(Figure 3.3). The younger generations in general – and those entering the labour market 
for the first time in particular – were hit hardest by the economic recession. The level of 
unemployment among young Lithuanians surpassed 30% (Figure 3.4).
2001-02 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Job contract 60.8 82.1 79.8 81.8 63.2 69.3
Studies 3.9 4.3 4 4.3 6.6 12.6
Family circumstances 17.2 11.1 4.6 8.9 13.8 7.9
Other 18.1 2.6 11.6 4.9 16.4 10.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total (thousands) 23.2 11.7 17.3 32.5 15.2 12.7
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Figure 3.3. Migration and economic indicators in Lithuania, 2000-10
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
Figure 3.4. Total unemployment and youth unemployment, 2005-11
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
Better employment opportunities, higher salaries (three to four times higher, even 
when purchasing power is taken into account) and better social security benefits, etc., are 
major economic reasons for Lithuanians to move abroad. In the context of the crisis, in 
addition to macro-economic factors, new push factors emerged at the micro-economic 
level, such as the inability to pay back bank loans and other financial commitments (even 
with a job in Lithuania), mass bankruptcy of small and medium businesses, etc. In many 
FDVHVHPLJUDWLRQEHFDPHWKHRQO\HFRQRPLFVXUYLYDOVWUDWHJ\6WDQNǌQLHQơet al., 2012). 
New phenomena, such as moving abroad due to “personal bankruptcy” (a very 
complicated procedure in Lithuania) have been documented. The above push factors, 
coupled with frustration and disillusion with government economic policy, imbue 
emigration with the features of desertion.
In addition to economics, other reasons, such as social insecurity, social injustice 
(“social serfdom”) or family-related reasons (e.g., family reunion) contribute to 
LQFUHDVLQJHPLJUDWLRQIORZV6LSDYLþLHQơDQG6WDQNǌQLHQơ
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On the other hand, factors related to past migrations, such as the existence of well-
functioning informal migration networks as well as established support mechanisms at the 
destination can be identified. These act as pull factors that facilitate the realisation of 
migration intentions. Two recent studies commissioned by the IOM Vilnius office and 
carried out in Lithuania (2008 and 2010) reveal that the Lithuanian migration network in 
destination countries is quite extensive – 30% of Lithuanian residents have someone from 
their family/household working/studying/living abroad and 80% have migrants in their 
close social environment (friends, relatives, etc.) (SipDYLþLHQơ, 2011). An effective 
migrant support mechanism exists, as can be deduced from the fact that as many as 80% 
of emigrants find a job abroad through this channel.
Return migration, chain migration and changes in the geography of emigration
As the economic crisis spread globally to encompass most destination countries for 
Lithuanian migrants, return migration was expected to increase. This is because, as a rule, 
migrants are the first to be fired, especially temporary, seasonal workers in sectors such 
as construction, manufacturing and tourism. No pronounced increase in return migration 
was observed, however. On the contrary, the first years of crisis witnessed a decrease in 
return migration from 6 300 people in 2008 to only 4 200 people in 2010 (Figure 3.5). 
The increase in return migration recorded in 2011 should be evaluated with caution, for, 
rather than real returns, the datum could reflect mere formal return declarations by 
emigrants seeking to (once again) benefit from the Lithuanian health care system. Only 
targeted research, or an analysis of emigration data collected over the course of several 
years, will be able to reveal whether emigrants are indeed returning to Lithuania. 
Figure 3.5. Immigration (foreigners) and return migration (Lithuanian nationals), 2001-11
Thousands
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
As data from some destination countries show, emigrants who lose their jobs, rather 
than opt for return migration, often choose to remain in the destination country 
(especially if they are entitled to social benefits) or to migrate to a third country (OECD, 
2011). The evaluation of chain migration is rather complicated. Here, too, only scientific 
studies will be able to assess how widespread this phenomenon is. However, the crisis 
affects also migrant choice of initial emigration destination, to favour closer, 
economically more secure and “reliable” countries. Statistical data indicate that, in 2011, 
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an absolute majority (94.4%) of Lithuanian emigration was intra-continental, of which 
81.8% was within the European Union (Table 3.2).
Among destination countries, the leaders remain the United Kingdom (49%) and 
Ireland (10.4%), though the importance of Ireland continues to diminish. At the same 
time, new trends can be identified – increased emigration to Scandinavian countries (that 
are less affected by the economic crisis, that have a better labour market situation, and 
better social security systems, even for the unemployed). An especially pronounced 
increase was observed in emigration to Norway. Compared with the pre-crisis period 
(2008), emigration flows from Lithuania to Norway in 2011 increased more than tenfold 
(Table 3.2), comprising 7.4 % of Lithuania’s total emigration (from only 2% in 2008). On 
the other hand, the proportion of the Russian Federation, Belarus, and Ukraine in the 
emigration outflow structure has significantly decreased (from 16.5% in 2008 to only 
4.4% in 2011); the importance of the United States as a destination country has also 
decreased (from 10.5% to 3.3% during the same period).
Table 3.2. Registered Lithuanian emigrants, by country of destination
Share
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
The full opening of labour markets in Germany and Austria in 2011 did not have any 
pronounced impact on the geography of emigration from Lithuania. This full opening, 
however, simplified migration procedures for skilled workers, expanded recruitment and 
improved information for aspirant migrants, which could easily have led to an increased 
share of skilled workers among migrants. Although not yet backed by hard data, such a 
development arouses concern in Lithuania. Fears are related to the possible loss of skilled 
workers such as medical doctors and other health care personnel, IT specialists or 
engineers.
Country of destination 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011
Europe 83.2 83.5 86.4 95 94.4
EU27, of which: 67.5 63.3 61.5 83.6 81.8
    Ireland 13.3 11.7 12.6 15.7 10.4
    Spain 5.1 5.4 6.2 4.3 3.6
    United Kingdom 27.1 26.3 26 49.2 49
    Germany 9.5 7.9 6.1 4.6 7
Other European countries 15.7 20.2 24.9 11.3 12.6
     Belarus 4.5 5.9 9.4 1.7 1.6
     Norway 1.5 2 2.4 5.9 7.1
     Russian Federation 7.1 6.3 5.2 1.8 2
     Ukraine 1.8 4.3 4.6 0.8 0.8
Africa 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2
America 13.9 12 8.7 3.7 3.9
     United States 12.9 10.5 7.7 3.3 3.3
Asia 2.4 4.1 4.3 0.9 1.2
Oceania 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3
Not indicated 0 - 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Total (absolute value) 15 571 17 015 21 970 83 157 53 863
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The changing composition of emigration flows
The economic crisis not only increased the scale of emigration, but also affected its 
composition. First, an increase has been documented, in the emigration of people of 
working age, especially of young people (Table 3.3, Figure 3.6). In 2011, young persons 
aged 20-34 made up more than half (55.4%) of all Lithuanian emigrants (compared with 
46.6% in 2008).
Table 3.3. Distribution of Lithuanian emigrants by age, 2007-12
Percentage
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
Figure 3.6. Age-sex pyramid of Lithuanian emigrants, 2007 and 2011
Percentage
Source: Statistics Lithuania (2012), Demografijos metraštis 2011, Vilnius.
Migration losses that mainly involve young people are known to affect future 
demographic processes (population ageing, increased dependency ratio, future family 
formation, fertility, etc.) as well as future labour resources, which may then have to be 
imported from other countries. The emigration of young people reinforces brain drain, 
Age 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
0-14 13.9 13.7 12.1 10.2 10.5 12.6
15-19 9.8 7.0 6.0 5.9 7.1 7.1
20-34 43.3 47.4 48.4 54.9 55.4 52.9
35-39 8.8 9.4 10.3 9.4 8.6 8.8
40-59 20.9 19.4 20.7 18.7 17.1 16.8
60+ 3.3 3.1 2.5 0.9 1.3 1.9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
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i.e. the loss of highly qualified labour force, which may in turn lead to decreasing 
economic and competitive potential. No data on the emigrants’ level of education are 
available, however, and no studies on possible brain drain have been conducted in 
recent years.
The low proportion of children among emigrants is also evident. Increasingly,
emigrants depart without their children, leaving them to the care of relatives or even 
strangers; sometimes children are left without any guardians at all. According to data 
from the State Child Rights Protection and Adoption Service, the number of children left 
in foster care by migrant parents has more than doubled since the pre-crisis period (from 
916 in 2007 to 2 134 in 2011; Table 3.4). These are only official data however. More 
frequently migrants, hoping that emigration will be temporary, fail to arrange for foster 
care and leave children without any adult guardian. The consequences of this 
phenomenon for families and children has been studied (Maslauskaitơ and 6WDQNǌQLHQơ
2007), but its broader effects on future demographic, social and economic development is 
difficult to forecast.
Table 3.4. Parental requests for foster care for children due to parents’ emigration, 2007-10
Annual number of new requests by child’s age
Source: State Child Rights Protection and Adoption Service.
Family separation due to migration represents a serious problem in Lithuania, but 
official statistics do not register an increase in this phenomenon. On the contrary, a 
decline in the proportion of married people among emigrants can be observed – their 
share decreased from 56% in 2001 to 30.4% in 2011 (Table 3.5).
Table 3.5. Distribution of registered Lithuanian emigrants aged 18 and older, by marital status, 2001-11
Percentage
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
Economic activity
Statistics Lithuania data on emigrants by previous employment show, that even 
during the economic boom, in 2008, approximately 56% of all emigrants were 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
0-3 99 131 148 144 132
4-6 171 275 287 290 326
7-9 164 354 373 386 392
10-14 295 674 694 676 721
15-17 187 518 517 530 563
Total 916 1 952 2 019 2 026 2 134
Age of 
child
Marital status 2001 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Single 29.9 38.4 43.1 42.4 50.8 55.6
Married 56 44 39.9 42 34.7 30.3
Divorced 8 15.3 15.1 13.8 13.3 12.8
Widowed 4.7 2.4 1.9 1.8 1.2 1.3
Not indicated 1.4 - - - - -
Total (absolute value) 5 990 11 218 14 090 18 788 73 185 47 329
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unemployed prior to departure. The economic crisis appears to have increased their share 
in the population of emigrants to 82% in 2011 (Table 3.6). As these figures are based on 
declared emigration, they do not indicate whether long-term unemployed emigrants had 
been out of work for more than a year before departure or before the declaration of 
emigration, since in many cases, the date of declaration was subsequent to that of 
emigration, often by months or even years.
The majority of employed emigrants had been working in the wholesale and retail 
trade sectors (4.6%), in manufacturing (3.1%), transport (1.9%), in the hotel/restaurant 
sector (1.6%), and in construction (1.8 %) (Table 3.6). These are all sectors in which 
Lithuania itself had experienced labour shortages before 2008. Despite the crisis and 
dramatically increased unemployment, some sectors in Lithuania are unable to fill 
positions for certain categories of workers (scientists, engineers, medical staff, IT, etc., 
but also construction, transport). This type of situation – when labour shortages and 
emigration coincide – can be attributed to both economic (e.g. wage differentials), and 
non-economic (e.g., self-realisation) factors. Such conditions are expected to persist in the 
near future, suggesting that highly skilled workers will continue to emigrate in 
large numbers.
Table 3.6. Distribution of registered Lithuanian migrants aged 15 and older, by previous employment,
2008-11
Percentage 
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
Emigration of secondary school graduates is on the rise, and a large proportion of long-
term unemployed emigrants are young people who, having graduated from schools and 
universities, were unable to find jobs in Lithuania. The highest rates of unemployment are 
among youth, as are the highest rates of emigration. An inadequate match between high 
school curricula and the needs of the Lithuanian labour market acts as a push factor 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011
Out of employment for at least one year 56.0 81.3 85.0 81.8
Employed 44 18.7 15.0 18.2
Agriculture 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.3
Mining and quarrying 0 0 0 0
Manufacturing 9.3 2.4 2.3 3.1
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Construction 5.1 2 1.5 1.8
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and personal and household goods
9.7 2.4 3.7 4.6
Hotels and restaurants 3.5 1.1 1.1 1.6
Transport, storage and communication 4.7 7.3 1.6 1.9
Financial intermediation 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2
Real estate 4.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Public administration 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
Education 2.1 0.5 0.6 0.7
Health and social work 1.3 0.2 0.4 0.5
Other activities 1.6 1.9 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total (absolute numbers) 14 618 19 357 74 674 48 212
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contributing to brain drain, especially among young people. An additional contributing 
factor is the recent (2008-09) rise in university tuition fees in Lithuania, making studies 
abroad – especially in more prestigious foreign universities – relatively cheaper and more 
attractive.
Emigration potential
Still, the biggest concern in Lithuania stems from the fact that, mostly due to the 
economic crisis, emigration potential – as reflected in emigration intentions – is 
increasing rather than diminishing. A number of studies and public opinion poll surveys 
indicate that nearly half of the Lithuanian adult population is considering emigration and 
would like to move abroad for employment (48.4% in 2012, compared with 37% in 2011, 
 LQ  DQG  LQ  $SNODXVD  $SNODXVD  3RåLǌULV 
6LSDYLþLHQơ et al., 2011). Migration intentions among young adults have taken on 
unprecedented dimensions, reaching DOPRVW  DPRQJ SHRSOH XQGHU  6LSDYLþLHQơ
et al., 2011). These tendencies have been accelerating since the onset of the crisis and 
represent a real threat to Lithuania’s future (Figure 3.7).
Figure 3.7. Willingness of Lithuanians to move abroad for work, by age group
Percentage
Source: IOM Study, 2008 and 2010 Public Opinion Surveys.
Social and economic impact
The first and most obvious consequence of mass emigration is a decreasing 
population. Mass emigration, coupled with very limited immigration and return 
migration, reduced the Lithuanian population by nearly one sixth over two decades, from 
3.7 million residents in 1990 to 3 million in 2011. While natural increase fully or partially 
compensated for migration losses prior to 1994, since 1995 the population has been 
decreasing. In the years of economic crisis (2009-11), emigration accounted for 
approximately 90% of total population decline. While depopulation is the aspect most 
often emphasized by politicians and the media when discussing emigration, changes in 
population composition due to emigration may be even more problematic. The skewed 
distribution of outflows towards the younger age-groups (Figure 3.8), and the mirror-
image age composition of the remaining population, increase the dependency ratio and 
the burden on the active population, indirectly acting as an additional push factor. In 
addition, the real wage index continues to decrease (Table 3.7).
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Figure 3.8. Age distribution of emigrants and residents, 2010
Percentage
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
Table 3.7. Real wage index in Lithuania, 2005-11
Percentage change compared to previous year
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
The economic impact of emigration is not easy to evaluate on the basis of standard
statistical data. A simple comparison of economic development and emigration indicators 
sometimes reveals paradoxical situations, raising more questions than it answers.
First, such intense emigration clearly predominated by people of working age would 
be expected to correspond to shrinking labour force indicators. Still, as can be seen from 
the statistical data (Table 3.8), this was not the case. During the years 2007-09 the labour 
force was growing. This was a temporary phenomenon, mainly due to an exceptionally 
large cohort entering the labour market (the cohort born in 1989-91, when due to political 
reasons, birth rates increased dramatically). The labour force began shrinking in 2010, 
and is expected to exhibit further and more drastic drops due both to smaller age-cohorts 
entering the labour force and emigration, potentially causing serious labour supply 
shortages should the economy recover.
Table 3.8. Labour force, employment and unemployment in Lithuania, 2004-11
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
106.8 114.9 117.0 110.1 92.8 95.7 98.5
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Activity rate (%) 57.1 56.6 55.9 56.3 56.7 57.7 58.1
Population aged 15+ (thousands) 2 837.1 2 840.2 2 842.9 2 846.8 2 849.4 2 844.9 2 814
Labour force (thousands) 1 620.6 1 606.8 1 588.3 1 603.1 1 614.3 1 640.9 1 634.8
Employed (thousands) 1 436.3 1 473.9 1 499 1 534.2 1 520 1 415.9 1 343.7
Unemployed (thousands) 184.4 132.9 89.3 69.0 94.3 225.1 291.1
Unemployment (%) 11.4 8.3 5.6 4.3 5.8 13.7 17.8
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Another apparent paradox: even though more than 80% of adult emigrants are long-
term unemployed, the number of unemployed people in Lithuania, as well as 
unemployment rates, steadily increased between 2007 and 2010. The prevailing 
explanation is that without emigration unemployment would have been much higher and 
social tensions greater. In fact, emigrants tend to be resourceful people, able and willing 
to work, who shun social benefits. Even if their departure helped to reduce 
unemployment, the country lost an important segment of the labour force. As noted 
above, the fact that the composition of the emigrant population by sectors echoes the 
labour shortage list, might lead to labour market imbalances when the economy starts to 
recover. Furthermore, if – in the context of persisting high emigration rates – immigration 
policy remains restrictive, the Lithuanian labour market will also face general labour 
shortages, which are likHO\ WR VORZ GRZQ HFRQRPLF UHFRYHU\ 0DOGHLNLHQơ 
Finally, emigration does not appear to have reduced pressure on the social welfare system 
*UXåHYVNLV =DEDUDXVNDLWơ  6WDWLVWLFDO GDWD LQGLFDWH WKDW VLQFH  ERWK WKH
number of beneficiaries and the sums paid on welfare have been on the rise (Table 3.9).
Table 3.9. Social welfare in Lithuania, 2005-11
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
Conceivably, the loss of a very active and labour/business oriented segment of the 
labour force, even under conditions of unemployment, could result in missed 
opportunities and jobs not created, leading to increased unemployment and pressure on 
the social system. These are only speculations, however. Research is needed to elucidate 
the mechanisms by which emigration affects the Lithuanian economy. 
Official emigration statistics do not register the level of education or professional 
qualifications of migrants, but several studies indicate that emigration of low-skilled 
people has been particularly high (6LSDYLþLHQơ and Jeršovas, 2010; Karpavicius, 2006).
Emigration could thus be among the factors contributing to the reduction in the share of 
unskilled workers, and the consequent rise in the share of highly skilled workers, 
registered in the Lithuanian labour force since 2004 (Figure 3.9).
The result is that low-skilled workers are disproportionately in demand, and before 
the crisis these workers saw greater relative wage increases than those seen by highly 
skilled workers. This in turn served as an additional push factor for highly qualified 
specialists. In this way, imbalances in the wage system created by migration act as a 
catalyst for further emigration (Maldeikienơ, 2010).
On the other hand, wages have not kept pace with general work productivity 
(Table 3.10), creating imbalances in the economy (Maldeikienơ, 2010). During the 
economic boom wages were rising faster than productivity, and the opposite occurred 
during the crisis. . Emigration reacts not only to changes in economic growth per se, but 
also to internal economic imbalances, and as such is difficult to predict.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of recipients 54 145 37 849 36 621 37 292 73 512 181 285 221 060
Expenditures (thousands LTL) 52 822 43 800 52 135 78 927 190 660 510 586 n.a.
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Figure 3.9. Labour force composition by skill level, 2004-11
Percentage
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
Table 3.10. Productivity and wage development, 2006-11
LTL: Lithuanian litas.
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
Remittances are a potentially positive aspect of emigration. As can be seen in 
Figure 3.10, remittances rebounded from a drop in 2009, and in 2011 constituted 
LTL 4.84 billion, equivalent to 4.6% of GDP or approximately 25% of all salaries paid in 
Lithuania. The importance of remittances to families and households, especially during 
the crisis, has been enormous – it cushioned the consequences of the economic crisis, and 
in many cases compensated for financial problems due to drastically reduced incomes in 
Lithuania. No in-depth research regarding the use of remittances has been carried out in 
Lithuania, but the experience of other countries suggests that the money is often 
squandered, and only an insignificant part is used for investments, business or job 
creation. Thus, remittances, albeit very important for family consumption, have probably 
had a much smaller impact on the country’s economy.
Other positive effects – e.g. expertise acquired abroad, joint projects/ventures, etc. 
could not be evaluated due to the small numbers of return migrants, and the lack of 
studies and relevant statistical information.
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Work productivity (value added for one hour worked, LTL) 27.2 31 34.7 31.5 33.9 37.6
Percentage change from previous year 12.9 13.9 11.9 -9.2 7.6 10.9
Average monthly wage (LTL) 1 496 1 802 2 152 2 056 1 988 2 046
Percentage change from previous year 17.2 20.5 19.3 -4.4 -3.3 2.9
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Figure 3.10. Remittances in millions of litas and as a proportion of GDP
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Lithuania; Statistics Lithuania.
Policy response
Lithuania’s policies regarding migration, asylum and other issues related to the 
movement of people are not concentrated in any single document. Nonetheless, migration 
policy provisions contained in separate documents show that the return of Lithuanian 
citizens to Lithuania is considered a very important goal (IOM/EMN, 2012), and the 
immigration of third-country nationals2 is merely seen as an additional means of solving 
the economic problems of the country. Among such political and strategic documents, the 
following are worthy of mention:
x Long-Term Development Strategy of the State3 which only mentions the problems 
linked to emigration, but does not envision measures to tackle them.
x National Demographic (Population) Policy Strategy4 stipulates the strategic goal of 
economic migration policy – to ensure that, in case of fast economic growth, 
Lithuania would not experience labour shortages and would avoid the negative 
consequences of migration.
x Economic Migration Regulation Strategy5 (adopted April 2007) identifies two goals 
– to meet the needs of the Lithuanian labour market and to encourage the return of 
economic migrants to their respective countries of origin. Workers from third 
countries must be attracted only in sectors facing labour shortages, where workforce 
from Lithuania or other EU member states cannot be engaged, and only for a limited 
duration. Among other goals, reaching zero net migration by 2012 was envisioned. 
Due to the economic crisis, by 2010 almost all activities under the strategy had been 
terminated.
x Lithuania’s Immigration Policy Guidelines6 (adopted December 2008) – the first and 
only political document presenting the position of the state on migration, including 
the immigration of third-country nationals. The Guidelines stipulate the following 
goals for the country’s immigration policy: i) to ensure that Lithuania does not 
experience labour shortages or other detrimental effects of emigration, such as an 
ageing population; ii) to ensure the effective management of immigration flows; 
iii) to participate, in an active and targeted manner, in the formulation of 
EU immigration policy.
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x The document clearly affirms that the guiding principle for the immigration of aliens 
must be the benefit of the state, whereas meeting the needs of the labour market is to 
be considered secondary. Priority should be given to returning Lithuanian citizens. 
No steps followed, to convert this political document/declaration into an Action 
Plan. This was partly due to the expectation (and promises made by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs) that a new Programme for the Creation of a “Global Lithuania” (see 
below) would encompass all issues pertaining to emigration, return migration and 
immigration taking into account imminent demographic and economic/labour market 
problems and needs. As it turned out, however, when the awaited programme was 
finally approved, it included only a policy for maintaining ties with the diaspora.
x The Programme for the Creation of a “Global Lithuania” (Involvement of 
Lithuanian Emigrants in the Life of the State) for 2011-19,7 as approved in 2011, 
introduced a new approach to emigrant Lithuanian citizens, one that acknowledges 
the fact that they may be an asset to their country even if residing abroad. The 
aspiration to promote the return of Lithuanian citizens to their homeland remains, but 
the target group of the programme has been expanded to include citizens who do not 
intend to return to Lithuania, as well as aliens of Lithuanian descent or who have 
other links with Lithuania. The programme aims to ensure that emigrants from 
Lithuania preserve their national identity, promoting their involvement in the 
cultural, political and economic life of Lithuania, encouraging Lithuanians to return 
to Lithuania, and turning “brain drain” into “brain exchange”, by involving the 
emigrants in the exchange and dissemination of information. The immigration of 
foreigners or the economic problems related to emigration are not addressed.
Conclusion
Emigration from Lithuania continues to be identified as one of the most urgent 
national problems, posing demographic as well as labour market problems, yet until 
recently very little has been done to stop such massive emigration, to encourage return 
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Notes
1. The stages identified in this report are not absolute, of course. Migration does not 
always directly and immediately react to social, economic or political changes, and 
there is no clear-cut moment in time in which one migration model transforms into 
another. As a rule, these develop gradually, with different models co-existing for 
quite some time.
2. Third country national – a person who is not a citizen of an EU member state, or of 
a member of the European Free Trade Association (Norway, Switzerland, 
Lichtenstein and Iceland).
3. Resolution No. IX-1187, approved by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on 
12 November 2002 (Official Gazette, No. 113-5029, 2002).
4. Resolution No. 1350, approved by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on 
28 October 2004 (Official Gazette, No. 159-5795, 2004).
5. Resolution No. 416 approved by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on 
25 April 2007 (Official Gazette, No. 49-1897, 2007).
6. Resolution No. 1317 approved by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on 
3 December 2008 (Official Gazette, No. 143-5706, 2008).
7. Resolution No. 389 approved by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on 
30 March 2011 (Official Gazette, No. 42-1969, 2011).
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Chapter 4
Emigration from Latvia: Recent trends and economic impact
Mihails Hazans
University of Latvia and Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA), Bonn
This chapter examines the substantial outflows of population from Latvia since 2000, 
which has major implications for the demography and development of Latvia as well as 
its social security system. Different statistical sources are described and compared. The 
chapter examines the characteristics of emigrants relative to the resident population, in 
terms of education, age, employment experience and income. The chapter examines the 
relationship between growth and emigration, as well as emigration potential, exploring 
the role of non-economic factors. The changing characteristics of emigrants from Latvia 
are discussed. The current and future impact of emigration on the labour market is 
examined. The chapter concludes by indicating some means for alleviating negative 
impact.
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Introduction
Since the beginning of the 21st century, Latvia has lost 9.1% of its population 
(including almost 14% of its working-age population) in several waves of emigration. 
Three quarters of adult emigrants are younger than 35 at the time of their departure. 
Combined with a large negative natural increase, this causes the Latvian population to 
shrink and to age very quickly, much faster than that of the countries hosting Latvia’s
emigrants.
The main reasons for emigration, the most popular destinations, as well as the profile 
of the emigrant population and emigrants’ plans, have changed substantially during this 
relatively short period. The most recent wave of emigration is associated with the 
economic crisis, which affected Latvia much more than most European countries. 
Figure 4.1 presents the economic and labour market context of this wave. At the end of 
2009, Latvian GDP was 24% lower than the pre-crisis maximum. It took only six months 
longer for the number of legally employed persons to also shrink by one-fourth, while 
employment in full-time equivalents fell by almost one third.
Figure 4.1. Latvian real GDP and employment during the economic crisis
2008/Q2 = 100
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Statistics Latvia and the State Social Insurance Agency.
Three years later, only half of the GDP decline and much less than half of the 
employment loss had been recovered.
Latvian emigration during the crisis stands out in the European Union as the most 
dramatic response to the crisis. According to the 2011 EU Labour Force Survey 
(EU-LFS), between 2008 and 2011 the stock of Latvian citizens aged 15-64 who arrived 
in another EU member state within the last three years increased by 47%. A parallel 
increase for Hungarian and Estonian citizens was modest (15% and 1%, respectively, 
while a decrease was recorded for citizens of other CEE countries (ranging from -4% for 
Bulgaria to -17% for Lithuania and -60% for Poland), see Aujean (2012). Moreover, 
Latvia is the only country among the EU8+2 for which the estimated impact of recession 
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on net migration to EU15 countries in 2008-09 was positive (see European Commission, 
2012, Chapter 6, Table 9, based on Holland et al., 2011). In terms of overall mobility rate 
(measured as the percentage of working-age population living in another EU member 
state) Latvia (6%) is fourth among CEE countries, following Romania (12.5%), Lithuania 
(8.5%) and Bulgaria (7%) and followed by Poland, Slovakia and Estonia (4% to 5%), as 
well as Hungary and Slovenia (2% each) and Czech Republic (1.5%), see Aujean (2012); 
see also European Commission (2012) for similar results based on EU-LFS 2010.
After EU enlargement in 2004, and especially during the crisis years of 2009-11, 
emigration reached levels that pose a threat to the reproduction of the Latvian population, 
the country’s economic development and the sustainability of its social security system. 
Thus, some positive side effects notwithstanding, emigration has become a serious 
obstacle to human development and economic growth in Latvia. According to a recent 
survey, three quarters of Latvia’s population perceive emigration as the single largest 
threat to the country and its people (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2. Share of Latvia’s residents aged 18-74 who perceive the processes below as a major threat
to Latvia and its people, July 2012
Percentage
Source: SKDS (2012), The Popularity of National Ideas in Society Survey, Marketing and Public Opinion Research 
Centre (Latvia).
This chapter opens with an updated, revised and extended version of our previous 
emigration estimates for 2000-11. In this section we also compare Latvian and Estonian 
emigration in 2000-10. It then discusses whether there is evidence to suggest that 
emigration is substantially slowing down and will soon return to pre-crisis levels. It then 
presents a brief description of the history of three recent emigration waves shaped by 
economic and institutional developments in Latvia and in potential destination countries: 
i) the pre-accession period (which we have treated as loosely corresponding to 2000-03, 
although it also included the first four months of 2004); ii) the post-accession period, 
characterised by economic growth, corresponding to 2004-08 (the crisis hit Latvia in the 
last quarter of 2008, but its effect on emigration appears only in the data of 2009-11); 
iii) the crisis period, 2009-11 (data for 2012 are scarce). A number of hypotheses (or 
stylised facts) regarding the nature of the emigration flows in each of the periods will be 
put forward. We will then test these hypotheses through a quantitative analysis of 
migration processes and the migrant population profiles, using administrative and survey 
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data. The next section explores changes in emigrant population profiles over time and 
compares emigrants, non-migrants and return migrants along various dimensions. The 
prospects of return migration are addressed, as are the development of migration 
networks, and the impact on return migrants of having lived abroad. The chapter then
analyses intentions to emigrate in the Latvian population since the onset of the economic 
crisis. In conclusion, there is a discussion of the economic impact of emigration 
on Latvia.
How many people left Latvia in 2000-11?
Until late 2011, according to official Latvian statistics, net emigration from Latvia 
between 2000-10 amounted to 33 000 persons. Hazans (2011a, 2011b) combined 
destination country (and, in some cases, Latvian) statistics on population and on bilateral 
migration flows by citizenship and/or country of birth, data on social security number 
(SSN) allocation in the United Kingdom and Ireland, and estimates of return migration to 
Latvia based on several population surveys, to arrive at an estimate of net emigration of 
the Latvian population during 2000-10 of at least 169 000 (the most recent update of this 
estimate is 194 000, see Table 4.1 below). Estimates are essential due to the inevitable 
incompleteness of migration data as well as circumstances specific to Latvia: e.g., as of 
2005, 20% of the population aged 15-74 were not Latvian citizens, although most of them 
held Latvian (non-citizen) passports; 14% were foreign-born; moreover, some destination 
countries classify persons born in Latvia in 1940-91 as born in the Soviet Union. The 
preferred expert estimate of net emigration during the period in question, as reported in 
Hazans (2011a, 2011b) was 200 000, while the upper expert estimate (total net emigration 
of 250 000 persons) accounts for the fact that the 2011 census data yielded only 
1 880 000 directly collected records (Statistics Latvia, 2012), or 348 000 less than the 
population figure previously published on March 31, 2011.
Three months later, Krasnopjorovs (2011) published an independent but very close 
estimate of the outflow from Latvia (178 000) based on the difference between the 
numbers of passengers departing and arriving via Riga airport and sea port (this 
methodology is of course far from perfect, as it ignores migration by land).
Hazans (2011a, 2011b) also presents a breakdown of net emigration by periods as 
described above as well as a comparison between Estonia and Latvia (Hazans, 2012). 
Table 4.1 below is based on these results, with updated entries for Latvia (labelled [2] 
and [3]) (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4 below for details).
In both countries, emigration rates at least doubled after accession to the European 
Union. Furthermore, during the crisis years (2009-10) the Latvian annual net emigration 
rate more than doubled again (compared to the post-enlargement period of 2004-08). In 
Estonia, the increase in the rate of emigration during the crisis was not nearly as sharp as 
in Latvia, despite a similarly deep recession: in 2009, GDP and employment (in full-time 
equivalents) in both countries were about 20% below 2007 levels (see Figure 4.1
for Latvia).
However, Estonia, which created a stabilisation fund during the years of economic 
growth, managed without external help, and experienced more modest wage cuts than 
Latvia (European Commission, 2011, Graph I.3.1). Moreover, the crisis in Latvia was 
perceived by the majority of the population as a systemic – rather than merely financial –
crisis, which was not the case in Estonia. Table 4.2 illustrates these differences.
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Table 4.1. Net emigration from Estonia and Latvia, 2000-10
Sending and receiving country estimates
1. Official sending country estimates (as of September 2011).
2. Conservative documented estimates based on receiving countries’ population and/or migration statistics by citizenship
and/or country of birth (for countries outside the European Union and OECD, sending country statistics was used). Inflows
into Ireland and the United Kingdom are estimated using data on the allocation of social security numbers, while data on
outflows from the United Kingdom and Ireland have been adjusted upwards (especially for 2004-08) using Latvian and
Estonian LFS and other population surveys.
3. Realistic expert estimates based on [2] and accounting for the fact that receiving countries’ immigration statistics are 
incomplete both in general and especially regarding inflows from Latvia and Estonia due to large proportions of non-citizens 
and foreign-born in these two countries.
Source: Eurostat, OECD, Statistics Latvia, Statistics Estonia, other national statistical offices, Department of Work and
Pensions (United Kingdom), Department of Social Protection (Ireland), author’s calculation and compilation.
Table 4.2. Public sentiment indicators during the economic crisis
Note: Satisfaction and trust are measured at the 0-10 scale. The table reports mean values (excluding non-response).
Standard errors in all cases are between 0.04 and 0.06.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the European Social Survey (2008-09).
While current (February 2013) official estimates of emigration from Latvia are more 
realistic than those published a year earlier, the underlying methodology of the 2011 
population census suffers from limitations both in terms of data collection and in terms of 
allocating unregistered outflows to particular years (see Annex 4.A1 for details). 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4, as well as Tables 4.3 and 4.4, present our alternative estimates, which 
update, revise and extend those by Hazans (2011a, 2011b) and rely heavily on receiving 
country data (see Box 4.1 for details). 
[1] [2] [3] [2] [3] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3] [2] [3] [2] [3]
2000-03 7.3 12.2 15 0.22 0.27 0.9 1.1 13.3 [30.0 ;  40.0] 45 0.38 0.48 1.5 1.9
2004-08 9.7 35.1 44 0.54 0.65 2.6 3.2 7.2 [83.6 ; 90.4] 87 0.78 0.78 3.8 3.8
2009-10 3.3 18.5 25 0.72 0.94 1.4 1.9 12.6 [71.4 ; 72.5] 80 1.68 1.89 3.3 3.7
2000-10 20.2 65.8 84 0.46 0.56 4.8 5.9 33.1 194.5 212 0.79 0.88 8.2 8.9
Persons
(thousands)
Estonia Latvia
Net migration rate, % Net migration rate (%)
Period total
(vs. initial 
population)
Annual average Annual average Period total
(vs. initial 
population)
Persons
(thousands)
Estonia Latvia
(Nov. 2008 - Feb. 2009) (Apr. 2009 - Aug. 2009)
Satisfaction with the state of the country's economy 3.53 1.81
Satisfaction with the national government 3.53 1.8
Satisfaction with the state of education 5.86 4.62
Satisfaction with the state of health services 5.07 3.53
Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country 4.52 3.27
Trust in the country's parliament 3.88 1.95
Sample size 1 661 1 980
70 – 4. EMIGRATION FROM LATVIA: RECENT TRENDS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
COPING WITH EMIGRATION IN BALTIC AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES © OECD 2013
Figure 4.3. Alternative estimates of net emigration from Latvia, 2000-11
Thousands
Source: CSB – official data (Statistics Latvia, as of January 2013). (*) Receiving country data compiled by the author
and complemented with Latvian data for countries outside the EEA and OECD. (**) Statistics Latvia data corrected 
by the author. (***) Emigration data as in (*) combined with Statistics Latvia immigration data for 2011.
Figure 4.4. Net emigration of Latvian nationals by destination, 2000-11
Thousands
Source: Eurostat, OECD, Statistics Latvia, other national statistical offices, Department of Work and Pensions
(United Kingdom), Department of Social Protection (Ireland), author’s calculation and compilation and Box 4.1.
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Table 4.3. Net emigration of Latvian nationals by destination, 2000-11
Thousands
Note: In columns [6] and [7] we report total net emigration rather than emigration of nationals.
Source: Eurostat, OECD, Statistics Latvia, other national statistical offices, Department of Work and Pensions (United
Kingdom), Department of Social Protection (Ireland), author’s calculation and compilation.
Table 4.4. Alternative documented estimates of net emigration from Latvia, 2000-11
Thousands
1. Receiving country data compiled by the author and supplemented with Latvian data for countries outside the EEA and OECD.
2. Statistics Latvia data (see Annex 4.A1 for details). The data are as reported in January 2013. Statistics Latvia (2013a) revised 
the 2011 figure to 20 100, using methodology which is not comparable with previous years and may underestimate both gross 
and net emigration (Baltic Course, 2013; LETA, 2013).
3. Krasnopjorovs (2012), based on data from Statistics Latvia.
4. Assuming figures from the first column for 2000-01.
Source: Eurostat, OECD, Statistics Latvia and other national statistical offices; Department of Work and Pensions (United
Kingdom), Department of Social Protection (Ireland), Krasnopjorovs, O. (2012), “VDL HPLJUƗFLMDV YLOQLV L]VƯNVW"´ (Does 
emigration slow down?), www.makroekonomika.lv/vai-emigracijas-vilnis-izsikst and author’s calculation and compilation.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
2000 0. 50 1.05 1.58 0.74 2.76 3.77 10.40
2001 0.40 3.02 2.10 0.97 1.12 2.89 10.49
2002 0.21 1.54 2.07 0.90 1.08 0.08 5.88
2003 0.37 1.23 1.97 0.54 0.69 0.07 4.88
2004 2.38 3.76 2.44 0.65 0.95 0.03 10.22
2005 8.88 4.64 4.00 0.76 0.59 0.05 18.91
2006 7.50 5.79 4.34 0.93 1.47 0.08 20.10
2007 6.23 6.22 2.98 0.70 1.32 0.03 17.47
2008 5.38 6.22 3.75 0.40 1.15 0.02 16.91
2009 20.84 -1.39 7.55 0.57 1.44 0.13 29.15
2010 29.56 0.79 10.02 0.64 1.14 0.12 42.26
2011 22.37 -0.03 10.79 0.80 -3.71 0.11 30.33
2000-11 104.61 32.84 53.59 8.50 10.90 7.38 217.00
TotalYear
United 
Kingdom Ireland Rest of the EEA
Former Soviet 
Union 
countries Rest of World
Rest of the 
OECD
Latvian 
nationals1
Total1 Total2
Air and sea 
passengers3
2000 10.4 12.4 16.4 n.a.
2001 10.5 12.4 19.2 n.a.
2002 5.9 7.7 9.2 5.5
2003 4.9 6.9 11.6 5.5
2004 10.2 12.2 15.3 10.3
2005 18.9 20.5 11.0 7.5
2006 20.1 20.7 8.8 13.1
2007 17.5 18.8 7.9 10.6
2008 16.9 18.2 22.4 23.8
2009 29.1 31.0 34.5 47.5
2010 42.3 41.5 35.6 43.2
2011 30.3 27.5 23.1 27.6
2000-11 217.0 229.7 215.0 194.6
(214.54)
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Box 4.1. Our methodology for estimating net emigration
For every destination country F and every year between 2000 and 2011, we have calculated all available
estimates of net emigration (based on Eurostat, OECD and national statistics data):
1) net inflow of Latvian citizens to F based on migration flows; 2) net inflow of Latvian citizens to F based 
on the population figures by citizenship, and acquisition of citizenship by former Latvian citizens; 3) net inflow 
of persons born in Latvia into F based on migration flows; 4) net inflow of persons born in Latvia into F based 
on the population figures by country of birth; 5) total net inflow from Latvia to F based on migration flows by 
country of previous or next residence.
For each year, the largest of the above estimates (1)-(4) was used as the component of our first time series,
net outflow of Latvian nationals to F, reported in Table 4.3 and presented in Figure 4.4.
On the other hand, estimate (5) was calculated using all available combinations; the maximum figure was 
used in each case as the component of our second time series, total net emigration from Latvia to F. For
countries/years where the component of one of the series was missing, the respective component from the other
has been used instead. In most cases, net emigration of “foreigners” was positive, thus the second series gives
somewhat higher emigration figures.
Inflows into Ireland and the United Kingdom are estimated using full-coverage data on allocation of social
security numbers (SSNs); for the United Kingdom these data are for adults only, so they have been adjusted 
using the age structure of migration flows from Latvia to other EEA countries for the respective years. SSNs are 
issued only once, at the first migration, so do not capture exits and subsequent returns. Data on outflows from the
United Kingdom and Ireland to Latvia during the post-enlargement period of 2004-08, when migration was
predominantly short-term and circulatory, have been adjusted to account for 40% of gross registered inflows 
from Latvia to these countries during this period (according to estimates from the Latvian LFS, as well as 
various population surveys, see Hazans and Philips (2010), Hazans (2011b) for details). Note that total outflows
from other EEA countries to Latvia in 2004-08 matched the 40% estimate well, and did not require correction.
During the crisis years 2009-11, return migration to Latvia was less intensive. We thus applied a 10% return rate
to gross inflows into the United Kingdom in these years, while uncorrected migration statistics were used for
other countries.
Ireland is a special case which requires more explanations. For 2005-10, net emigration of Latvian nationals
to Ireland was much larger when calculated as change in stock (which was actually used) rather than as net flow 
(even if gross outflows are based on allocation of the Irish social security numbers to Latvia’s nationals); the 
overall difference, strongly positive in 2007-08 but negative in 2009, amounts to 5 400. Note that substantial
outflows of Latvian citizens from Ireland have been recorded in 2009-10, but survey and anecdotal evidence 
indicate that many left for countries other than Latvia. Yet the estimated total (rather than only Latvian citizens)
net outflows from Latvia to Ireland in 2008-10 are positive (these alternative data are used in the second time
series reported in Table 4.3).
1. The term “foreigners” is not limited to recent immigrants, as it may also include persons born in Latvia or living there for
more than 20 years who hold other citizenships (mostly Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and of other former Soviet republics)
or who are Latvian non-citizens. The latter category appears separately in Latvian statistics, but appears neither separately nor 
as “recognised non-citizens” or “stateless” in Eurostat data for most years, nor is it accounted for as a sub-category of Latvian 
citizens.
Figure 4.3 and Table 4.4 present, for each year from 2000 to 2011, two of our net 
emigration estimates: one refers to Latvian nationals, while the other looks at total 
migration flows (see Box 4.1 for details). Two of our series are quite close to each other 
in terms of both size and dynamics and are consistent with the expectation (supported 
also by evidence from the EU-LFS, see e.g. Brucker et al. (2009), Fic et al. (2011), and 
the European Commission (2012), that emigration after EU enlargement has been 
substantially higher than pre-enlargement emigration. An analysis of the dynamics of the 
net outflow of passengers from Riga airport and Riga port (Krasnopjorovs, 2012a; shown 
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in Table 4.4) is also consistent with our estimates. Statistics Latvia figures are shown 
alongside our estimates. 
Our estimates imply a slightly higher overall outflow between 2000 and 2011 than the 
estimates of Statistics Latvia. The important difference, as already mentioned, mainly 
concerns the dynamics. Data sources for our estimates are predominantly those of 
destination countries, while Statistics Latvia estimates combine Latvian administrative 
data with information provided by respondents of the 2011 population census using a 
mathematical procedure which ignores the difference in selectivity patterns between 
registered and unregistered emigrants (see Annex 4.A1 for details). Figure 4.3 includes 
(as the dotted line labelled ** in the legend) another time series which for years 2000-10 
is based on the same Latvian data used by Statistics Latvia but different (in our opinion, 
more realistic) assumptions (see Annex 4.A1 and Figure 4.A1.1, Panel B).
Our methodology (see Box 4.1 for details) is based on two well-known facts: 
migration is better captured at the receiving rather than at the sending country; most 
migration estimates are incomplete (in the Latvian case, as mentioned above, there are 
also special reasons for the latter).
Figure 4.4 breaks down net annual outflows of Latvian nationals by four destinations: 
the United Kingdom; Ireland; other EEA countries (an area which includes, apart from 
the EU member states, two important destinations for Latvian emigrants: Norway and 
Switzerland); and the rest of the world. Underlying statistics are presented in Table 4.3, 
which further subdivides the destinations outside of the EEA into three groups: OECD 
countries (here, non-negligible outflows to the United States, Canada, Australia and Israel
can be observed), former Soviet republics, and other destinations.
Is emigration slowing down?
Since the beginning of 2011, the above question has been the focus of public debate. 
Some observers (Krasnopjorovs, 2011, 2012a among others) argued that 2011 was a 
turning point, and that in 2012, emigration slowed down further. Let us have a careful 
look both at the question and the data.
Emigration may have slowed down from the 2010 peak, but has it reached pre-crisis 
levels? The 2008 outflows should serve as the benchmark in this case, while the outflows 
observed in 2009 indicate the “height” of the crisis-triggered emigration wave. Only 
when emigration falls well below the 2009 level, one can talk about the turning point; and 
only when the absolute size of the outflow will become comparable to that observed in 
2008, one can say that the “exodus” is more or less over (strictly speaking, one should 
compare emigration rates, and this test is even harder to pass, as the population size is 
declining).
Should one use gross or net outflows to judge emigration trends? While net outflows 
are, arguably, more important in terms of impact, gross outflows can be measured more 
accurately, at least when data on SSN allocation are available from the countries of 
destination (as is the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland).
As far 2011 is concerned, our estimates based on destination country data (the first 
two columns in Table 4.4; see also lines in Figure 4.3) do not suggest that net emigration 
returned to levels close to the pre-crisis ones or significantly lower than the ones observed 
in 2009.1 Nor does this seem to have happened in 2012. In 2012, gross outflows to the 
United Kingdom (which exclude children), Germany and the Nordic countries, along with 
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data for flows to the Russian Federation from Statistics Latvia, sum up to 29 200. This is 
higher than the official Statistics Latvia (2013a) estimate for emigration to all 
destinations, 25 200, based on a methodology (Statistics Latvia, 2013b, 2013c) which is 
not comparable with previous years and may underestimate both gross and net emigration 
(Baltic Course, 2013; LETA, 2013).
Figure 4.5 presents, across the years 2008-12, reliable information (available as of 
August 2013) on dynamics of gross outflows to the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, 
the Nordic countries and the Russian Federation, as well as net emigration from Latvia to 
Germany and the Nordic countries. Registered emigration (to all destinations) as well as 
the official estimate of total emigration are shown for comparison.
Figure 4.5. Outflows to main destination countries and registered emigration, 2009-12
Index 100 = 2008 for each destination
Note: Total registered emigration data for 2012 is a forecast based on the first nine months.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Department of Work and Pensions (the United Kingdom), the Department 
of Social Protection (Ireland), the national statistical offices of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Germany, Statistics 
Latvia. German data for 2012 as reported by Düll, N. (2013), “Geographical Labour Mobility in the Context of the Crisis: 
Germany”, European Employment Observatory.
With the exception of Ireland (where worsening economic conditions explain the 
decline), gross outflows to all main destinations in 2012 remain well above the pre-crisis 
level: the ratio of the 2012 outflow to the 2008 one is 1.6 for the United Kingdom, 4.6 for 
Germany, 2.7 for Norway, 1.6 for other Nordic countries (taken together) and 2.6 for total 
registered emigration.2 Likewise, net outflow to Germany and all Nordic countries 
together was 4.5 times higher in 2012 than in 2008. This evidence contradicts the official 
estimate indicating that the gross outflows in 2012 fell back to 2008 levels.
On the other hand, the data indicate a clear decline of emigration in 2012 as compared to 
2011. Gross outflows to Norway declined by 22%, to other Nordic countries by 16%, to 
Ireland by 20% and to Germany by 9%. Emigration to the United Kingdom fell by 40%.3
Total registered emigration in the first nine months of 2012 fell by 12% against 
corresponding period of 2011. Net emigration to Germany and Nordic countries declined by 
25%, a steeper decline than the fall in gross emigration, indicating a higher level of return.
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Emigration from Latvia: Three waves in a decade
According to the human capital model of migration (Sjaastad, 1962; Borjas, 1987, 
1999), an individual (or a family) decides whether to move by comparing expected benefits 
and costs associated with migration. In order to assess [net] benefits, one should account for 
all factors that can affect the quality of life in the country of origin and in the potential 
country of destination: job-finding and job-losing probabilities, expected earnings, legal 
status, career prospects, working and living conditions, generosity of the social security 
system, social and cultural norms, perceived life prospects for children, etc. These factors 
can interact with each other in a variety of ways. For instance, the attractiveness of long-
term migration is significantly undermined if, in the case of job loss in the country of 
destination, the immigrant has to apply for a work permit repeatedly. The same is true if 
employment protection and/or unemployment assistance legislation in the country of 
destination does not cover the immigrants to the same extent as it does native workers.
The determinants of migration flows are often subdivided into two groups: push
factors are related to negative (undesired) circumstances in the country of origin, whereas 
pull factors are those which make potential destination countries attractive (Lee, 1966). A 
factor can play both roles either simultaneously (for instance, in 2009-10, high 
unemployment in Latvia was a push factor, but low unemployment in Norway was a pull 
factor) or depending on circumstances (for instance, the wage level is a pull factor for 
professionals who earn LVL 600 (EUR 854) per month in Latvia but can earn three to 
five times more abroad, while it is a push factor for those whose earnings in Latvia are 
not sufficient to support their family). 
The costs of migration, in turn, include monetary as well as non-monetary costs (e.g., 
effort) and can be subdivided into the following categories: i) costs related to acquiring 
the necessary information and job search costs; ii) transportation costs; iii) costs of 
maintaining contact with the country of origin; iv) psychological costs related to missing 
people and the environment one has left behind, uncertainty associated with life in the 
new country, and adaptation to the new reality.
This framework will help us to understand the individuals’ migration decisions, as 
well as the characteristics which drive emigrants’ self-selection, in other words, which 
groups have a higher propensity to emigrate in a specific situation.
The pre-accession wave: Personal initiative and effort
Between 2000 and 2003, Latvia featured rather high unemployment (above 10% 
according to Latvian Labour Force Survey data), combined with very low wages. 
Average earnings in the public sector (at purchasing power parity) were well below those 
of an unskilled worker in the United Kingdom, Germany or the Nordic countries.4
Therefore, many people in Latvia were dissatisfied with their material well-being and 
were considering permanent or temporary emigration as a solution to their problems. 
According to a survey of the economically active population conducted in 2000 (see 
Rose, 2000, or Hazans, 2003, Table 3.3), 8% of ethnic Latvians and 25% of their minority 
counterparts said that they (or some family member) would like to work abroad (at least)
for a number of years, when their country enters the European Union. Moreover, 4% of 
Latvians and 9% of non-Latvians were ready to emigrate permanently. Higher propensity 
to emigrate among non-Latvians can be explained by the fact that their labour market 
situation at that time was, on average, worse than that of the ethnic (titular) Latvian 
population (Hazans, 2010, 2011a), as well as by their relatively weaker sense of 
76 – 4. EMIGRATION FROM LATVIA: RECENT TRENDS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
COPING WITH EMIGRATION IN BALTIC AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES © OECD 2013
EHORQJLQJWR/DWYLDVHH=HSDDQG.ƺDYH7KHVHGDWDLPSO\WKDWLQWKH\HDU
about 15% of the economically active population of Latvia was willing to work abroad, 
and half of them were considering permanent emigration. According to the same survey, 
another 25% of the labour force were considering emigration as a possibility. Thus, a 
sizeable emigration potential existed.
Actual emigration rates were of course much lower (see Table 4.1). Emigration was 
limited not only by hopes for a better life in Latvia (in 2000-03, unemployment was 
slowly but steadily decreasing and earnings were growing faster than consumer prices), 
but also by an institutional environment which was not favourable to economic migration, 
and by very high migration costs. Both residence and work permits were necessary unless 
one was ready to take on the risk of illegal immigration and/or employment. In addition, 
Latvian non-citizens needed visas to enter most EU member states. Looking for a job 
abroad was much more difficult and expensive than it is now. International phone calls 
from Latvia were very expensive; internet access was limited, slow, and expensive; air 
travel was costly. Moreover, there were no convenient extensive sources of information 
on vacancies and living and working conditions abroad such as the European 
Employment Services (EURES) portal,5 developed after 2004, where this information is 
available even in Latvian.
The services of private recruitment firms were expensive and often associated with a 
high risk of fraud. In an online survey conducted in Latvia in 2003, among 
2 100 respondents who said that after EU accession they would be ready to work in 
another EU country, 89% asserted that they would move only with a work contract in 
hand, and only 20% considered a contract with a licensed Latvian recruitment firm as a 
sufficient guarantee (Hazans, 2003, Tables A2.12, A2.13).
In brief, rather high de facto thresholds having to do with people’s own initiative, 
access to information, and willingness to accept risk limited economic emigration in the 
pre-accession period. In such a situation, emigration costs would have been relatively 
lower for potential emigrants with a high level of initiative, professional or at least private 
contacts in possible destinations, good foreign language and IT skills, and opportunities 
to use the internet for private purposes at the workplace. Clearly, all these attributes are 
more often found among university graduates. 
Emigrants’ choice of destination was also probably affected by cost considerations: 
while some tried to minimise information and adaptation costs using social networks 
associated with previous waves of migration to/from the United States, Canada, Australia, 
Sweden and Germany, as well as the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus, others 
were oriented towards relatively new directions, mainly the United Kingdom and Ireland 
(which combined lower language barriers than other EU countries with being much closer 
than other English-speaking countries), but also to other countries of “Old Europe”.
Thus, theoretical considerations suggest that:
(H1) In 2000–2003, economic emigrants from Latvia featured:
a) a higher than average proportion of people with tertiary education
b) a higher than average proportion of ethnic minorities
c) a high degree of geographical diversification.
Note that the latter point is well supported by data presented in Figure 4.4.
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Post-accession emigration: Institutional and market factors
During Latvia’s first five years within the European Union (before the effect of the 
crisis on migration patterns became apparent), migration flows were shaped mainly by 
two factors: i) gradual implementation of free movement of labour within the European 
Union (see Brucker et al., 2009, Table 2.1); ii) economic growth in Latvia as well as in 
potential destinations.
Economic growth in Old Europe resulted in an increased demand for labour, thus 
enhancing expected gains for potential economic emigrants and stimulating migration. On 
the other hand, due to strong economic growth in Latvia, the unemployment rate was 
falling while real wages were rising, gradually reducing expected gains from emigration. 
As a result, motivation to move abroad was falling, whilst motivation to return among 
recent emigrants was on the rise.6
For Latvians, the introduction of free movement of labour within the European Union
lowered both the monetary and the non-monetary costs of job search abroad and 
migration, thus stimulating emigration. By contrast with the relatively slow changes in 
Latvia’s labour market, the institutional changes had an almost immediate effect. Since 
May 1, 2004, citizens of Latvia and other new member states have been able to compete 
for jobs in Ireland, the United Kingdom and Sweden on equal terms with local workers.7
This reduced the psychological and adaptation costs of migration, as well as the risk of 
failed labour migration. At the same time, the European Mobility Portal and consultants 
of the EURES started to work in Latvia (and elsewhere in Europe). EURES consultants 
provided about 10 000 consultations in 2004-05, followed by 12 000 in 2006-07. This 
substantially reduced information and job search costs for potential emigrants.
Migration-friendly institutional changes boosted demand for international 
transportation and telecommunication services. As a result, the lower end of the 
passenger and cargo transportation market grew significantly across Europe (including 
Latvia), causing air and land transportation costs, as well as international phone call 
tariffs to fall. Communication costs were also reduced due to increased coverage and 
speed of internet connections. This, in turn, further reduced both direct and indirect 
(e.g., job search) costs of migration. Another side effect of the EU provisions for free 
movement of labour are the growing Latvian diasporas in Ireland, the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Germany and elsewhere in Europe. Rich social infrastructure (including printed 
and electronic media) within these diasporas (see SKDS, 2006; Hazans and Philips, 2010) 
also helped to reduce the risk of “failed emigration” as well as the information, job search 
and psychic costs of migration.
Several factors contributed to a further decline in emigration costs and related risks. 
First, thanks to ongoing emigration and return migration, potential emigrants could 
increasingly rely on relatives and friends as a source of information about work abroad 
(this is known as social network or migrant network effect). Second, a number of 
countries (Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; in part also Norway) opened their 
labour markets in 2006; the Netherlands and Luxembourg followed in 2007 (see Brucker 
et al., 2009, Table 2.1 for details).
As the result of these developments, the threshold for potential emigrants with respect 
to personal initiative and risk taking was not as high as before EU accession. Hence, in 
2004-08 emigrants’ self-selection in terms of human capital was driven not so much by 
individuals’ relative advantage in terms of [falling] migration costs, but mainly by expected 
gains in terms of income and working conditions. These gains were, on average, greater for 
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persons with secondary education or less. For instance, in 2005 employees with tertiary 
education in Latvia earned 54% more than otherwise similar workers with secondary 
education and 76% more than those with less than secondary education (Hazans, 2007). On 
the other hand, 40% to 50% of tertiary educated Latvian migrant workers abroad in 
2004-07 held jobs which did not require a higher education (Hazans and Philips, 2010) and 
hence could not earn much more than other emigrants from Latvia.8
The effect of ethnicity and citizenship on the propensity to emigrate has also changed. 
Due to strong economic growth and labour shortages caused by emigration (see, for 
example, Hazans and Philips, 2010, Section 7 and Figure 12), as well as gradual 
improvements in language skills among minorities (Hazans, 2010, Figure 3; Hazans, 
2011a, Tables 8.8 and 8.9), the labour market position of ethnic minorities in 2004-07
steadily improved. Economic activity and employment rates among non-Latvians were 
growing faster than among Latvians, thus reducing the ethnic employment gap (which 
disappeared completely by 2007, see Hazans, 2010, 2011a). In addition, a substantial part 
of the minority population – those without Latvian citizenship – was not covered by the 
legal provisions on free movement of labour.9
To sum up, theoretical considerations suggest that:
(H2) Between 2004 and 2008, compared to the pre-accession period:
a) the rate of economic emigration from Latvia substantially increased due to the 
introduction of free movement of labour within the European Union, decreasing 
migration costs and social network effect
b) migration flows redirected, to a large extent, towards the United Kingdom, Ireland 
and Sweden
c) the proportion of tertiary-educated persons among emigrants decreased and is now 
lower than their proportion in the [adult] population of Latvia
d) the proportion of non-Latvians (especially non-citizens) among emigrants declined
In addition:
e) in the second half of the period, the intensity of emigration declined due to strong 
economic growth in Latvia.
It is worth noting that hypotheses (a), (b) and (e) have been confirmed in previous 
studies (Hazans, 2009; Hazans and Philips, 2010; Brucker et al., 2009) and are also 
supported by the data shown in Table 4.3 of this chapter. Hypotheses (c) and (d) have 
been confirmed earlier (using Latvian LFS data) with respect to guest workers who 
worked abroad while still being considered as household members in Latvia (Hazans, 
2009, pp. 9, 14; Hazans and Philips, 2010, Figures 3 and 11); here we will provide 
broader evidence. The relative decline in the emigration of tertiary-educated Latvians is 
reflected also in the decreasing share of Latvian-born university graduates in OECD 
countries from 42% in 2000 to 40.6% in 2005/06 (OECD, 2012, p. 244).
Another important feature of this emigration wave (which could not be predicted 
based on theoretical considerations alone) is its mixed nature: while migration was to a 
large extent short-WHUPDQGRUF\FOLFDO.ULãMƗQHet al., 2007; Hazans and Philips, 2010),
there was a steady growth in the number of Latvians staying long enough abroad to be 
captured in statistics and considered in expert estimates of diaspora size.
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Crisis-driven emigration (2009-11): Lost jobs and lost hopes
The economic crisis which began at the end of 2008, in a short time left a segment of 
Latvian population jobless (see Figures 4.1 and 4.6 for employment and unemployment 
developments; Figure 4.6 illustrates emigration response to growing unemployment).
Figure 4.6. Unemployment and emigration developments in Latvia, 2002-12
Thousands
Source: Department of Work and Pensions (United Kingdom), Latvian State Employment Agency, Eurostat.
In the second quarter of 2008, slightly more than 6% of economically active males 
and females were jobseekers. A year later, this rate more than tripled among males and 
more than doubled among females. By the end of 2009, the unemployment rate had 
reached 25% among males and 16% among females.10 Only one out of three jobseekers 
received unemployment benefits. Benefit recipients with less than 20 years of social 
insurance record (which was the case for most potential emigrants) faced the prospect of
benefit reduction to just LVL 40 (EUR 57) per month. Those who were lucky enough to 
keep their jobs experienced wage cuts: median real earnings from all jobs fell by nearly 
25% during 2009 and stayed at this level at least until June of 2012 (Figure 4.7). The 
psychological shock was no less painful: a large proportion of people of working age 
(including those who managed to keep their jobs) lost confidence in the future.
Figure 4.7. Total monthly gross earnings from all legal jobs for employed population with non-zero earnings
Mean and percentiles at constant September 2012 prices, in LVL
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the State Social Insurance Agency.
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In order to assess the propensity to emigrate by socio-economic group, let us look at 
the differences in employment and unemployment rates depending on ethnicity, 
citizenship and education before and during the crisis (Table 4.5). Unemployment, a 
strong push factor, increased particularly among individuals having no higher education 
(and even more so among those having no secondary education), as well as for non-
Latvians, especially those without Latvian citizenship.
Despite the crisis, finding a job in Western Europe was possible, although not as easy 
as before (hence, the role of diasporas and informal networks increased). The rate of 
unemployment was very low (3 to 4%) in Norway, the Netherlands and Austria, and 
remained modest (about 8%) in the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland (European Commission, 2010, Table 24). During 2009-10, the job vacancy rate 
(i.e. the number of vacancies relative to the sum of vacancies and occupied posts) in these 
countries was five to eight times higher than in Latvia (European Commission, 2010, 
Chart 6). Moreover, across Old Europe nominal earnings continued to rise, while real 
earnings did not decline (European Commission, 2011, graphs I.1.8 and III.A3.5). Thus, 
expected gains from emigration in terms of employment and earnings are higher than they 
were during the pre-crisis period.
Table 4.5. Employment and unemployment rates in the working-age population, by educational attainment,
ethnicity and citizenship, 2008-11
Population aged 15-64
1. Employment rate is defined as the proportion of the population (in a particular age group) that is employed.
2. Unemployment rate is defined as the proportion of the economically active population (in a particular age group) that is
seeking a job. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Latvian Labour Force Survey.
The issue of social protection, previously neglected by the middle class, has gained 
importance. In contrast with the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Nordic countries, Germany 
and the Netherlands – where a worker with a sufficient contribution record and earnings 
between 67% and 100% of the average, receives (in benefits) about 70% of previous net 
earnings even in the case of long-term unemployment – in Latvia, after only nine months 
of unemployment (or even six, depending on contribution record – and, indirectly, age), 
the income replacement rate is about 40% even once social assistance and housing 
benefits, if any, are accounted for (European Commission, 2011, graph II.2.4). Moreover, 
Latvian child benefits (LVL 8, or EUR 11.5 per month) are negligible in comparison with 
Tertiary Secondary
Below 
secondary Latvian
Minority
(Latvian 
citizens)
Minority
(other)
2008 86.9 74.5 37.1 68.8 68.3 69.1
2009 82.3 64.6 29.4 62.4 60.4 57.4
2010 80.6 61.5 28.4 61.4 57.1 54.7
2011 83.4 62.4 29.0 63.0 57.0 57.8
2008 4.2 7.7 14.6 6.5 8.8 11.3
2009 8.4 18.7 31.4 15.3 18.2 23.6
2010 10.5 20.4 32.3 16.2 21.5 26.2
2011 7.3 18.5 30.0 13.4 20.9 22.1
Employment1
Unemployment2
Educational attainment Ethnicity and citizenship
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those paid, for every child younger than 16 years, in Old Europe (e.g. EUR 140 per 
month in Ireland and GBP 20.3/GBP 13.4 per week for the first/next child in the 
United Kingdom).11
The above factors converged to make emigration a real option in the minds of Latvian 
residents, even those who had not considered such a possibility before. This category 
consists of two groups: i) individuals who are inherently not very mobile but did not see 
another way out of trouble; and ii) persons who were not satisfied with the developments 
in Latvia and with their own prospects here. In the latter group, one can expect to find a 
higher-than-average proportion of university graduates, because people who have opted 
to invest in higher education are usually future-oriented. As far as the propensity to 
emigrate among persons with less than secondary education is concerned, the direction of 
change is theoretically ambiguous a priori. On the one hand, representatives of this group 
suffered more than others from crisis-related unemployment (see Table 4.5); on the other 
hand, in times of crisis, it would have been difficult for them to compete with secondary 
school graduates for jobs abroad (one of the reasons being poor language skills).
There are two reasons why one should expect ethnic non-Latvians to be 
overrepresented among the post-crisis emigrants (in fact, among both of the above 
mentioned groups). First, the proportion of workers who lost their jobs during the crisis 
was higher among non-Latvians (Hazans, 2010, Table 1), resulting in the re-emergence of 
a significant ethnic employment gap, especially wide among university graduates 
(Hazans, 2010, Figures 6 and 7; see also Table 3.5 above). Second, in July 2009 (despite 
objections by employers’ associations), the government adopted new regulations on state 
language proficiency requirements, which substantially expanded the list of occupations 
(both in private and public sectors), which require certified intermediate or advanced 
Latvian language skills. Given that the previous regulations were perceived by most 
workers (Latvians and non-Latvians alike) as adequate or in some cases even too strict 
(Hazans, 2010, pp. 151-153), non-Latvians saw this as a measure undermining the labour 
market position of minority workers and, in a wider context, signalling the radicalisation 
of language policies. Such a signal of course works as an additional push factor 
increasing the inclination to emigrate among non-Latvians. Taking into account that the 
EU provisions for free mobility of labour do not apply to those who are not citizens, one 
should expect the largest increase in the propensity to emigrate among non-Latvians 
holding Latvian citizenship.
To sum up, in the beginning of 2009 one could expect (as formulated in Hazans, 
2009) an intensification of emigration, as well as changes in both reasons for emigration 
and migrant population profile:
(H3) In 2009–2010, compared to the pre-crisis period:
a) the intensity of emigration from Latvia increased
b) migration flows have further diversified; with a decline in the share of Ireland, 
heavily hit by the crisis, and an increase in the shares of other (also non-European) 
destinations
c) the role of push factors in shaping migration flows increased (especially 
unemployment and wage cuts, but also lack of prospects, loss of hope and 
uncertainty of Latvia’s development path); among pull factors, the role of destination 
countries’ social protection systems increased
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d) migrants are much more oriented towards long-term or permanent emigration and 
are more likely to move as entire families
e) the proportion of tertiary-educated individuals among emigrants increased 
significantly, exceeding the corresponding proportion among those who stayed
f) the proportion of individuals oriented towards self-employment or opening their own 
business among emigrants increased
g) the proportion of ethnic minorities (especially those holding Latvian citizenship) 
among emigrants increased.
Note that evidence supporting points (a) and (b) is presented in Figure 4.4. Point (d) 
and the part of (c) related to social security are supported by an interesting account of the 
changes in the profile of potential emigrants from Latvia (EURES clients) based on the 
daily records of EURES consultants summarised by Žanna Ribakova, former EURES 
manager in Latvia, and presented in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6. Changes in the profile of EURES clients in Latvia, 2004-10
Source: Ribakova, Z. (2009), “EURES – An Instrument for Facilitating Free Movement of Labour with
15 Years of Experience in European Employment Services”, Presentation at the State Employment
Agency conference.
Changes in the emigrant population profile, 2000-10
Table 4.7 presents the statistical portrait of adult emigrants at the end of 2010. The 
portrait is based on data from a representative population survey – the National Identity: 
Place, Capability, Migration (NIPCM) survey – in which Latvian residents were asked 
about their family members and close relatives who left Latvia in 2000-10 (and were 
living abroad during the survey). The population of emigrants is divided into three groups 
by period of departure.
For the sake of comparison, Table 4.7 presents two additional population profiles – the 
profile of a non-migrant – a Latvian resident (as at March 2011), as derived from the 2011 
population census, and the profile of a return migrant (a person who, during the past 
decade, lived abroad for three or more months at a time). Data for the latter profile is based 
on the NIPCM survey. According to the same survey, return migrants accounted for about 
10% of the population aged 18-74. While our definition of return migrant also includes 
individuals who have not spent a sufficiently long time abroad to be included in partner 
countries’ population or migration statistics, the same three-month threshold has been used 
for identifying return migrants in many surveys, including the Eurobarometer 
(March-April 2010). Note also that while in the literature the term “non-migrant” or 
“stayer” often excludes return migrants (see e.g. Hazans, 2011b), column “All” in Table 4.7 
refers to the entire resident population.
2004-07 2008-10
Planning to move alone Planning to move with family
Looking for temporary, low-skil led job Looking for permanent, skil led job
Minimal knowledge of foreign languages Better knowledge of foreign languages, higher qualifications
Planning to return Interested in legal employment and social security
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Table 4.7. Emigrant and general population profiles
1. The distribution of emigrants is based on information provided by their close relatives in Latvia in the framework of the 
NIPCM survey commissioned by the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia and conducted between December 2010
and January 2011 by the SKDS public opinion research centre. For 12% of emigrants, year of departure is unknown; these 
emigrants have been included in the 2000-10 column, and are not shown separately.
2. Population census results (Statistics Latvia, 2012c) and author’s calculations.
3. Return migrants – persons who, between 2000 and 2010, spent three months or more abroad at a time but were living in
Latvia during the survey. Their profile is derived from the NIPCM survey (see Note 1 above).
4. Using the emigrant population (2000-10) as standard.
5. “Other” include housekeepers, pensioners and other economically inactive persons; “n.a.” refers only to emigrants.
Source: Author’s calculations based on NIPCM survey and Statistics Latvia.
Gender and age structure
According to the NIPCM survey (Table 4.7), women accounted for 57% of adult 
emigrants who left Latvia during the first decade of the 21st century, as compared to 51% 
among similarly aged non-migrants and only 39% among returnees. Similarly, according 
to demographic data from other EU countries, the proportion of females among Latvian 
citizens residing abroad is 57%. Foreign data also confirm that the share of females 
among those returning to Latvia is smaller than among those leaving Latvia for these 
countries. This suggests that male emigrants are more likely to return than their female 
counterparts. The gender imbalance among emigrants puts the reproductive potential of 
the Latvian population at risk. A much greater risk for Latvia’s demographic prospects 
Age-adjusted4 Aged 18–74 
Males 46.5 45.2 39.9 42.8 49.1 46.5 61.3
Females 53.5 54.9 60.1 57.2 50.8 53.5 38.7
Age
18-24 6.9 23.4 32.7 22.6 22.6 13.7 20
25-34 54.3 48.1 38.8 44.9 44.9 18.3 37.6
35-44 29.7 18.3 17.9 19.6 19.6 18.3 22.8
45-54 7.2 8.3 9.3 8.5 8.5 19.5 12.8
Educational attainment
Below secondary 5.3 5.4 4.6 6.0 21.0 21.0 11.6
Secondary 53.8 70.6 59.9 61.8 51.9 54.2 70.2
Tertiary 32 21.5 27 24.2 27.1 24.8 18.1
Unknown 8.9 2.5 8.6 8 0 0 0
Main occupation
Wage earner 55.2 84.8 79.9 78.3 54.5 47.7 59.4
Self-employed or employer 0.0 1.8 3.6 2.1 6.0 5.9 6.2
Student 1.7 6.2 5.7 5.0 10.3 5.6 6.6
Unemployed 0.0 0.6 1.5 0.9 14.7 12.4 16.9
Other or n.a.5 43.1 6.7 9.3 13.7 14.5 28.4 10.9
Number of observations 57 215 144 471 891 880 000
Emigrants (by year of departure) Latvian population, March 2011
% distribution1 % distribution2
All Return 
migrants32004-08 2009-10 2000-102000-03
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however, is associated with the age structure of the emigrant population. By the end of 
2010, two thirds of emigrants were younger than 35 (at departure, this proportion is at 
least three quarters). This is more than twice as high as the share of this age-group among 
non-migrants. Persons aged 35-44 are proportionally represented among emigrants, while 
just one out of ten emigrants is older than 54 years. Return migrants are, on average, 
slightly older than emigrants but much younger than non-migrants.
Educational attainment
By the end of 2010, 24% of emigrants were university graduates; this was similar to 
the proportion among residents aged 18-74 (25%) but somewhat lower than among 
residents of the same age distribution as emigrants (27%). Among emigrants who left 
during the crisis, however, 27% have higher education. The share of university-
educated individuals among economically active post-enlargement working-age 
emigrants (24%) is slightly higher than the corresponding figure among all 
EU10 emigrants in EU countries (22%, see European Commission, 2012, p. 272), but 
the difference is not statistically significant. The proportion of individuals with a low 
level of education among emigrants is between 6% and 14%, and is probably closer to 
the latter, since those 8% of emigrants whose relatives were unaware of their 
educational attainment, are less likely to have had a high level of education. Given that 
21% of the resident population lacks secondary education, emigrants, especially the 
most recent ones, appear to be better educated. Among return migrants, both the lower-
educated and the university graduates are under-represented in comparison with the 
general population, while 70% hold secondary education. The share of university 
graduates among returnees (18%) is lower than among emigrants, suggesting that
emigrants with higher education are less likely to return; Hazans (2012, Figure 5) 
supports this hypothesis using Latvian LFS data.
When the share of university graduates is compared across the three waves of 
emigration, a U-shaped curve emerges (32% – 21% – 27%), which is consistent with 
hypotheses (H1)-(a), (H2)-(c) and (H3)-(e) above, regarding the propensity to emigrate 
among tertiary-educated residents of Latvia. This becomes even more obvious when only 
emigrants aged 22 or older are considered (note that this group includes all but two 
tertiary-educated emigrants in our sample): among pre-accession emigrants, the 
proportion of university graduates is 31%, in the post-accession period this proportion 
falls to 24%, but then rises again to reach 32% among those who left Latvia in 2009-10 
(Figure 4.8).
Figure 4.8 also presents differences between the educational profiles of emigrants 
depending on their ethnicity, citizenship and the country of destination. The largest 
proportion of university graduates is found among non-Latvians holding Latvian 
citizenship. This is well in line with two already mentioned circumstances: a relatively 
low employment rate among tertiary-educated non-Latvians and restrictions faced by 
Latvian non-citizens in EU labour markets. When emigrants in different destination 
countries are compared, the lowest proportion of university graduates is found 
in Ireland.
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Figure 4.8. Educational attainment among emigrants from Latvia aged 22 and over by period of departure,
ethnicity, citizenship and destination
Percentage
Note: Educational attainment – the highest level of education completed by the end of 2010; Ethnicity and citizenship are
proxied by attributes of the emigrant’s relative who provided the information.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from NIPCM.
Labour market status and occupation
A striking feature of the emigrants’ situation in the host countries’ labour markets is 
an extremely high employment rate: at least 87% among those who left Latvia in 2004-08
and at least 84% among crisis-period emigrants.12 For the sake of comparison, only 54% 
of non-migrants aged 18-74 were employed in March of 2011, while the age-adjusted rate 
of employment for non-migrants was 61%. Unfortunately, the rate of employment among 
emigrants who left Latvia before 2004 could not be calculated with any degree of 
certainty due to the high percentage of missing values (43%), but it is surely higher than 
among non-migrants. Note that return migrants in Latvia also feature a higher 
employment rate (about 66%) than stayers. On the other hand, they also feature a higher 
unemployment rate, but this might be because they can afford to search longer due to 
savings from earnings abroad (Hazans, 2008).
The proportion of self-employed and entrepreneurs among crisis-period emigrants 
doubled in comparison with the previous period, confirming hypothesis (H3)-(f).
Even under the most radical (and unlikely) assumption that all emigrants with an 
“unknown” employment status were in fact unemployed, emigrants of the last two waves 
feature a much lower unemployment level than the one observed in Latvia during the 
crisis. To sum up, emigrants’ labour market outcomes are significantly better than those 
of non-migrants.
Figure 4.9 provides a more detailed breakdown of Latvian emigrants’ main activities 
abroad (by education, destination country and period of departure from Latvia). On 
average, only 26% of emigrants held a paid job in which they used their qualifications 
(education). This proportion is higher (and the incidence of brain waste smaller) in 
continental EU15 countries, where it reaches 36%, than in other countries of destination. 
31 24 32 23 36 25 28
15
30 36 27
0
20
40
60
80
100
20
00
-2
00
3
20
04
-2
00
8
20
09
-2
01
0
La
tv
ia
n/
La
tv
ia
n
M
in
or
ity
/L
at
vi
an
M
in
or
ity
/O
th
er
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Ire
la
nd
Co
nt
in
en
ta
l E
ur
op
e
O
th
er
/n
.a
.
To
ta
l
Period of departure Ethnicity and citizenship Country of destination
Not specified Below secondary Secondary Tertiary
86 – 4. EMIGRATION FROM LATVIA: RECENT TRENDS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
COPING WITH EMIGRATION IN BALTIC AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES © OECD 2013
The lowest rate (19%) is found among emigrants living in Ireland and in countries outside 
Old Europe (United States, Canada, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, etc.). Tertiary-
educated emigrants are more likely to use their qualification than those with a secondary 
education or less. Those who emigrated during the crisis were less choosy with respect to 
their job abroad: only 23% of them use their qualification, whereas this is the case for 
29% of emigrants who left Latvia during the previous two waves of migration (the 
difference is statistically significant).
Figure 4.9. Emigrants’ main activity abroad at the end of 2010, by educational attainment,
destination and period of departure from Latvia
Percentage
Note: “Continental Europe” refers to the EU15 (without the United Kingdom and Ireland), Norway and Switzerland.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from NIPCM.
Will the emigrants ever come back? 
Given Latvia’s deteriorating demographic situation, the possible return of emigrants 
can be extremely important. Figure 4.10 summarises information on Latvian emigrants’ 
intentions to return, as reported in the NIPCM survey. On average, 8% of emigrants 
intend to (or would like to) return within six months, while about 20% of emigrants 
entertain the possibility of returning within five years. A more recent survey of users of 
the Latvian social network Draugiem.lv residing in the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Germany, Norway and Sweden produced a similar result: only 23% of respondents plan 
to return to Latvia within the next five years, 65% plan to stay abroad longer than five 
\HDUVDQGSODQWRPRYHWRDQRWKHUFRXQWU\.ULãMƗQH et al., 2012). These findings are 
in striking contrast with the situation observed in 2005-06, when two-thirds of emigrants 
having left Latvia in 2004-05 were planning to return within two years, most of them 
(almost half of all emigrants) even within one year (Hazans and Philips, 2010, Figure 9). 
In fact, in 2002-07, more than half of Latvian guest-workers13 returned home within one 
year, according to the Latvian LFS (Hazans, 2009, p. 19; Hazans and Philips, 2010, 
Figure 10). These data support hypothesis (H3)-(d) namely that Latvian emigrants who 
left during the crisis are to a much larger extent oriented towards long-term or permanent 
emigration.
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Ethnicity and citizenship are also associated with intentions to return, with 
non-Latvians having no Latvian citizenship show the lowest propensity to return: only 
8% within five years (Figure 4.10). Tertiary- and secondary-educated Latvian emigrants 
are more likely to return than their counterparts who do not have a secondary education. 
When different destination countries are compared, it appears that Latvian emigrants in 
Ireland have the lowest propensity to return within five years (Figure 4.10).
The proportion of emigrants intending to return sharply declines as the duration of 
stay abroad increases. Thus, among those who left Latvia less than a year ago, one-fifth 
plan to return within six months, and more than one-third contemplate return within 
five years. By comparison, these proportions fall to 3% and 15%, respectively, among 
emigrants who stayed abroad between three and five years.
Figure 4.10. Intentions to return within six months and within five years, among emigrants from Latvia,
by ethnicity and citizenship, educational attainment, destination and duration of stay abroad, 2010-11
Percentage
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from NIPCM, December 2010 to January 2011.
Migration networks and the experience of return migrants 
As shown in Hazans (2011b, Box 2.25), among those aged 18-65, the proportion of 
individuals who had some relative or friend with foreign work experience reached 75% as 
early as the end of 2005 and increased to 82% by the beginning of 2011. Both at the end 
of 2006 and in the middle of 2008, 15% of working-age individuals were able to obtain 
information about work abroad from recent (of the last two years) experience, either their 
own or that of a close relative. Moreover, at the end of 2010, 28% of respondents 
indicated that some of their close relatives were working abroad (i.e., during the survey), 
and 10% had personal foreign work experience (including 9% during the last five years).
These data confirm the emergence of powerful migration networks. This, as noted 
above, significantly reduces information and job search costs, as well as psychic and 
adaptation costs for potential emigrants. Another (possibly, even more important) 
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conclusion from these data is that in recent years, work abroad has become an integral
part of Latvian national identity.
Let us now look at how return migrants assess their experience abroad. The NIPCM 
survey (December 2010-January 2011) identified 89 respondents who spent at least three 
months abroad (in a single visit) during the last ten years, but have returned to Latvia. 
Figure 4.11 presents information on the impact of this experience on various aspects of 
their lives (health, family, etc.), according to their own assessment. Generally speaking, 
migrants seem to view their experience abroad as having affected their lives favourably.
A majority of respondents were of the opinion that the time spent outside of Latvia 
had a positive effect on their lives in terms of health (60%), relationships with family 
members (82%), material well-being (73%; only 8% reported a negative impact) and 
self-confidence (82%).
Figure 4.11. Return migrants’ assessment of the impact of their time spent abroad on various aspects
of their lives 
Percentage
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from NIPCM.
Respondents were also asked to assess the effect of their stay outside of Latvia on 
their professional skills. Again, most (69%) considered the experience to have affected 
their lives positively in this respect (Figure 4.11). The effect of time spent abroad on 
language skills in Latvian or Russian as second language is less pronounced but very 
interesting. 44% of respondents reported a positive effect, one-third noticed no effect, 
while a negative assessment was very rare (Figure 4.11). As could be expected, most 
respondents (69%) felt that their English language skills had improved. 
With respect to other foreign languages, a perceived negative effect of time spent 
abroad is more common (13%) than in the case of English, yet a perceived positive effect 
prevails (33%).
Return migrants have higher employment levels than people without a migration 
background. An econometric analysis (omitted here), however, showed that this 
association can be accounted for by differences in the age and gender distributions of the 
two groups.
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Figure 4.12 sheds some light on the question of whether foreign work experience 
helps to earn more in Latvia. For this purpose, we look at the personal net income of 
individuals employed in Latvia in the second half of 2010, depending on their (and their 
family members’) post-accession foreign work experience. Among those respondents 
who did not have family members working abroad during the survey, those who had 
personal work experience abroad have, on average, an 18% higher income than those 
without such experience (LVL 306 vs. LVL 261 per month). On the other hand, among 
respondents who did have a family member working abroad during the survey (and, 
therefore, were likely to receive remittances), return migrants’ average income exceeds 
the average income of individuals without recent foreign work experience by 25% 
(LVL 383 vs. LVL 306 per month). Comparing median rather than average income of 
these groups does not change the results qualitatively. Econometric analysis (details 
omitted) confirms that even after controlling for educational attainment, age, gender, 
region and family members working abroad, employed return migrants collect a 13% 
higher income than their employed counterparts without post-accession foreign work 
experience. Moreover, this difference is due to experience abroad rather than to 
differences in productivity between return migrants and other workers. A study based on 
2007 data yielded similar results (Hazans, 2008).
To sum up, both the respondents’ opinions and their labour market outcomes suggest 
that the effect of foreign work experience on various aspects of the lives of return 
migrants has been largely positive.
Figure 4.12. Personal net income of individuals employed in Latvia in the second half of 2010,
by their own and their family members’ foreign work experience
LVL per month
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from NIPCM.
Intentions to emigrate
This section explores emigration intentions of Latvian residents aged 18-65 in the 
period between December 2010 and February 2011, after more than two years of 
recession, accompanied by a powerful wave of emigration. The results, based on 
two surveys, are broken down by respondents’ level of education, main occupation 
(status), ethnicity, citizenship, region, type of settlement and a background of migration. 
The NIPCM survey asks whether the respondent plans to move from Latvia in the 
near future in order to improve material well-being for themselves or their families.
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Those who answered “Yes” or “I do not exclude such a possibility” are categorised as 
potential emigrants; the former group is further referred to as having concrete plans.
To analyse reasons for emigration, we used the “DnB NORD Latvian Barometer
survey No. 35” conducted in February 2011 (DnB NORD), which sampled from the same 
reference group (Latvian residents aged 18-75) as the NIPCM survey. The DnB NORD 
survey asked “Do you plan to live and work abroad?”, followed, in the case of a positive 
answer, by a multiple choice question in which the respondent was asked to specify one 
or more reasons from a given list. We divided potential emigrants into two categories. 
The first one includes those who mention one of the following economic reasons (no jobs 
available in Latvia; no possibility to earn a living in Latvia; elsewhere one can earn much 
more; better social protection abroad), possibly together with one or more other 
(non-economic) reasons. The second category includes those who did not mention any of 
the economic reasons, but plan emigration only for non-economic reasons – namely, one 
or more of the following: an opportunity to see the world, to get new impressions, to meet 
new friends; education and career possibilities; no future in Latvia; does not like what is 
going on in Latvia; does not like the political environment; wants to live in a stable 
country; influence of other people.
Overall, in December 2010-January 2011, 9% of the population aged 18 to 65 
planned to leave Latvia in the near future to improve their material well-being and 
another 17% did not exclude such a possibility. Potential emigrants (both groups) thus 
constituted 26% of the population. In February 2011, in the framework of the 
DnB NORD survey, 20% of respondents reported plans to emigrate for economic 
reasons, and another 10% only for non-economic reasons, thus raising the proportion of 
potential movers to about 30% (note however, that in this case, plans do not necessarily 
refer to the near future and are not restricted to emigration for economic reasons).
According to the NIPCM survey, the highest propensity to emigrate in the near future 
is found among those with a secondary education: 28% of them are potential movers, 
including 10% with concrete plans. The other two groups are not far behind, however: 
25% of those with less than secondary education and 22% of the tertiary-educated are 
potential emigrants, in both cases including 7% with concrete plans (Figure 4.13, top).
Larger differences are observed with respect to reasons for emigration (Figure 4.13, 
bottom). The proportion of those who plan to move abroad for economic (and possibly 
other) reasons decreases with educational attainment: from 29% among respondents with 
a basic education to 13% among university graduates. By contrast, the proportion of those 
who plan emigration only for non-economic reasons increases from 8% among 
respondents with less than secondary education to 14% among respondents with tertiary 
education.
From an occupational perspective, the highest propensity to emigrate in the near 
future is found among students: more than half of them are potential emigrants, including 
18% with concrete plans (Figure 4.13, top). A lower, yet significant propensity to 
emigrate is found among the unemployed, manual workers and non-manual workers, with 
between 23% and 30% potential emigrants, including 7% to 12% with concrete plans 
(Figure 4.13, top). On average, one-third of potential movers mention only non-economic 
reasons for emigration. The only occupational group in which most potential movers do 
not mention any economic reasons for their plans, is that of non-manual workers 
(Figure 4.13, bottom).
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Figure 4.13. Intentions to emigrate among Latvian residents aged 18-65, by educational attainment
and main occupation, December 2010 to February 2011
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data: top – “DnB NORD Latvian Barometer”, No. 35; 
bottom – NIPCM.
Noteworthy is the very high propensity to emigrate (37% overall, including almost 
9% with concrete plans) among persons who did not complete their higher education and 
who are not students (this result is not shown in Figure 4.13).
The unemployed are more often inclined to leave Latvia due to economic, or a 
combination of economic and non-economic reasons (this is the case for 35% of all 
jobseekers), than for non-economic reasons alone (8%). A similar situation is found 
among manual workers (20% and 7%, respectively). Among non-manual workers, on the 
other hand, 15% plan to leave Latvia only for non-economic reasons, while 12% mention 
economic reasons. Interestingly, total emigration potential is equally large (27%) among 
both manual and non-manual workers (Figure 4.13, bottom).
In order to gain a more in-depth understanding of the motivations and concreteness of 
intentions to emigrate in various population groups, we used an econometric model, 
which evaluates the impact on the individual’s emigration plans, of each of the following 
variables: gender, age, family status, educational attainment, ethnicity and citizenship, 
main occupation, region and degree of urbanisation, while holding all other variables 
constant. The main results of this analysis – presented as the mathematical difference, in 
percentage points, between the adjusted proportion of potential emigrants in each 
category and that in the reference category – are summarised in Table 4.8.
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Other things being equal, females and males without under-age children do not differ 
much in terms of propensity to emigrate, although the probability of an emigration plan in 
the near future is 2.6 percentage points higher for a female than for an otherwise similar 
male. By contrast, when a woman with children is compared to an otherwise similar man 
with children, the probability for the woman to plan emigration in the near future or in 
general is 5.5 to 6 percentage points lower, and her probability to plan emigration for 
economic reasons 9 percentage points lower, while probability to plan emigration due to 
non-economic reasons alone is 3 percentage points higher.14
The presence of children in the family significantly increases males’ propensity to 
emigrate due to economic reasons, while for females this effect is negative with respect to 
plans for the near future but is not significant with respect to emigration in general or due 
only to non-economic reasons (note that for females, the effect of the presence of children
in each of the five columns of Table 4.8 can be obtained by summing the rows “Lives 
with children” and “Female with children”). This supports hypothesis (H3)-(d) namely, 
that since the onset of the economic crisis, potential emigrants are oriented towards long-
term or permanent emigration and tend to move as entire families.
While intentions to emigrate vary significantly by age group, it is worth noting that 
the 25-34 year-olds have practically as strong a propensity to emigrate as those aged 18 
to 24. For both groups, the probability of a plan to emigrate in the near future is 
23 percentage points higher than for 55-65 year-olds, the probability of a more general 
plan to emigrate (without specifying the time) 30 to 35 percentage points higher, and 
the probability of a plan to emigrate due to economic reasons 26 to 34 percentage 
points higher. For population aged 35 to 44 years, all the above probabilities are 6 to 
11 percentage points lower than for the 25-34 year-olds, but for those aged 45-54 years, 
another 6 to 10 percentage points lower. When the average probability for each model 
is taken into account (see row “Proportion of positive answers” in Table 4.8), it appears 
that the strongest age effects, which exceed the average prevalence of emigration plans 
by a factor of two-and-a-half, are related to concrete plans to move abroad in the 
near future.
It is worth noting, that the highest propensity to emigrate due to non-economic 
reasons alone, is found in 25-44 year-olds.
When other factors are controlled for, the difference between persons with 
secondary and tertiary education with respect to propensity to emigrate becomes 
insignificant, with the exception of emigration due only to non-economic reasons. In 
the latter case, university graduates feature a 4.3 percentage points higher probability of 
contemplating emigration. These findings once again support our hypothesis (H3)-(e)
regarding a significant increase in the proportion of individuals with higher education 
among emigrants during the crisis. On the other hand, for a person whose education is 
below secondary, the probability of a plan for [economic] emigration in the near future 
is 6 to 7 percentage points lower than for an otherwise similar person having completed 
secondary education. This is despite the fact that people of low educational attainment 
suffered more than others from recession-related lay-offs (see Table 4.5).
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Table 4.8. Impact of demographic and occupational factors on emigration plans, population aged 18-65,
December 2010-February 20111
Mathematical difference between proportions of potential emigrants as compared to reference category, in percentage points
Note: *, **, *** – estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
1. Factors and reference categories are given in bold. Cells report the mathematical difference, in percentage points, between the 
adjusted proportion of potential emigrants in each category and that in the reference category. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data: the first two columns are based on “DnB NORD Latvian Barometer”,
No. 35; the last three columns, on the NIPCM 2010 survey.
After controlling for the above variables, Non-Latvians with Latvian citizenship are 7
to 8 percentage points more likely than ethnic Latvians, to plan or consider moving 
abroad (“in the near future”, “in general” and “for economic reasons”). On the other hand, 
non-Latvians without Latvian citizenship are not significantly different from ethnic 
Latvians with respect to the first two of the above-mentioned probabilities (i.e., “in the 
near future” and “overall”). The probability of planning emigration due to economic 
reasons among non-citizens, however, is 7 percentage points higher than among ethnic 
Latvians. This, in turn, is partly offset by a 6 percentage points lower probability of 
planning emigration due to non-economic reasons alone. Finally, among non-Latvians 
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Lives with children  3.6**  8.0*** 4.6  7.8*** -3.6
Female with children -8.1***  -6.4* -5.1* -9.6***  4.9**
Age 18-24 22.9*** 33.0*** 34.5*** 33.4*** 2.2
25-34 23.0*** 32.4*** 30.4*** 25.6***  8.0**
35-44 17.0*** 20.9*** 22.8*** 19.2***  6.3**
45-54 11.4*** 14.1*** 13.2*** 13.2*** 2.6
55-65 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Education Below secondary  -6.0***  -7.1** -3.4 -1.9 -1.9
Secondary Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Tertiary -2.7 -2.5 2.3 -3  4.3***
Latvian Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Non-Latvian, Latvia citizen -2  7.3***  7.4***  8.3*** -0.5
Non-Latvian, non-citizen  2.6* 2.4 0.9  6.7** -6.4***
Main occupation Wage earners Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Unemployed  4.8***  6.0** 14.9*** 14.3*** -1.1
Student 1.7 6.8 19.4*** 6.3 11.1***
Other 1.1 -10.7*** 1.4 2 -0.8
Up to 80  5.4** -1.9 -2.3  -5.1* 3.2
81-120  4.3** 1.8 1.5 -4.5  8.0***
121-160 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
161-200 3.3 1.8 -1.1  -8.8***  9.3***
>200 1.3 -3.3 -4.4  -7.8**  5.2**
Unspecified  4.3* -0.3 0.5  -9.3*** 11.2***
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urbanisation level)
Number of  
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869 869 868 868 868
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income per capita, 
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Proportion of positive answers 
Factors1,2
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the near future to improve your/family 
material well-being?
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with Latvian citizenship the propensity to move abroad due to non-economic reasons 
alone is the same as among ethnic Latvians. 
While findings reported in the previous paragraph suggest that non-citizens are less 
inclined to emigrate than non-Latvians with Latvian citizenship, results from the first 
column of Table 4.8 are slightly different: holding other variables constant, the probability 
of planning economic emigration in the near future for non-citizens is, on average, 
2.5 percentage points higher than for Latvians and 4.5 percentage points higher than for 
minority citizens. In all likelihood, this is attributable to the difficult labour market situation 
of non-citizens (see Table 4.5). Overall, the results of the econometric analysis support 
hypothesis (H3)-(g) above, regarding changes in the role of ethnicity after the onset of the 
economic crisis: the propensity to emigrate among minority individuals – especially among 
those holding Latvian citizenship – appears to be higher than among Latvians. Official data 
on ethnic composition of emigrants in 2011-12 (Statistics Latvia, 2013a) also support this
conclusion: estimated proportion of ethnic Latvians among emigrants is below 50%, while 
their share in general population is about 61%.
As can be expected, the unemployed are much more likely than the employed, to plan 
emigration (“in the near future”, “in general”, “for economic reasons”).The impressive 
size of this effect is demonstrated by the fact that the difference in probabilities between 
the unemployed and employed (respectively, 5, 15 and 14 percentage points), is very 
large relative to the average proportion of potential emigrants of the given kind 
(respectively, 9%, 31% and 20%) in population aged 18-65. If those who do not exclude 
the possibility of moving abroad in the near future are also considered potential emigrants 
(along with those having specific plans), then the likelihood to belong to this group for an 
unemployed person is 6 percentage points higher than for an employed person. By 
contrast, with respect to plans to move abroad only for non-economic reasons, an 
unemployed person does not differ significantly from an employed individual.
Finally, students are much more oriented towards emigration for non-economic 
reasons alone, than those whose main activity is work: the difference in probabilities is 
11 percentage points, which is a very large effect given that overall just 10% of 
population falls into this category.
Results reported so far refer to early 2011. Figure 4.14 provides evidence from a more 
recent (August 2012) survey, in which respondents were asked to choose from a list (or to
suggest) three main reasons that would cause them to reject an offer to live and work 
outside Latvia for a long time.
According to this survey, 4% of respondents aged 18-64 are “determined movers” –
people who, while ready to move under certain conditions, could not think of a reason 
which would stop them. 
In the same survey, respondents were asked about the main conditions that would 
need to be met for them to accept an offer to live and work outside Latvia for a long time. 
Figure 4.15 ranks the most frequent answers. Higher income, better living conditions and 
(notably) better social policies in the potential country of destination lead the list. Just one 
out of eight respondents mentioned warranted possibility to return as a precondition.
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Figure 4.14. Main reasons to reject an offer to live and work outside of Latvia for a long time
Proportions of population aged 18-64 who chose each answer
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the “DnB NORD Latvian Barometer”, No. 51 (August 2012).
Only 22% of respondents are “determined non-migrants” – under no conditions 
would they move abroad.
Questions similar to those reported in Figures 4.14 and 4.15 were asked in another 
survey conducted by the same agency early in 2010. Figure 4.16 compares the results 
regarding determined non-migrants (as defined above) and potential emigrants – those who 
would accept an offer to work and live abroad, at least under certain conditions.15 The lists 
of conditions differed somewhat across years, but in both surveys there was an open-ended 
option to list “Other conditions”. Thus, the results are comparable (although not perfectly). 
In two and a half years, the share of potential emigrants increased from 54% to 68% at the 
expense of the proportion of determined non-migrants, while the share of the undecided 
remained at 10%. This suggests that emigration potential has increased – despite the 
intensive emigration that took place in the period between the two surveys (see Table 4.4), 
restored economic growth (5.7% in the first three quarters of 2012 vs. 2.4% in the same 
period of 2010) and declining (yet high) unemployment (14.2% in the third quarter of 2012 
vs. 20.5% in the first quarter of 2010, seasonally adjusted).
Figure 4.15. Main reasons to accept an offer to live and work outside of Latvia for a long time
Proportions of population aged 18-64 who chose each answer
Note: The five least popular answers are not shown.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the “DnB NORD Latvian Barometer”, No. 51 (August 2012).
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Figure 4.16. Determined stayers and potential emigrants in population aged 18-64
August 2012 vs. February 2010
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the “DnB NORD Latvian Barometer”, No. 22 and No. 51.
This result is consistent with the increasing importance of non-economic reasons for 
emigration, or reasons that are economic in nature but rooted in the past rather than linked 
to current economic trends, such as credit liabilities. Indeed, .ULãMƗQHHWDO. (2012), based 
on a survey among users of a Latvian social network residing outside of Latvia, found 
that debt repayment was the most popular main reason for emigration (22% of 
respondents), followed by uncertainty about one’s future (19%), difficulties in finding a 
job (17%) and insufficient career prospects (15%).
The economic impact of emigration on Latvia
Emigration may affect the sending country’s labour market in a number of ways. 
First, it tends to reduce unemployment below the levels expected under a zero-emigration 
scenario, because actual or potential unemployed, and economically inactive individuals 
move abroad or fill the vacancies left behind by previously employed emigrants. 
Table 4.9 (based on LFS data) indicates that in 2003-10 one-fifth to one-third of Latvian 
guestworkers experienced unemployment or economic inactivity in Latvia during the year 
prior to their departure.
Table 4.9. Unemployment or spells of economic inactivity in Latvia during the year prior to departure,
among Latvian guestworkers,1 2003-10
Percentage
1. Guestworkers here are labour emigrants still considered household members back home.
2. For 2007-08, the results are not comparable with the other years due to a change in LFS design in 2007.
3. Data for 2010 refer to “one year ago” rather than “during the previous year” and hence should be seen as lower 
bounds.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Latvian Labour Force Survey.
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Moreover, among all emigrants with legal work or registered unemployment 
experience in Latvia, the share of those whose last registered activity before leaving was 
unemployment, rose from 10% in 2005 to 48% in 2011 (Figure 4.17).
Figure 4.17. Estimated share of registered unemployed among emigrants with registered labour market
experience, and average last monthly amount received in benefits by emigrants before departure, 2005-11
Note: Emigrants’ age structure is used for assigning weights to individuals (excluding retirees) permanently leaving both SSIA 
and SEA datasets in between January 2005 and August 2011 (to allow one year abroad for those who left most recently).
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the State Social Insurance Agency (SSIA) and the State Employment Agency (SEA). 
These data suggest that, were it not for emigration, there would have been fewer 
vacancies, and unemployment would have been much higher, at least in 2009-12, a period 
in which vacancies were scarce (Figure 4.18). Moreover, emigration led to significant 
fiscal savings on state and social benefits (Figure 4.17). Note that whether, during a 
period of intensive emigration, unemployment actually falls and job vacancy rate grows 
depends on the business cycle. Unemployment was falling in 2004-07, then growing until 
the first quarter of 2010 and then again falling (Figure 4.6); job vacancy rate “predicted”
the coming recession earlier than did unemployment, and resumed growth later 
(Figure 4.18).
As discussed in detail in Hazans and Philips (2010), during the growth period, 
emigration was not the only cause for the decline of unemployment. Increase in job 
vacancy rate (especially in manufacturing and construction, as well as for semi-skilled 
manual workers) outpaced emigration in 2005-07 (even more so in 2005-06), see 
Figure 4.18. By contrast, during the jobless recovery of 2010-11, job vacancy rate was 
either roughly constant at a very low level or growing at a much slower pace than 
emigration. Moreover, the fastest growth in job vacancy rate refers to high-skilled non-
manual jobs (Figure 4.18). This is consistent with an increasing share of university 
graduates among the emigrants.
Several studies have used large macro-econometric models to estimate the effect of 
emigration on the rate of unemployment in sending countries, including Latvia; see 
Holland et al. (2011) and European Commission (2012, pp. 275-276) for a summary. In 
particular, Barrel et al. (2007, Tables 3 and 4) estimate that migration contributed to 
reduce the rate of unemployment in Latvia by 2.4 percentage points over the four-year 
period of 2005-08. Holland et al. (2011), however, find a much smaller effect. Zasova 
(2012) developed a model which sets the estimated contribution of emigration to the 
decline in the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) after 
EU enlargement, at 0.4 points (applying our emigration estimates).
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Figure 4.18. Net emigration and job vacancy rate, 2005Q1 to 2012Q3
A. Total economy, manufacturing and construction
B. Trade, finance & insurance, and information & communication
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Figure 4.18. Net emigration and job vacancy rate, 2005Q1 to 2012Q3 (cont.)
C. Total economy, by occupation
Note: Annual outflows are transformed into quarterly ones assuming the dynamics of social security numbers (NINos) in the
United Kingdom.
Source: Vacancy rates from Eurostat and immigration data from Eurostat, OECD, Statistics Latvia, other national statistical
offices, Department of Work and Pensions (United Kingdom), Department of Social Protection (Ireland), author’s calculation
and compilation.
A major focus of public debate in Latvia is the question whether emigration has already 
led to labour shortages, as it had in 2005-07 (see Hazans and Philips, 2010; and Rutkowski, 
2007 for discussion and evidence). Employers and potential investors complain that despite 
high unemployment they cannot find qualified workers, suggesting that unemployment in 
Latvia is largely structural. Survey data, however, provide only limited support for these 
claims. The highest proportion of enterprises reporting labour shortages is found in the 
construction sector and among large manufacturing firms, but even there it peaks at about 
20% in late 2012, and at any rate remains below 10% in trade and services (Figure 4.19). A 
more detailed analysis by Anosova et al. (2012) and Hazans (2013a, 2013b) also seems to 
refute the hypothesis that Latvian unemployment is structural (i.e. that available unemployed 
are not suited for most of the vacancies offered). Difficulties in finding relevant employees 
concern only a small share of businesses and a small proportion of available vacancies. 
Nevertheless, labour shortages will inevitably become a serious challenge in the near future, 
seeing that the cohorts of labour market entrants are expected to be smaller than those of 
leavers (a situation exacerbated by emigration, but that would have occurred in any case).
Increased propensity to emigrate tends to reduce labour supply and make it more 
elastic, thus increasing real wages and narrowing the gap between the marginal 
productivity of labour and pay, but also forcing employers to lower hiring standards (for a 
discussion of the latter point, see Hazans and Philips, 2010). Through real wages, 
emigration also contributes to increases in consumer prices. At the same time, however, 
through falling domestic demand, it also exerts influence in the opposite direction.
Holland et al. (2011) do not provide estimates for emigration impact on real wage growth 
in Latvia, while Barrel et al. (2007, Tables 3, 4) estimate that over the four-year period of 
2005-08 emigration contributed 0.8 percentage points of inflation in Latvia and Lithuania, 
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and 0.2 points in Estonia. Figure 4.20 presents estimates of the effect of emigration on 
real wages in Latvia for the period 2001-10, based on a macro-econometric model 
developed by Zasova (2012). By 2010, the estimated cumulative effect is an increase of 
real wages by 2.5% (compared to a zero-emigration scenario). These estimates seem quite 
low. The European Commission (2012, p. 276) notes that this might be due to 
aggregation bias and that the effects for specific skill groups, occupations or sectors 
might be significantly larger. Hazans and Philips (2010) discuss other reasons why 
macro-models might underestimate the effect of emigration on real wages: macro-models 
do not account for the monopsonistic structure of the labour market, in particular the 
threat of a substantial fall in labour productivity when a firm loses not just a marginal 
worker but, say, half of its workforce. Scale effect, work organisation problems, and the 
inability to compete for publicly financed projects can all be underlying factors.
Figure 4.19. Proportion of enterprises reporting a shortage of labour as a limiting factor, by sector,
2010 Q3 to 2013 Q2
Source: Author’s calculations based on surveys of economic sentiment provided by Statistics Latvia.
Figure 4.20. The estimated effect of emigration on real GDP and real wages, 2001-10
Percentage
Source: Author’s calculations based on macro-econometric model by Zasova, A. (2012), “Econometric Assessment of 
Performance of Latvian Labour Market”, PhD Thesis, University of Latvia, Riga.
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The overall economic impact of emigration results mainly from a reduction of the 
labour force. This effect might be reinforced if emigrants are on average more skilled 
than non-migrants or mitigated if they are less skilled. Emigrants’ remittances, on the 
other hand, can partly or fully compensate the loss of output, but this is unlikely to last 
forever, especially when emigration becomes increasingly permanent, as in the case of 
Latvia. For the period of 2004-09, Holland et al. (2011), assuming a net outflow of only 
2.5% of the population (this study focused on outflows to EU15) estimated the long-term 
effect on Latvian real GDP to be 3.3%; only half of which has been compensated by 
remittances during the same period (European Commission, 2012, p. 278). Clearly, the 
overall long-term effect of losing 9% of a country’s population (and 14% of its labour 
force) would be much larger, but estimating it using the same model is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. A simpler model by Zasova (2012) produced a smaller impact of 1.5% 
(Figure 4.20). On the other hand, introducing the loss of 14% of the labour force into the 
production function with the share of labour being 0.64 (as in Krasnopjorovs, 2012b; a 
number of previous studies arrived to similar estimates), one gets a permanent reduction 
of 9 percentage points in potential output.16
Figure 4.21 suggests that the latter estimate is too high since domestic productivity of 
at least three quarters of emigrants was below median productivity of all legally 
employed persons in Latvia. At the same time Figure 4.21 provides strong evidence to 
support to the hypothesis that during the crisis the emigrants (especially the top half) are 
relatively much more productive than before, and the brain drain risk is increasing.
Figure 4.21. Estimated mean and percentiles of emigrants’ last earnings from all jobs
as a proportion of median earnings of all legally employed persons in the same month, 2005-11
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the State Social Insurance Agency (SSIA) and the State Employment Agency
(SEA). Annual ratios shown in the figure are obtained as averages of respective monthly ratios. Emigrants’ age structure is used
for assigning weights to individuals (excluding retirees) permanently leaving both SSIA and SEA datasets in between January
2005 and August 2011 (to allow one year abroad for those who left most recently).
As noted above, return migrants are on average more productive than non-migrants, 
but as long as their number is small, this will not be sufficient to compensate for brain 
drain.
Due to space constraints, we are unable to cover all aspects of the economic impact of 
migration at length, but let us briefly mention a number of factors not addressed here.
By reducing population and hence domestic market size, emigration discourages 
investment – both foreign and domestic. This is reinforced by the threat of labour 
shortages (Kugler and Rapoport, 2005; Javorcik et al., 2011; Gormsen and Pytlikova, 
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2012). While theoretical considerations suggest that investment from and trade with 
countries hosting large numbers of recent emigrants from Latvia should substantially 
increase, this is yet to happen. Should Latvian diasporas in the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Germany, Norway, Sweden, etc. be considered as potential trade partners and foreign 
direct investment sources?
Conclusion
The negative demographic effects of emigration on the Latvian economy (and 
especially on the sustainability of its social security system) suggest the need for 
measures which would address both causes and consequences of emigration. Direct job 
creation measures, as well as tax policies stimulating labour demand would address lack 
of jobs. Given that most emigrants come from the lower part of the distribution of 
earnings, raising non-taxable income thresholds and allowances for dependents, 
increasing the role of targeted rather than universal benefits and other ways of promoting 
progressivity seem to be the right direction in further development of the tax and benefit 
system. Given a high proportion of former registered unemployed among emigrants, 
investments in training programmes for the unemployed are welcome. Latvia should 
avoid policy changes and discard existing policies  which increase motivation to 
emigrate among large groups of population, especially in such fields as education, 
employment, health care, taxation and benefits. State and local governments should 
actively foster diaspora engagement in economic and social development and expand 
Latvia’s “virtual borders”. At the EU level, Latvia (together with other new member 
states) should actively promote creation of a mechanism to compensate the countries of 
origin of migrants for the loss of human capital, labour force and reproductive potential.
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Notes
1. The fact that the net outflow of air and sea passengers in 2011 fell below the 2009 
level (see Table 4.4) can be explained by reasons other than an actual decline in total 
emigration such as a reduction in the number of Air Baltic flights, or a shift in 
preferences towards land transport following the complete opening of the German 
labour market and a growing share of families among the emigrants.
2. Outflow to the Russian Federation remains stable, although at a level 30% higher than 
in 2008.
3. For the period between 2012Q2 and 2013Q1, however, the issuance of new SSNs fell 
just 27%. By this measure, migration to the United Kingdom from Estonia and 
Lithuania in 2012 was 30% lower than in 2011, while emigration from Poland 
declined by less than 5% (Department for Work and Pensions, 2013).
4. Hazans (2003, Tables A4.1-A4.4) provides a detailed comparison of earnings.
5. EURES – The European Job Mobility Portal, available at http://ec.europa.eu/eures/
6 See Hazans and Philips (2010, Section 7) for a detailed discussion of the impact of 
emigration on Latvia’s labour market and economy in 2004-07.
7. In Ireland and in the United Kingdom, the citizens of new member states need to 
register to obtain living and working permits, but if the documents are in order, 
permits are guaranteed without any specific prerequisites (Brucker et al., 2009, 
Table 2.1).
8. Brucker et al. (2009, Tables 6.7 and 6.8) showed that in 2004-07 returns to schooling 
for post-accession immigrants from new member states in the United Kingdom were 
quite low: just 2% per year of schooling. Moreover, 82% of tertiary-educated 
representatives of this group worked in medium- or low-skilled jobs.
9. Indirectly – via spouses holding Latvian citizenship, as well as via social networks –
new migration possibilities emerged also for non-citizens. Nevertheless, their position 
in terms of mobility options worsened compared to that of citizens.
10. Latvian Labour Force Survey data, 2009/Q4 and 2010/Q1 average.
11. See www.citizensinformation.ie/en/social_welfare/social_welfare_payments/;
www.hmrc.gov.uk/childbenefit/, accessed on 15August 2011 and refer to year 2011.
12. The actual level could be even higher given that information on labour market status 
is missing for 7-9% of emigrants in these two waves.
13. Guestworkers include also short-term and seasonal migrant workers. On the other 
hand, in the context mentioned here (due to LFS design) guestworkers are still 
considered as household members back home (those who moved as entire families are 
therefore not guestworkers).
14. These results are obtained by summing the effects from the rows “Female” and 
“Female with children”.
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15. The concept of potential emigrants here is somewhat broader than the one used earlier 
in this section. Here, it refers to accepting a hypothetical offer rather than planning 
emigration.
16. The effect of emigration on total labour force participation is theoretically ambiguous. 
Changes in the age structure caused by emigration suggest a negative effect, while 
higher real wages and lower hiring standards tend to increase the participation rate, 
especially among disadvantaged groups (Hazans and Philips, 2010; Hazans, 2011a). 
In fact, the activity rate of the Latvian working-age population was much higher in 
2011-12 than in the pre-accession period, but it could have been even higher in 
absence of emigration.
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Annex 4.A1
Emigration accounting based on Latvian Population Census
and Population Registry
Preliminary results of the Latvian Population Census (Statistics Latvia, 2012a, 2012c) 
report net emigration of 189 000 persons between the censuses of 2000 and 2011. While 
this estimate is very close to independent estimates (Hazans, 2011a, 2011b;
Krasnopjorovs, 2011, 2012a), the underlying methodology suffers from a number of 
shortcomings. First, since a significant part of the information was collected online, the 
physical presence of the respondent in Latvia was not always verified. Second, the census 
questionnaire asked about living abroad after 1989 (rather than after 2000). By covering 
such a long period, respondents may have been reluctant to answer this question and thus 
emigration may have been underreported. Third, 188 000 persons have been recognised 
as present in the country (and 160 000, absent) based solely on their appearance (or lack 
thereof) in the State Social Insurance Agency data, Health Payment Centre data, local 
government data or data of the Ministry of Education and Science during the 12 months 
before the census.
Finally, the estimate in question was obtained by summing three components: 
i) “official” emigration based on Population Registry data (treating the difference 
between identified change in population and natural increase as net migration rather than, 
as it was done before, accounting only for declared emigration); ii) emigration of family 
members, as reported by the census respondents; iii) persons recognised as emigrants 
based on lack of information. The exact year of departure for these people remains 
unknown. While the latter component accounts for the majority of emigrants, however, 
Statistics Latvia (2012b, 2012c) applied the dynamics of registered and reported 
emigration (driven mainly by the former) on this unregistered/undeclared emigration, thus 
overestimating pre-enlargement emigration at the expense of post-enlargement 
emigration and emigration during the crisis (see Figure 4.3, as well as Figure 4.A1.1).
In Figure 4.A1.1, Panel B, we construct an alternative time series (for years 2000-10), 
based on the same data used by Statistics Latvia under a different assumption, namely 
that, between 2000 and 2010, the [gross] outflow of emigrants for whom the year of 
departure is unknown, followed the same pattern as our estimated [gross] outflows of 
Latvian nationals to EEA countries. The latter have been obtained by summing inflows to 
the United Kingdom and Ireland as measured by allocated social security numbers, and 
inflows to other EEA countries estimated by the statistical authorities of these countries; 
see Box 4.1 for details. The resulting dynamics of net emigration is similar to that derived 
from our estimates completely based on receiving countries’ statistics but suggests 
somewhat smaller outflows in 2006-07 and larger ones in 2009 and 2011.
110 – 4. EMIGRATION FROM LATVIA: RECENT TRENDS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
COPING WITH EMIGRATION IN BALTIC AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES © OECD 2013
Figure 4.A1.1. Population outflows from and inflows to Latvia based on Latvian data sources, 2000-11
Thousands
A. Official estimate
B. Alternative estimate
Note: “Outflow, Registry” and “Outflow, Census” refer to emigrants identified from Population Registry and Population Census
2011 records, respectively. “Outflow, unidentified” stands for the number of persons recognised as emigrants, but for whom the
exact year of their departure is unknown. In the official estimate (Panel A), the latter component is assumed to have followed the
weighted dynamics of “Outflow, Registry” and “Outflow, Census”. In the alternative estimate (Panel B), we assumed
unregistered emigrants to follow the same pattern as gross outflows to EEA countries, estimated on the basis of receiving
country statistics (see Box 4.1 for details). "Outflow, estimated" is the difference between estimated gross outflow and registered 
emigration in 2011. Our estimate of gross outflow (in Panel B) is larger than the official one (in Panel A) mainly because we
take into account United Kingdom data on the allocation of National Insurance numbers. Inflows for all years are as reported by
Statistics Latvia.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Statistics Latvia and receiving countries.
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Chapter 5
Matching the skills of return migrants to labour market needs in Poland
3DZHá.DF]PDUF]\N
Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw
The chapter looks at the phenomenon of recent return migration to Poland with special 
emphasis on the labour market performance of returnees. The chapter examines the 
post-2004 migration in terms of its characteristics, including the extent to which it has 
been temporary migration, and assesses the share of the population with migration 
experience. Differences between migrants and those without migration experience are 
examined, and a distinction is made returning migrants who left before or after 2004. The 
impact of migration experience on labour market outcomes is examined, including in 
terms of unemployment and entrepreneurial activity, and some explanation for this 
impact is provided. The chapter concludes with a discussion of policies to support 
returning migrants and lessons from these programmes.
112 – 5. MATCHING THE SKILLS OF RETURN MIGRANTS TO LABOUR MARKET NEEDS IN POLAND
COPING WITH EMIGRATION IN BALTIC AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES © OECD 2013
Introduction
Poland is undoubtedly an emigration country, with a century-old tradition of
international emigration. The country witnessed transcontinental migration to the United 
States, large flows of labour migration to Western European countries prior to 
World War I, significant outflows during the Solidarity era and numerous “incomplete 
migrants” in the 1990s.1 Even so, accession to the European Union marks a turning point
in migration trends from Poland. The post-accession years saw a spectacular increase in 
the scale of Polish emigration which, in the regional context, can only be compared to 
that of Romanian citizens. The increase in the number of Polish migrants abroad 
(reaching roughly 7% of the total population in 2007) was accompanied by growing 
public interest in migration as a socio-economic phenomenon. Massive emigration after 
EU enlargement sparked an intense debate about (expected) return migration and its 
impacts. The chapter will assess the scale and structure of recent return migration to 
Poland and the performance of returnees in the Polish labour market. Special emphasis 
will be placed on skill transfer and the match between migrants’ skills and labour market 
needs, with an eye to policy implications. The chapter hypothesises that due to particular 
features of recent migration from Poland (temporary, labour migration, significant scale 
of underemployment abroad) well-tailored migration policies would be needed to 
efficiently improve labour market performance of returnees upon return.
This chapter examines the scale and structural features of return migration to Poland, 
especially short-term or circular migration practices. It then looks at the labour market 
re-integration of Polish returnees, and explores the issue of “social remittances”. Finally, 
it summarises official programmes and initiatives which aim to create incentives for 
returnees and / or to improve their return to Poland.
Return migration to Poland – scale and structural features 
How to assess the scale of return migration to Poland? Traditionally, temporary 
mobility constituted a significant portion of Polish migration, both before and during the 
post-enlargement period. How we define (and understand) the return movement thus 
becomes a critical question. Contrary to the classic case of settled migrants returning to 
their country of origin, for many Polish migrants “return” can often mean only a short 
break between periods spent abroad. We shall thus refer to both “typical” return migrants 
and persons with migratory experience (mostly temporary migrants currently residing in 
Poland but who may emigrate again in the future). The term liquid or fluid migration is 
increasingly used (Engbersen et al., 2012; Grabowska and Okólski, 2010) to refer to this 
phenomenon involving Polish as well as other Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
migrants. It points to very flexible migration plans or strategies which, to some extent, are 
the consequence of the free movement regime introduced in 2004. In statistical terms, 
recent migrants are extremely difficult to follow. Administrative data sources capture 
only a portion of the phenomenon, while stock data are usually more reliable. At any rate, 
most estimates point to the massive scale of the phenomenon.
According to stock estimates, the number of Polish nationals staying temporarily 
abroad peaked in 2007, reaching 2 27 million persons (Fihel, 2011; Kaczmarczyk, 2011) 
– see also Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1.
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Figure 5.1. Stock of Polish migrants staying temporarily abroad, 2002-11
Note: “Temporarily abroad” is defined as “permanent residents who have stayed in a foreign country for longer than 
three months”.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Central Statistical Office (CSO).
Table 5.1. Stock of Polish migrants residing temporarily abroad, 2002-11
Main destination countries, thousands
Source: CSO – Central Statistical Office (2012), “Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach emigracji z Polski w latach 2004-2011 –
notatka informacyjna” [Information on the scale and destinations of Polish emigrants, 2004-2011. Press Release], CSO, Warsaw.
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Total 786 1 000 1 450 1 950 2 270 2 210 2 100 2 000 2 060
of which : Europe 461 770 1 200 1 610 1 925 1 887 1 765 1 685 1 754
of which:
Austria 11 15 25 34 39 40 36 29 25
Belgium 14 13 21 28 31 33 34 45 47
Czech Republic . . . . 8 10 9 7 7
Denmark . . . . 17 19 20 19 21
Finland 0.3 0.4 0.7 3 4 4 3 3 2
France 21 30 44 49 55 56 60 60 62
Germany 294 385 430 450 490 490 465 440 470
Greece 10 13 17 20 20 20 16 16 15
Ireland 2 15 76 120 200 180 140 133 120
Italy 39 59 70 85 87 88 88 92 94
Netherlands 10 23 43 55 98 108 98 92 95
Norway 36 38 45 50 56
Portugal 0.3 0.5 0.6 1 1 1 1 1 1
Spain 14 26 37 44 80 83 84 48 40
Sweden 6 11 17 25 27 29 31 33 36
United Kingdom 24 150 340 580 690 650 595 580 625
2011Destination 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
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In 2009, this number was as high as 2.1 million, i.e. it decreased slightly and remained 
more or less stable in the following years. The difference between these two stocks 
(around 150 000), is obviously lower than the actual number of returnees (see below) but 
may point to the significance of the phenomenon. As shown in Table 5.1 below, the decline 
in the stock of Polish migrants abroad, is mostly due to a decrease in a few countries: those 
that experienced the highest inflows in the post-2004 period (the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
and the Netherlands) on the one hand; and those that were hard hit by the economic crisis 
on the other (most notably Spain and Ireland, with a spectacular increase in the stock of 
migrants between 2002 and 2007 followed by a significant drop).
Polish Labour Force Survey (LFS) data may represent a better source of information on 
return migration. Moreover, having introduced, in the second quarter of 2008, a special 
module dedicated to migrants, the Polish LFS reported 580 000 return migrants (or persons 
with migratory experience, as the figure includes both long-term and short-term migrants) 
between 2004 and the second quarter of 2008 (213 000 in 2007 alone). If we consider a 
longer time span, the figures are much higher. According to the 2008 LFS, around 4.2% of 
Poles (i.e. 1.28 million) had a migration experience (had been abroad for at least three
months), most of whom (1.05 million – 2.7% of the total population) returned after 1989 
(CSO, 2008). In 2008, the total number of Polish emigrants and return migrants was 
3.5 million, i.e. 9% of the total population of Poland (Anacka and Fihel, 2012b).
The highest number of return migrants was provided by the Public Opinion Research 
Centre survey, and equalled 2.9 million persons (over 9% of the adult population). These 
were people who had worked abroad sometime between 1997 and 2008, and were residing 
iQ3RODQGDW WKH WLPHRI WKH VXUYH\ LH  )LDáNRZVNDDQG6]F]HSDĔVNL 7KH
most valid data on return migration to Poland is expected with the publication of the final 
results of the 2011 national census (first quarter of 2013).To sum up, massive migration in 
the post-accession period led to a significant reverse flow of return migrants. This is clearly 
consistent with the observation expressed many years ago by Ernst Ravenstein, to the effect 
that return migration often accompanies migratory movements.
Structural features of return migration to Poland
Generally, the profile of return migrants reflects the structure of migration from 
3RODQG$VHVWLPDWHGE\)LDáNRZVNDDQG6]F]HSDĔVNL RQ WKHEDVLVRI/)6GDWD
return migrants who came back to Poland after 2000 are younger and better educated than 
the population without migration experience. The largest differences were found with 
respect to the attainment of tertiary and primary education (24.4% for returnees vs. 14.9% 
for non-migrants; and 8.7% for returnees vs. 27.2% for non-migrants, respectively). With 
respect to other socio-demographic characteristics, return migrants also tend to be male 
DQGVLQJOH)LDáNRZVNDDQG6]F]HSDĔVNL
According to the 2008 LFS, only 35% of return migrants stayed abroad for a period 
longer than one year, which again reflects the structure of recent outflows characterised 
by a significant share of temporary migrants. Most of those coming back to Poland 
returned from Germany (more than 30%), the United States and the United Kingdom 
(about 11% from each country) (CSO, 2008). The share of returnees from EU countries, 
including the United Kingdom, was as high as 60%-70% (depending on the period) and 
significantly increased in recent years. Anacka and Fihel (2012a) offer a different 
perspective. They performed a detailed analysis of migrant selectivity, comparing 
emigrants and returnees. This kind of analysis is extremely useful, as it may point to 
possible causal factors related to return migration. Table 5.2 presents the most important 
findings of this analysis.
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Table 5.2. Selected characteristics of emigrants and return migrants
1. The selectivity index compares the proportion of return migrants falling in each category with the respective proportion 
among migrants abroad (who did not return to Poland).
Source: Anacka, M. and A. Fihel (2012), “Return Migration to Poland in the Post-Accession Period”, in J. Leschke, B. Galgoczi 
and A. Watt (eds), Migration and Labour Markets in Troubled Times, Ashgate, Aldershot.
No significant differences between migrants and return migrants were found with 
respect to age or sex. In contrast, marked differences were noted with respect to education 
– the difference between migrants and return migrants was greatest with regard to 
vocational education (in favour of returnees). Interestingly, among returnees there was a 
clear overrepresentation of those originating from villages and small towns, which is not 
necessarily in line with commonly expressed expectations concerning potential return 
migrants who were supposed to target rather large cities with efficient labour markets 
(Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2008). On the other hand, selectivity indexes for destination 
countries (countries of residence before return) reveal the highest propensity to return 
among migrants to countries such as Italy, France or Germany, suggesting that recently 
observed return migration is mostly a product of pre-2004 migratory waves and does not 
involve the most recent outflows.
With regard to the geography of the phenomenon (which seems crucial to migration 
policy and initiatives targeting returnees) clear patterns of selectivity have been observed. 
Figure 5.2 presents selectivity index values by geographical region (vovoidship). Three 
groups of regions have been identified: “pulling regions” (with SI>0.1), “pushing out 
regions” (SI<-0.1) and “unspecified regions” (-0.1<SI<0.1) (Anacka and Fihel, 2012a).
Characteristic Emigrants (%) Return migrants (%) Selectivity index1
Male 61.1 64 0.05
Female 38.9 36 -0.07
University degree 14.1 10.2 -0.28
Secondary 14.1 12.9 -0.09
Secondary vocational 30 29.7 -0.01
Vocational 33.4 38.6 0.16
Primary 8.4 8.5 0.01
Urban 57.1 43.2 -0.24
Rural 42.9 56.8 0.33
EU-15 80.8 82.6 0.02
Austria 2 1.4 -0.3
Belgium 2.4 2 -0.18
France 3.4 3.8 0.12
Germany 23.3 30.9 0.33
Greece 1.3 1.3 -0.01
Ireland 6.6 3.7 -0.43
Italy 8.9 9.8 0.1
Netherlands 4.8 5.5 0.13
Spain 2.9 3.1 0.1
Sweden 1.4 1.7 0.2
United Kingdom 22.8 18 -0.21
Norway 1.8 2 0.09
United States 11.8 8 -0.33
Country of destination
Sex
Level of education
Type of settlement
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Figure 5.2. Return migrant selectivity index by geographical region, Poland
Source: Author’s calculations based on Anacka, M. and A. Fihel (2012), “Return Migration to Poland in the Post-Accession 
Period”, in J. Leschke, B. Galgoczi and A. Watt (eds), Migration and Labour Markets in Troubled Times, Ashgate, Aldershot.
As shown in the above figure, Polish regions differ greatly with respect to selectivity 
of return migration. On the one hand, there are regions where the share of returnees is 
KLJKHU WKDQ WKDW RI HPLJUDQWV VXFK DV /XEHOVNLH 3RGODVNLH ĝZLĊWRNU]\VNLH DQG
Wielkopolskie. On the other hand, in suFK UHJLRQV DV ĝOąVNLH 0D]RZLHFNLH DQG
Pomorskie, the percentage of returnees is lower than that of emigrants (Anacka and Fihel, 
2012a). This pattern contradicts expectation. In fact, the share of return migrants is lower 
in regions with relatively well developed labour markets and large cities (Warsaw, 
.DWRZLFH*GDĔVN7KHIDFWWKDWWKHUHJLRQVDWWUDFWLQJUHWXUQHHVDUHWKRVHZLWKUHODWLYHO\
long traditions of emigration and not necessarily those with strong pull factors, offers 
additional support to the hypothesis that what we are witnessing is the return of people 
who left Poland prior to EU enlargement 
The labour market performance of return migrants 
The re-integration of return migrants into the labour market is a crucial issue in the 
debate about the impact of return migration. The labour market performance of return 
migrants shapes the very assessment of migration and plays a significant role in the 
migration-development nexus (de Haas, 2010). Secondly, successful re-integration into 
the labour market is the main target of most migration policies targeting returnees. The 
most reliable information on the labour market performance of Polish return migrants can 
be drawn from the LFS module described above. Generally speaking, according to the 
2008 LFS migrant module, the labour market position of Polish returnees was not 
significantly different from that of non-migrants. Around 69% of return migrants were 
employed as compared to 63% of non-migrants. At the same time, however, the 
unemployment rate of returnees was higher by about 2 percentage points (CSO, 2008; 
)LDáNRZVNDDQG6]F]HSDĔVNL
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An in-depth, rigorous analysis based on the same data was performed by Anacka and 
Fihel (2012b).2 The general picture that emerged is consistent with the results cited 
above. Return migrants were more exposed than non-migrants to the risk of 
unemployment. At the same time, their participation rates were higher than those of non-
migrants. In order to control for additional variables which could be responsible for a 
particular labour market position, a set of multinomial logit models was estimated (in 
which a distinction between short-term and long-term migration was considered). Results 
can be summarised as follows (Anacka and Fihel, 2012b):
x The risk of unemployment was much higher for short-term migrants (2.5 times
higher) than for non-migrants.
x A similar pattern was observed among long-term migrants: for those 
aged 18-35 years, the risk of unemployment was 3-5 times higher than for non-
migrants.
x The highest risk of unemployment was observed among those with secondary 
education (particularly the long-term migrants among them).
x Generally, migration experience was associated with higher participation rates in the 
labour market.
x This was not true, however, for young persons with a background of short-term 
migration for whom the risk of labour market inactivity was around twice as high as 
in reference categories.
x Experience of migration thus seems to affect labour market performance in a 
negative way, particularly in the case of young people and those who spent a short 
period of time abroad (3-12 months). This effect is partially attributable to the profile 
of Polish post-accession migrants, many of whom left Poland after completing their 
education without ever entering the Polish labour market. In such cases – especially 
if combined with depreciation of skills abroad – reintegration in Poland upon return 
can be extremely difficult. A commonly discussed issue in the context of return 
migration is the question of skill transfer. Three factors are liable to compromise the 
ability of Polish return migrants to transfer to their country of origin, skills acquired 
in their country of destination:
 The majority of Polish migrants abroad are employed in jobs that are not in line 
with their education (so that skill transfer between Poland and destination 
countries also rarely occurs). According to CSO data, this was true of 
approximately 66% of Polish return migrants (CSO, 2008).
 Most Poles working abroad are considerably overqualified. For example, while 
close to 30% of Polish migrants in the United Kingdom have tertiary education, 
the vast majority of them (around 80%-90% ) are employed in jobs that require 
far lower qualifications (mostly in secondary sectors of the dual labour market 
offering manual jobs) (Kaczmarczyk, 2011).
 Mostly due to the above reasons, for Polish migrants abroad, the rate of return to 
human capital investment is low (or even extremely low) (Kaczmarczyk and 
Tyrowicz, 2012). This may explain not only specific strategies applied by 
migrants but also their decisions regarding return or further migration to a 
different country.
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Skill transfer is thus unlikely in Poland. The following points are worth considering 
however:
x There is evidence to suggest, that return migrants are more likely than non-migrants 
to hold stable employment contracts (SSC, 2010; SSC, 2011a; SSC, 2011b).
x Labour market reintegration in Poland tends to be easier for well-educated migrants; 
the position of persons with primary and secondary education is generally much 
more difficult (for these groups, self-employment serves as an escape from 
unemployment) (SSC, 2010; SSC, 2011a; SSC, 2011b).
x Return migrants tend to be self-employed. Regional studies indicate that the share of 
the self-employed (5%-12%, depending on the region) is significantly higher among 
return migrants than among non-migrants (SSC, 2010; SSC, 2011a; SSC, 2011b). 
While there is no clear evidence that self-employment is a dominant reintegration 
VWUDWHJ\)LDáNRZVNDDQG6]F]HSDĔVNLKRZHYHULWVHHPVSDUWLFXODUO\IUHTXHQW
among migrants who completed tertiary education in Poland but were employed in 
the secondary sectors abroad and faced problems with finding a job upon return.
On the basis of available data, it would be difficult to conclude that a 
migration/mobility experience is an advantage on the Polish labour market. Brain 
waste/deskilling abroad appear to be major problems. In addition, expectations regarding 
employment upon return were often frustrated, particularly in the time of economic 
downturn, becoming a major issue for return migrants.
Social remittances
Migration may affect sending countries not only through economic mechanisms such 
as labour markets or remittances. In many cases – particularly when migrants retain close 
links with sending communities or return to their places of origin – the socio-cultural 
impacts of migration, or “social remittances”, should also be considered. According to de 
Haas (2009), migration involves not only flows of people but also flows of ideas, norms 
etc. Migration may thus alter socio-economic structures in sending communities (social, 
class and ethnic hierarchies), traditional care arrangements, family structure, gender 
relations or particular modes of behaviour (culture of migration, entrepreneurship).
In light of the relatively large scale of return migration to Poland, such cultural 
changes may be expected, but have not been studied extensively so far. As shown by 
*PDM DQG0DáHN PDQ\ UHWXUQHHV VXUYH\HG VWDWHG WKDW WKH\ KDYH OHDUQHG D QHZ
organisational culture which may be useful in old or new working environments.
According to Social Diagnosis3 data, persons with migration experience assess their 
chances on the Polish labour market in a more positive way than non-migrants, are more 
self-confident, open minded and ready to accept different lifestyles, but are relatively 
critical towards religious or political authority.
A closer look at the data reveals however, that return migrants share roughly the same 
characteristics as non-migrants, often contrary to expectations. For example, the average 
number of close friends amounted to 7.1 in case of returnees and 6.9 in case of non-migrants; 
return migrants and non-migrants similarly assessed the impact of foreigners on Poland 
(“Foreigners do have too much impact on life in Poland” – the average score, on a scale of 1
to 7, was as high as 4.6 for return migrants and 4.4 for non-migrants); or level of 
self-responsibility (“Everyone is responsible for his own life” – 2.34 and 2.37, respectively). 
Tables 5.3-5.5 present other examples (to avoid problems with self-selection and provide a 
robustness check, columns 4 and 5 include information on persons aged 18-35 years only).4
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Table 5.3. Assessment of one’s own life
Percentages
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Social Diagnosis.
As shown above, generally return migrants assess their own life more positively: the 
share of those declaring themselves “very happy” was 9.6% among non-migrants and 
about 16% among returnees. Nevertheless, when we limit our analysis to persons aged 
18-35, those differences are much smaller (15.6 and 18.9 respectively).
Table 5.4. Assessment of socio-economic reforms started in 1989
Percentages
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Social Diagnosis.
As can be seen in Table 5.4, young return migrants seem to be far more critical with 
regard to the socio-economic transition than young non-migrants. Last but not least, 
Table 5.5 summarises the assessment of main factors responsible for a person’s life. 
Interestingly, returnees tend to believe in the power of authorities (policy makers, 
government representatives) more than non-migrants and also in their own power to 
change reality. Nevertheless, comparison of persons aged 18-35 reveals an (unexpected?) 
similarity between the responses obtained from the two groups.
Table 5.5. Main factors responsible for one’s own life
Percentages of positive answers
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Social Diagnosis.
Non-migrants Returnees Non-migrants Return migrants
Very happy 9.6 15.9 15.6 18.9
Fairly happy 70.7 63 71.8 60.1
Not so happy 18.1 19.8 12 19.1
Unhappy 1.6 1.4 0.7 1
Number of observations 25 604 816 8 719 494
How do you feel?
Total population 18-35 year-olds
Non-migrants Return migrants Non-migrants Return migrants
Successful 13.8 14.8 14.5 12.6
Not successful 36.6 33.7 19.8 26.1
Difficult to say 49.6 51.5 65.7 61.3
Number of observations 25 604 816 8 719 494
How do you assess the socio-
economic transition in Poland?
Total population 18-35 year-olds
Non-migrants Return migrants Non-migrants Return migrants
Government/policy makers 7.9 9.8 6.3 8.7
Other people 26.2 24.2 32.6 25.9
Fate / God 41.8 36.6 33.4 42.8
My own 71.4 73.8 79.9 73.1
Number of observations 25 604 816 8 719 494
My life depends on:
Total population 18-35 year-olds
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The analysis of Social Diagnosis data suggests that social remittances appear to be a 
limited phenomenon, which is, at any rate, difficult to ascertain. Conceivably, in the case 
of Poland, the recent nature of the social processes in question means that potential 
effects may become visible only in the longer term.
Policies and programmes targeting return migrants
Poland had policies targeting return migrants as early as the 1920s. Nevertheless, 
the issue entered into the public debate only in the late 1990s, and it was not before 
2006 – following the massive scale of post-enlargement wave of emigration and the 
emergence of shortages in the Polish labour market – that discussion regarding return 
migration and the reintegration of returnees into the Polish labour market gained 
momentum. Several of the more important initiatives taken as a result to encourage the 
return of emigrants and Polish citizens staying temporarily abroad are discussed below. 
Table 5.6 summarises some of them. 
Table 5.6. Programmes/initiatives targeting potential Polish return migrants
Source: )LDáNRZVND.DQG06]F]HSDĔVNL ), “Labour Mobility Within the EU – Impacts of Return Migration. Poland 
Case Study”, Eurofound – PPMI, unpublished manuscript.
Name of the 
programme/
initiative
“Masz PLan na 
powrót?” [Have you 
got a PLan to return?]
Chancellory of the Prime 
Minister, Ministry of Labour 
and Social Policy, Centre 
of Human Resources 
Development
All migrants staying 
abroad, persons 
considering return to 
Poland and return 
migrants
Since September 2008 
(still active)
National
Wracajdopolski.pl 
[ReturntoPoland.pl]
Hays Polska, Polish-British 
Chamber of Commerce 
Polish migrants abroad, 
particularly highly skilled 
migrants
October 2007-11 National
³=RVWDĔZ3ROVFH±
swoim szefem” 
[Become your own 
boss – stay in Poland]
8U]ąG0DUV]DáNRZVNL
:\ĪV]D6]NRáD)LQDQVyZL
Prawa
Returnees in region of 
Mazovia (especially 
migrants aged 45 and 
over, women, and people 
who were forced to return 
due to loss of job abroad)
Since September 2010 
(still active)
Regional
PLDVW±ZUDFDüDOH
GRNąG">7KHFLWLHV
– to go back, but 
where to?]
Poland Street Association 
(Polish NGO based in 
London), municipalities of 
12 biggest Polish cities: 
%LDá\VWRN%\GJRV]F]
*GDĔVN.DWRZLFH
.UDNyZ/XEOLQàyGĨ
3R]QDĔ5]HV]yZ
Szczecin, Warszawa i 
:URFáDZ
Polish migrants in the 
United Kingdom
January-August 2009 
(stopped due to financial 
problems and economic 
downturn)
Regional
Powroty [Returns] Fundacja Barka Polish migrants in 
London (particularly if 
homeless)
Since January 2007 (still 
active)
Regional 
Opolskie – tutaj 
]RVWDMĊ>µ2SROVNLH±
here I stay’] 
Self-Government of Opole 
region, Regional Labour 
Office in Opole 
Persons staying abroad, 
graduates, people looking 
for a job in the region
2009 Regional
Fundacja Fundusz Lokalny 
=LHPL%LáJRUDMVNLHM
3RZLDWRZ\8U]ąG
3UDF\%LáJRUDMVND$JHQFMD
Rozwoju Regionalnego 
:UyFLüLFRGDOHM">7R
return and what next?] 
Young (below 35) Polish 
migrants and their 
families
January 2007-June 2009 Local
Institutions responsible Main target groups Time frame Level of 
implementation
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National initiatives 
In 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the programme “Closer to work, 
closer to Poland” (%OLĪHM SUDF\ EOLĪHM 3ROVNL) which was followed by a programme 
targeting the Polish diaspora. The first mention of a government “return programme” was 
in October 2007, when the Minister of Labour and Social Policy announced its outlines, 
but Polish parliamentary elections and a subsequent change of government prevented any 
DFWLRQ 6]F]HSDĔVNL  ,Q $SULO  WKH ,QWHUGHSDUWPHQWDO :RUNLQJ *URXS RQ
Return Migration formulated a programme targeting return migrants. Importantly, this 
programme was based on two main premises: first, that returns are an inevitable 
consequence of mass emigration, and second, that the responsibility of the government 
should not be to influence individual migrants’ decisions to return, but to enable a 
“smooth” return to Poland and reintegration into its labour market. The programme 
consisted of six packages but only five have been implemented so far5 )LDáNRZVNDDQG
6]F]HSDĔVki, 2012; see also Table 5.6):
x Package 1 – services for returning migrants: a dedicated website, a “Return migrant 
handbook Social Diagnosis – a large-scale, countrywide survey devoted to the 
analysis of social norms and various forms of participation. Returner” (see also 
point 5), online employment office services, support for migrants with respect to 
vocational training, advice on investment and business opportunities in Poland.
x Package 2 – removal of barriers for persons planning to return to Poland: 
introduction of the Tax Abolition Act in order to avoid double taxation (2008), 
introduction of tax credits and investment allowances, grants for individual 
technology transfer, facilitated recognition of degrees and qualifications acquired 
abroad, easier acquisition or restoration of Polish citizenship.
x Package 3 – help for individual return migrants and their families, abroad as well as 
in Poland, particularly in the field of education (e.g. help for school children).
x Package 4 – interventions in the public administration, including the training of civil 
servants expected to come into contact with return migrants.
x Package 5 – information and promotion. In late 2008, a governmental campaign 
named “Have you got a PLan to return?” (where “PL” is the international 
abbreviation for Poland) was launched, to provide Poles who are considering or have 
already decided to return to Poland with all the necessary information for a smooth 
return to Poland and successful reintegration. Activities included the publication of a 
manual for return migrants (“A Returner”) and the launching of the programme’s
official website (www.powroty.gov.pl).6
Due to the very structure of the initiative and its aims, it is extremely difficult to 
evaluate. Nevertheless, the programme as well its underlying approach influenced the 
debate on return migration in Poland affecting other initiatives dedicated to return
migrants.
Regional and local initiatives
Several noteworthy regional and local initiatives have been introduced by local 
JRYHUQPHQWV1*2VRUSULYDWHFRPSDQLHV)LDáNRZVNDDQG6]F]HSDĔVNLVHHDOVR
Table 5.6):
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x Return, a programme run by the Barka Foundation (Polish NGO based in London), 
was among the first initiatives targeting Polish migrants abroad. The programme, 
launched in 2007, targeted Polish emigrants in extreme difficulty (mostly homeless 
people and addicts). The idea was to provide transportation to Poland and 
participation in reintegration programmes. According to data provided by the Barka 
Foundation, so far, about 900 migrants have returned from the United Kingdom to 
Poland for social rehabilitation, detoxification, and employment programmes. No 
data is available on their further reintegration.
x To return and what next? (:UyFLüLFRGDOHM) was a programme active between 2007 
and 2009, launched by the Local Labour Office and Agency of Regional 
Development in BLáJRUDM 7KH SURJUDPPH¶s objective was to create local 
infrastructure by providing training and assistance for young people intending to 
start their own business locally. Several local NGOs were actively engaged.
x Opolskie voivodship – here I stay (Opolskie – WXWDM]RVWDMĊ) is a programme initiated 
in 2008 by the self-government of the Opolskie voivodship and the Regional Labour 
Office in Opole. The main goals were to increase work and educational opportunities 
in the region and encourage the return of people working abroad. Target groups were 
graduates, unemployed persons and persons residing and working abroad (mostly in 
the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands).
x ReturntoPoland.pl (Wracajdopolski.pl) was launched in the third quarter of 2007 by 
the Polish branch of HAYES (an international human resources company) in 
co-operation with the Polish–British Chamber of Commerce and the Polish Ministry 
of Labour and Social Policy (the programme is not active at the moment). The 
programme’s main objective was to address the shortages of skilled workers on the 
Polish labour market. Its main target group was therefore Poles working abroad in 
the IT, banking and finance sectors. HAYES played a major role in this programme, 
being responsible for information and training activities abroad as well as upon 
return.
x The 12 cities. To go back, but where to? (PLDVW:UDFDüDOHGRNąG"), introduced 
in 2009 by Poland Street (a London-based Polish diaspora organisation), was one of 
the most ambitious initiatives to encourage return, drawing much media attention. 
Twelve Polish cities were to be promoted in London through monthly presentations 
covering different aspects relevant to return migration, such as potential for 
individual development, educational and labour market opportunities and business 
opportunities. Meetings were open to the public and aroused much interest in the 
United Kingdom. Unfortunately, the programme was abandoned shortly after its 
inception due to the deteriorating economic situation in Poland.
x Become your own boss – stay in Poland (=RVWDĔZ3ROVFH – swoim szefem) was a 
programme launched in 2010 by the Warsaw Municipality in co-operation with the 
Higher School of Finance and Management in Warsaw. The aim was to encourage 
return migrants and Polish emigrants abroad to establish innovative enterprises, in the 
Mazowieckie region. Activities included training and the preparation of individual 
business plans, grants and donations covering six months of operating costs.
The above initiatives suffer from a number of shortcomings. First, only few of them 
(including the governmental programme Have you got a PLan to return? launched in 
2008) could be described as evidence-based programmes, having clear assumptions, aims 
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and objectives. This was partially due to a limited knowledge of Polish migration in 
general and of returnees in particular. Second, in most cases the evaluation criteria of the 
initiatives in question remain unknown or have been formulated in a very general way, 
making assessment difficult. In addition, as in the case of “The 12 cities” programme, 
initial plans were often disrupted by the economic downturn. Changes in economic 
conditions affecting both by migrants and institutions/organisations may be a partially 
responsible for the fact that most of the programmes are no longer active. Third, the need
under Polish law, to avoid discrimination against Polish non-migrants is probably the 
reason why most programmes concentrate on providing information to returnees and 
Polish migrants abroad, or on training, with a special focus on self-employment. Lastly, 
and perhaps most importantly, it may be argued that, as with integration programmes 
targeting immigrants, reintegration programmes for returnees should above all be 
grounded in an efficient labour market support system. Unfortunately, however, in Poland 
– as in many other sending countries – the general labour market support system is highly 
inefficient.
Conclusion
In the second half of the 2000s, return migration emerged as an important topic in 
Polish public debate. This was due to a few reasons. First, the scale of emigration in the 
post-accession period was so massive that large-scale return migration was (and is still) 
expected. Second, the economic crisis had a profound effect on the situation of migrants 
in many countries, and was expected to boost return migration. Third, anecdotal evidence 
pointed to relative difficulties in the reintegration of return migrants in the Polish labour 
market.
The question of return migration and its effects is closely linked to the “crowding-out 
hypothesis” proposed by Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008). Accession to the European 
Union and post-accession mass migration facilitated – for the very first time in 
contemporary history – the outflow of the “economically redundant” population from 
economically backward regions. Available evidence suggests that one of the most 
important post-accession migrant groups comprised young and relatively well-educated 
persons departing from regions with weak labour markets and a significant share (or 
remnants) of semi-subsistence economy. Following this line of reasoning, one may argue 
that even if post-accession flows have only had a moderate impact on Poland in the short 
run (including unemployment, economic activity or wages), this “crowding out effect” 
can significantly improve development potential in the longer term. Recent migration can 
bring about significant changes in labour market structure and its institutional setup. 
Essentially, while affecting the oversupply of labour it makes all reforms of the labour 
market easier (or even feasible). Return migration can be helpful, but may also hamper 
the mechanism described above. Available evidence suggests that a migration experience 
may influence labour market performance in a negative way, especially for young persons 
and short-term migrants. This effect is partially attributable to the very profile of Polish 
post-accession migrants (e.g. a large share of persons who leave Poland shortly after 
finishing their education without ever having entered the Polish labour market), and to 
their position in the labour markets of destination countries. Thus, for many returnees 
reintegration in Poland upon return can be extremely difficult. Personalised programmes 
(focusing on individual needs and advantages) may help pave the way of potential return 
migrants to successful return and reintegration.
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Notes
1. Okólski (2001) defines “incomplete migration” as quasi-migratory in character, with 
often irregular stay or work, and although they draw economic benefits from 
migration and spend time abroad, they maintain close ties with home.
2. Note, however, that the study did not address endogeneity nor selection mechanisms 
among return migrants (self-selection) and thus should be treated with caution.
3. Social Diagnosis – a large-scale, countrywide survey devoted to the analysis of social 
norms and various forms of participation.
4. Given that migrants are usually younger than the sending population, this is the most 
critical variable responsible for potential differences between the populations under 
analysis.
5. A package targeting specific groups, such as medical professionals, students or 
second- generation migrants is still in preparation. To some extent, this is due to 
controversies regarding possible discrimination against non-migrants.
6. In July 2011, the “Powroty” website was incorporated into the official website of the 
Polish Public Employment Services (ZielonaLinia.gov.pl).
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Chapter 6
Mobilising migrants skills and resources in Romania
Cristina Mereuta
Employment Expert, Romania
This chapter focuses on Romanian labour migration, its effects on origin and destination 
labour markets, and its impact on social and economic development, as well as on 
pressing demographic issues, such as population ageing. The chapter then examines the 
effect of departure of Romanian workers on unemployment and its relation to economic 
restructuring. The educational characteristics of Romanian migrants are examined in 
terms of destinations, occupations and employment sector. The main policy initiatives to 
address emigration and support return are described, in terms of features and the actors 
implementing them. The chapter concludes by looking at potential future evolution of 
emigration and its impact on Romania.
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Introduction
Romania has had a tortuous experience of international migration. With a very low 
mobility in 1950-90 due to restrictions imposed by the totalitarian regime, emigration 
(mostly permanent) suddenly increased in 1990-91. The main reasons for emigration 
were ethnicity (significant flows to Germany, Hungary and Israel), business (small scale 
border trade), studies, and career (especially in mathematics, IT and other 
technical fields).
In 1990, 96 929 Romanian citizens settled permanently abroad, followed by over 
44 000 persons in 1991 and over 25 000 in 1995 (Figure 6.1). Due to EU restrictions and 
strict immigration rules in Canada and the United States, Romanian emigration slowed 
down in the late 1990s.
The new millennium brought important changes in migration patterns in terms of the 
scale of permanent migration, professional fields and destination countries. Italy and 
Spain gained popularity among Romanians seeking work, and the number of Romanians 
settling permanently abroad has steadily decreased.
According to the National Institute of Statistics, between 2005 and 2010, the number 
of emigrants (Romanian citizens who settled permanently abroad), varied, peaking in 
2006 (14 197 persons) and reaching a minimum in 2010 (7 906 persons; a 50% decrease).
Figure 6.1. Romanian citizens settling permanently abroad, by nationality, 1990-2010
Source: National Institute of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, various years.
During the period in question, the majority of emigrants were women (on average, 
women accounted for 63.5% of the total number of emigrants). In addition, an increase in 
the share of young emigrants (under 18 and aged 26-40) was registered.
The clear shift from ethnically motivated migration to migration motivated by work 
and life choices is reflected in the preponderance of ethnic minorities among emigrants in 
the early 1990s (Figure 6.1) on the one hand, and the clear predominance of Romanians 
in the period 2000-10 (reaching 99% in 2010) on the other. Although national statistical 
data do not reflect the full extent of the phenomenon, it is nevertheless clear that, as soon 
as EU regulations allowed easier movement for Romanian citizens (e.g. lifting of visa 
requirements for short-term travel in Schengen countries), a growing trend of labour 
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emigration began. The main triggers were (and partly still are) significant wage 
differentials between EU15 countries and Romania (Romanian minimum wage represents 
15-20% of the minimum wage in certain destination countries) and a drastic reduction in 
job opportunities due to economic restructuring and the transition to a modernised 
economy. To a lesser extent, family circumstances, studies, a wish to change lifestyle or 
to acquire life and work experience were behind the decision to migrate.
Results of a survey by Sandu (2010) show that the opportunity to improve one’s 
living conditions in Romania is an important reason for working abroad (specifically, 
56% of those with a background of labour migration state that their plan for the next 
two-three years is to improve conditions of their current dwelling; 27% plan to open a 
business). Due to serious recessions in Europe in the 2008-12 period, emigration rates 
slowed down, although labour migration will continue to be considered a better prospect 
than work Romania in terms of employment and earnings, especially for the younger 
generation.
The 2011 population census1 provides a snapshot of certain aspects of population 
mobility, and a better assessment of the actual extent of Romanian emigration (and of its 
effects on small and medium-sized communities).
The final results of the Romanian 2011 census show a sharp population decline (by 
7.2% compared to 2002). Mainly external emigration contributed to this outcome. 
According to the census, the usual resident population of Romania was 
20 121 641 persons, of whom 385 729 were temporarily absent (abroad for a period under 
12 months). The number of persons abroad for a longer period (over 12 months) was 
727 540. The Romanian National Institute of Statistics considers this figure an 
undercount, since for many long-term emigrants no family member or respondent was in 
Romania at the time of the census to report the information.
In spite of limitations, the census results for this population category show some 
significant elements: there is a balance in the gender ratio of emigrants; there are more 
urban residents (54%); and emigrants are predominantly working-age (46% in the 
20-34 age cohort and 25% in the 35-44 age cohort). Given the labour-oriented nature of 
Romanian emigration, the population decline will undoubtedly prove to have affected not 
only the country’s demography but also its society and its labour market. This is already 
evident in several North-East counties in Romania which are important providers of 
external mobility. These counties are among the top five counties with the largest shares 
of persons abroad for a longer period, and also show a lower share of population 
aged 25-64 compared to the national average.
Table 6.1 shows the top ten destination countries for both the persons temporarily 
absent (under 12 months) and for those abroad for longer period (over 12 months). Not 
surprisingly, the main destination countries are the same for both categories.
Additional data from the respective population censuses and population statistics of
the main destination countries contribute to the full grasp of the phenomenon. For 
example, Spain2 registered a strong increase in Romanian nationals compared to 2001 
with a relative growth of 1 287% (798 104 persons in 2011 compared with 57 533 in 
2001). In Italy,3 there were ten times more Romanians in 2011 (968 576) than in 2003 
(95 039). Romanians are the largest group in the foreign population in both countries.
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Table 6.1. Persons left abroad (under and over 12 months), by country of destination
Source: National Institute of Statistics, Population and Housing Censuses 2011.
It is worth noting that since 1992 Romania has registered a constant population 
decline from 22.81 million in 1992 to 21.68 million in 2002 and 19.04 million in 2012. 
Romania’s experience in regulating labour migration
Since 1990, Romania – having embarked on the road to EU membership – has 
modernised its labour market, especially with regard to labour mobility. In addition, 
negotiations were held with several states concerning the regulation of labour and social 
security arrangements. Traditionally, short-term labour migration was regulated through 
administrative arrangements for seasonal work, the oldest and most widely used 
instruments being those concluded with Germany (several agreements were signed in 
1990-99). A milestone in Romanian labour migration was the bilateral labour agreement 
signed with Spain in 2002. Although the agreement was general in scope, it resulted 
mostly in labour migration destined for the agricultural and construction sectors – those in 
which demand was highest in 2002-08. This arrangement shaped future Romanian labour 
migration to Spain, which is still mainly characterised by low and medium-skilled 
migrants. Another major destination country for Romanian outflows is Italy.
Interestingly, access to the Italian labour market was not regulated by labour agreements. 
Rather, cultural and linguistic affinity allowed an almost natural movement of Romanian 
workers towards sectors such as construction, domestic care services and agriculture in 
Italy.
Labour force survey data indicate that Romanian migrant workers moved mainly to 
Italy and Spain (about 40% to each country) and, to a lesser extent, to the United 
Kingdom, Germany and France (approximately 12% in total).
In the last decade, Romania became the European country with the largest outflow of 
migrants, with more than 2 million Romanians registered as residents in other 
EU countries, and over 70% concentrated in Spain and Italy (Eurostat, 2011).
Among immigrants residing in EU countries, Romanians – whose numbers increased 
seven-fold between 2001 and 2010 – currently represent the largest group of EU citizens 
(6.6% of all foreigners; second only to Turkish citizens, who represent 7.2% of 
foreigners).
Persons temporarily absent
(abroad for a period under 12 months)
Persons abroad for a longer period 
(over 12 months)
Share of temporarily absent persons 
among total reported abroad (%)
Italy 169 766 341 296 33.2
Spain 71 102 171 163 29.3
Germany 29 084 33 089 46.8
France 21 712 23 205 48.3
United Kingdom 19 064 40 378 32.1
Hungary 14 104 10 291 57.8
Greece 9 508 15 851 37.5
Belgium 8 257 11 611 41.6
Austria 7 737 9 075 46.0
Portugal 5 271 7 651 40.8
Total 385 729 727 540 34.6
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Romanian labour migration, initially a seasonal, circular movement of persons for 
work and study purposes (temporary work in Spain, Germany, Austria), later changed 
into a real option for long-term/indefinite stay, mainly in countries such Spain and Italy.
EU destinations appear to be linked to the migrant’s level of skill and education. 
Highly skilled Romanian emigrants tend to head North (Germany, France, United 
Kingdom) to work in information and communication technologies, business and social 
service sectors, while those with vocational or less than secondary education tend to head 
South (Spain, Italy, Greece) to work in construction, domestic care services, 
housekeeping, hospitality, agriculture and manufacturing. 
The effects of emigration on the Romanian labour market
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the outflow of Romanian workers represented an 
opportunity to reduce unemployment and alleviate the repercussions of economic 
restructuring. 
In spite of this initial beneficial effect on the national labour market (which is still 
characterised by a low level of job availability), the sheer volume of labour emigration 
gave rise to several negative effects: labour shortages, skill gaps, distorted wage demand; 
depopulated areas, deepening of regional discrepancies; social problems with dependents 
(especially children) left behind; inflationary pressure (due to remittances).
Since 2006-07, the business sector has registered labour shortages, especially in 
construction, with a direct effect on wage demands. During 2007-08, Romanian 
employers made efforts to attract Romanians working abroad or to reduce the “appetite” 
of their staff for emigration.
A study carried out in 2007 by the National Research Institute for Labour and Social 
Protection (Ciuca et al., 2007) showed that most Romanians are ready for international 
mobility with a view to attain better employment. The types of jobs that are sought differ, 
however, between residents of urban and rural areas: urban residents tend to look for 
better jobs, especially better paid, while rural residents tend to look for any type of job.
The same study revealed that emigrants left the Romanian labour market from 
marginal jobs/situations (daily worker, unemployed or self-employed). Another 
interesting finding, which partly explains the high propensity for work emigration at the 
expense of internal mobility, is the frequent lack of information on job opportunities at 
the local, regional and national level.
According to medium- and long-term labour market forecasts conducted by the 
Romanian Ministry of Labour, Social Protection and Family, in co-operation with the 
National Research Institute for Labour and Social Protection, the highest risk of shortage 
is predicted to accumulate for International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO) 
groups 3 (“Technicians and associate professionals”), 7 (“Craft and related trades 
workers”) and 8 (“Plant and machine operators and assemblers”). The Romanian National 
Agency for Employment (Public Employment Service) reported that vacancies have been 
repeatedly communicated by employers in clothing manufacturing, car manufacturing 
and building construction, with difficulties in finding suitable candidates (due to skill or 
location mismatch) and in placing jobseekers (due to low earnings, especially in clothing 
manufacturing).
Although last decade’s migration patterns were marked by the emigration of low-
skilled workers, emigration of highly skilled individuals also developed at a rapid pace, 
132 – 6. MOBILISING MIGRANTS SKILLS AND RESOURCES IN ROMANIA
COPING WITH EMIGRATION IN BALTIC AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES © OECD 2013
mainly based on student exchange programmes and rapid recruitment after graduation. 
Immigrant selection policies implemented by Germany, the United Kingdom and France 
attracted specialised workers to these countries, especially in the field of information and 
communication technologies. In recent years, the migration of health care workers has 
gained momentum, due also to significant wage reductions and poorer working 
conditions in the Romanian public sectors, coupled with an increasing demand in Western 
Europe for medium and highly skilled workers in the health sector (physicians, 
specialised nurses).
Finally, the phenomenon of children and teenagers left behind by migrant parents to 
be cared for by relatives or institutions (“home alone”) represents a grave social problem, 
resulting in abuse, violation of children’s rights, delinquency, poor educational
performance etc.
The effects of migration on domestic development
Immigration as a mechanism for the replacement of workers and their skills is limited 
in Romania, especially due to low earnings. During 1991-2010, the yearly inflow of 
persons (by change of domicile) has been 1 602 persons in 1991, 11 907 in 1998, 8 606 in 
2009 and 7 055 in 2010 (National Institute of Statistics, 2011), and – with the exception 
of 2001, 2007 and 2009 – net migration has been negative (Figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2. Net international migration, 1991-2010
Thousands
Source: National Institute of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, various years.
The geographical distribution of immigrants is skewed. The capital region, Bucharest-
Ilfov, attracts over 40% of immigrants, followed by the North-East (13%). Immigrants 
come mainly from the Republic of Moldova (over 33%), Italy (14%), the United States 
(6.2%), France (5.7%), China (5.3%) and Turkey (4.5%) (2009 data).
Young adults aged 26-40 make up about 50% of both emigration and immigration
flows. The majority of immigrants are male (60%) while the majority of emigrants are 
females (63%). People with higher education represent 27% of both emigration and 
immigration flows.
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Another important feature of Romanian labour migration is the valuable impact on 
the economic and social status of the families left behind. Remittances directly fuelled 
business investments and consumption in Romania in the past decade. Foreign 
remittances peaked in 2008. Since then, however, due to the economic crisis, a declining 
trend has been observed.
The high level of remittances may point to the temporary character of Romanian 
emigration. According to World Bank data, in 2009 the value of remittances sent by 
Romanians working abroad amounted to about 3% of Romanian GDP and was one of the 
highest among EU8+ two countries. The sheer volume of remittances, however, led to 
lower levels of economic activity in the remaining population. Money sent back by 
Romanian migrant workers represented, in a way, a second form of “welfare” deeply 
affecting recipients’ willingness to work.
The last decade of migration in Romania triggered major social change. Traditionally 
immobile populations (mostly rural) suddenly benefited from the opportunities offered by 
labour migration with direct positive effects on the living standards of those back home 
(spouses, children, parents) as well as on individual adaptability.
Given the fact that Romanian migration is mainly based on family and community 
migration networks, an efficient match between skills and labour demand would be 
difficult to achieve through systems based on institutional actors.
Skills aspects of return migration
Studies show that, upon return, Romanian migrants use their newly acquired skills, 
technological and business knowledge to increase their productivity at the workplace, 
start businesses and enhance their mobility on the labour market (Sandu, 2006a).
Free, or almost free movement of workers contributed greatly to Romania’s 
development. It increased labour force mobility, the transfer of skill, technology and work 
organisation models, and enhanced worker adaptability. Many self-employed individuals 
or small companies in the field of construction are based on work experience, skill and 
capital gained abroad.
According to Eurofound research which focused on Hungary, Latvia, Poland and 
5RPDQLD%DUFHYLþLXVHWDO, 2012), the foreign work experience of return migrants proves 
more valuable to highly skilled workers than for low-skilled workers.
Measures to encourage return
Migration channels affect policy approaches for stimulating return. The main 
migration channels from Romania are:
x Migration through family and community networks – most commonly used, 
especially in the context of restrictions imposed by destination countries in which 
informal (family and community) networks of support and facilitation are active. 
There are empirical examples of Romanian villages where a small group of 
successful emigrants formed the basis for mass labour migration.
x Legal migration facilitated by private agencies – a channel managed, since the 
beginning of the 1990s, by private agencies specialising mainly in the construction 
sector, and in emigration to Germany and Israel.
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x Legal migration mediated by state agencies – a channel strictly linked to bilateral 
labour agreements signed by Romania, and which allowed regulated, circular 
migration of Romanian workers in different economic sectors/occupations in the 
1990s and early 2000s.
x Direct (non-mediated) migration – most used by qualified workers entering in direct 
contact with future employers abroad.
Considering these main migration channels, Romania’s approach in responding to 
massive emigration and encouraging return focused on three elements: i) information; 
ii) entrepreneurship and large-scale investment; and iii) diversified public intervention. 
Only preliminary steps towards the implementation of policies focused on stimulating 
return have been taken (2007-08), however, as the impact of the domestic economic crisis 
diverted attention away from this issue.4
Information
Romanian migrant workers often lack important information and updates regarding 
opportunities to start a business or find satisfactory employment (mainly in terms of 
wages) in Romania in general, and in their regions of origin in particular.
Several information campaigns and labour exchanges have been organised in Italy 
and Spain by the Romanian Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Protection, in order to 
provide information as well as a concrete first step towards a decision to return – a job in 
Romania. A total of four events (information and job fair) were organised in 2008, in the 
four locations with the highest concentrations of Romanian workers: Castellon de la 
Plana (12-13 April) and Alcala de Henares (28 June) in Spain; Rome (24 February) and
Turin (21 June) in Italy.
The following themes were covered: EU social security co-ordination – pensions, 
health, unemployment and family benefits; rights and obligations of working exercising 
mobility within the European Union; illegal/undeclared work risks; starting a business in 
Romania (including funding opportunities). Romanian companies (especially in 
construction, car industry, and manufacturing) presented vacancies during special job 
fairs organised in Spain and Italy for Romanian migrant workers (see Box 6.1).
Box 6.1. Job fairs abroad
A job fair was organised in Rome on 23 February 2008 by the Romanian Ministry of Labour, Family and 
Social Protection, the Romanian Embassy in Rome, and the National Agency of Employment. This was the first 
job fair organised by Romanian authorities abroad. The aims were to facilitate the encounters between Romanian 
employers and possible Romanian returnees, to support the employers in identifying the needed workers, to 
publicise the current vacancies from Romania, and to increase the chances of those who work irregularly in Italy 
to find a proper job in Romania. Approximately 1 000 individuals attended the job fair, and around 7 500 job 
offers were presented.
On 12-13 April 2008, an information/job fair was organised in Castellon de la Plana (Spain). Around 
1 300 participants attended, and 8 000 jobs offers were presented. In addition to information on work and social 
security, relevant for migrant workers, special attention was paid to entrepreneurship in Romania (specific 
regulations; sources of funding).
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Although the main impediment to matching remained (the wage differential), 
information served as a good basis for a reassessment of options on the part of Romanian 
citizens who had left the country many years before. In 2008, the Romanian Government 
adopted an “Action Plan for promoting the return of Romanian migrant workers”,5 with 
the following objectives:
x to establish, maintain, and update databases periodically
x to conduct an information campaign on job opportunities in Romania, and actively 
recruit Romanian migrants for work in the Romanian labour market
x to stimulate return and professional reintegration of Romanian migrant workers by 
promoting a system for circular migration.
The Department for Romanians Abroad (see below) financed projects aimed at 
maintaining relations with Romanian communities abroad, including, for example, 
scholarships for graduate and post-graduate studies, research, and short-term training 
programmes to ethnic Romanians who established their permanent residence outside of 
Romania.
Interesting in this respect are also initiatives taken by associations6 of current and 
former students/graduates of foreign universities and/or international/European training 
programmes, who promote the transfer of knowledge and skill back to Romania (these 
initiatives are private, but provide valuable information, such as members’ assessments of 
the current situation in Romania, career promotion opportunities, etc.).
In the various destination countries, numerous associations/organisations of 
Romanians have been established, and their activities focus on supporting diaspora 
members and strengthening ties with the country of origin. Members of Romanian 
migrant communities have facilitated the conclusion of co-operation agreements (e.g., 
town twinning) between local administrative bodies (municipalities, regional 
governments) in destination countries (especially Italy, Spain and Germany) and 
Romania. These instruments have fostered cultural, economic and social exchange and 
development.
Entrepreneurship and large scale investments
Entrepreneurship is quite limited in Romania relative to other countries. One study 
(Sandu, 2006b) found that only about 10% of the population are entrepreneurs or have a 
member of the family who is an entrepreneur. Among persons with experience “abroad” 
(travel or work), the share of entrepreneurs is higher (16% and 23%, respectively). Thus, 
foreign work experience is positively associated with entrepreneurial initiative. Capital, 
experience and contacts accumulated abroad explain these differences. The same study 
gives examples of businesses started upon return to Romania by applying business 
models learnt abroad. This is one area where return-support initiatives have been piloted 
(see Box 6.2).
Many studies and data show, that Romanians working abroad tend to spend their 
earnings on individual consumption and the improvement of their living conditions 
(mainly construction, extension or modernisation of their dwellings; purchase of cars and 
home appliances), and to a lesser extent on setting up a new business or buying land.
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Box 6.2. Support for returning entrepreneurs
Unicredit Group (Unicredit Tiriac Bank in Romania) managed, under the supervision of the Italian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, a special fund to support migrants who want to return and start a business in Romania. The 
project provided special banking tools to support investments in the country of origin, using the money earned in 
the destination country. The programme focused mainly on youth and female entrepreneurship. The total credit 
allocated was EUR 1.6 million (a EUR 20 000 loan on average) and supported businesses in the health and care 
sector (35%), business services sector (25%), craftsmanship (25%) wellness/rural tourism – individual or family 
enterprises (15%).
Another strategy for stimulating the return or retention of Romanian workers, 
particularly highly specialised workers, is related to successful foreign investment in 
Romania, as, for example, in the automotive industry. The development of a Renault 
research centre near Bucharest, and a new Ford car factory in Craiova involved the 
implementation of training programmes, temporary work experience abroad for 
Romanian specialists, and a solid transfer of their knowledge and practice to the domestic 
market. Also, thanks to a qualified workforce and a dynamic business environment, big 
IT companies choose Romania as a base for their regional centres covering South-East 
Europe.
Former Romanian emigrants may act as agents of economic growth also by 
transferring knowledge and skills pertaining to the development and implementation of 
EU-funded projects,7 or by establishing the necessary contacts to build transnational 
partnerships.
Diversified public interventions 
The EU Public Employment Services (PES). A key source of information and 
support for potential return migrants is the EURES network (of which Romanian PES is a 
part). Institutional development projects were implemented to improve coverage of 
clients (especially jobseekers from Romania). PES experts and specialised websites 
provide information on living and working conditions in Romania and other European 
community countries. It can be a challenge for PES to inform job-seekers of opportunities
in other countries, even when the job-seekers are originally from another European 
country. Collaboration among PES can be further fostered (see Box 6.3. for an example 
of one such project).
Box 6.3. The MEDIT project
The MEDIT project was initiated by the Romanian Agency for Employment (Public Employment Service) 
in co-operation with Italia Lavoro (Veneto region). Developed during 2009-11, the project was co-funded by the 
European Social Fund. Its aim was to create a model of transnational co-operation for the return of Romanian 
migrants through the development of tools to inform Romanian migrants in Italy on the situation in Romania, 
and through the enhancement of local Romanian institutions’ ability to support Romanian return migrants once 
they decide to return.
Immigration policy. In its National Immigration Strategy, Romania identified the 
following challenges for 2011-14: a) registered labour shortages in certain economic 
sectors/occupations due to massive emigration of Romanian workers; and b) European 
interest in using immigration as a possible measure to counteract the negative social and 
economic effects of an ageing population. The Romanian Government has already 
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introduced changes in the conditions applied to work and residence permits, to facilitate 
the attraction and retention8 of highly skilled workers.
Maintaining cultural ties. Given the considerable size of Romanian communities 
abroad, another important strategy involves maintaining and strengthening cultural ties 
with these communities, and especially with the children of emigrants.9 In 1995, The 
Romanian Government established the Department for Romanians Abroad10 to develop 
and implement Romanian diaspora policies. The Department11 focuses on:
x fostering of contacts between Romanian public figures and organisations from the 
diaspora and the institutions of the Romanian state
x increasing co-operation to support consolidation of EU membership
x promoting Romanian cultural values and strengthening bilateral relations between 
Romania and migrants’ countries of destination.
The Government’s Department for Romanians Abroad provides financial support for 
Romanian language courses in countries with large Romanian communities (see Box 6.4).
It also promotes an online Romanian language course.12 In addition, the Ministry of 
Education, Research, Youth and Sports in Romania has organised Romanian language, 
culture and civilisation courses for teachers from Romanian communities abroad (such 
courses are given in numerous Italian regions, for example, based on a 2007 bilateral 
agreement with the Italian Ministry of Education).
Box 6.4. Romanian language and civilisation courses
The Government’s Department for Romanians Abroad provides financial support, on a project basis, for 
Romanian language, culture and civilisation courses. The following are examples of projects already 
implemented:
x “Romanian school for second generation migrants – IV” – aiming at teaching Romanian language, 
history and geography, and providing support for the young generation of Romanian citizens in Spain 
(implemented by Association ARIPI).
x “Introduction to Romanian language, culture and civilisation” – providing Romanian courses 
(language and civilisation) to employees of the Spanish administrative system who interact with 
Romanian migrants (e.g., police, social services, health care and education institutions). The project 
has facilitated communication between Spanish administration employees and Romanian migrants 
(implemented by the Federation of Romanian Associations in Spain – FEDROM).
Policy implications
Substantial migration flows entail risks and opportunities, and intra-EU work mobility 
is no exception. A crucial question is how national and EU policies respond to this 
challenge.
In the case of Romania, migrants can act as “catalysts for the transformation of the 
Romanian society and for the convergence of Romanian values and lifestyles towards 
European ones” (Prelipceanu, 2008). This is especially true for the rural areas of 
Romania. Mass emigration emerged abruptly, however, destabilising the domestic labour 
market, and was marked by a distinct pattern based on individual initiative and 
community networks. Adequate policies (especially policies aimed at efficiently 
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matching supply and demand on the domestic labour market) have therefore been 
difficult to implement. Migration management should constitute a key element in 
Romania’s new strategic framework for employment (currently under drafting). 
Temporary migration schemes and support for reintegration into the domestic labour 
market should be envisaged.
An important issue is the limited availability of data to guide policy decisions, in light 
of the growing influence of Romanian migration on demography, social protection (e.g. 
the sustainability of the public pension system), education, training, employment 
(especially labour shortages) etc. 
Romania continues to suffer from low employment (58.5%13), high unemployment 
among youth (23.7%14), and high in-work poverty (about 19%). Wages remain 
considerably lower than in destination countries. This suggests that Romania will 
continue to be mainly a migrant-sending country, with a low propensity for return, at least 
in the short and medium term. Moreover, outmigration occurs in the context of 
accumulated labour shortages, especially in the health care sector, coupled with an ageing 
and rather economically inactive population.15 Effective migration management should be 
high on any political agenda related to employment, human resources development and 
social protection.
During the past decade, despite the effects of the economic crisis since 2008, 
Romania showed a constant trend towards convergence with the EU average in terms of 
GDP, productivity and sector distribution of the economy. Regional disparities still mark 
Romania and they partly explain the high propensity for migration in certain geographic 
regions (North-East, South-West, rural areas). 
Romania does not lack opportunities for economic development and job growth, 
especially in sectors where development disparities between Romania and other 
EU countries are highest (transport infrastructure, construction, agriculture, alternative 
energy production) – sectors that match the skills of Romanian emigrants. Through 
effective employment and economic policies combined with information campaigns
among Romanians abroad, these development opportunities could be used to stimulate 
and facilitate migrant return and integration.
Conclusion
Emigration has been largely for employment and has involved working-age 
individuals, so the initial benefits in terms of alleviating unemployment are 
counterbalanced by negative demographic effects, labour shortages, remittance-related 
inflation, and a range of social implications. These effects are particularly intense in 
certain regions. By now, the characteristics of Romanian emigration are known, as is the 
distribution of emigrants, although greater detail will help direct future policies to support 
return from employment abroad to activity in Romania. Public intervention to foster 
return has not led to large scale return, and much will depend on future growth prospects 
and on informing Romanians abroad of these prospects.
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Notes
1. Population and Housing Census 2011 – Final Results, National Statistics Institute, 
Romania (www.recensamantromania.ro/rezultate-2/).
2. Press Release on Population and Housing Censuses 2011 (14 December 2012),
National Statistics Institute, Spain (www.ine.es/en/prensa/np756_en.pdf).
3. Foreign resident population on 1st January – focus on citizenship (data extracted),
National Statistics Institute, Italy.
4. The increase in the unemployment rate in late 2008 and throughout 2009 diverted the 
attention of public policy makers towards the domestic labour market and the effects 
of the economic crisis.
5. The implementation of this plan has never been evaluated, possibly due to the 
negative impact of the economic crisis on the domestic labour market and the change 
of government in 2009.
6. Examples of such associations/organisations of Romanian students abroad are 
available on http://washington.mae.ro/node/288 and www.lsrs.ro/.
7. Italy and Spain are well-experienced users of EU-funded programmes.
8. Romania is mainly a transition country for migrants on their way to Western Europe.
9. In 2007, the Spanish Ministry of Education, with the support of the Romanian 
Language Institute, decided to introduce Romanian language and civilisation courses 
in the Spanish public colleges. Over 350 schools have included, in their 
extracurricular programme, an optional course of Romanian language, culture and 
civilisation.
10. The Department functioned under the direct authority of the Prime Minister and, since 
January 2013, it is part of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
11. The main programmes funded by the Department for Romanians Abroad focus on 
culture, mass-media, education, spirituality and tradition. The total staff of this 
institution is 30 employees.
12. www.dprp.gov.ro/about-us/education/ and www.dprp.gov.ro/elearning/.
13. Age group 15-64 (Labour Force Survey 2011, National Statistics Institute).
14. Age group 15-24 (Labour Force Survey 2011, National Statistics Institute).
15. In 2011, according to the National Statistic Institute 2011 Labour Force Survey, the 
economic dependency rate was 1 340 per 1 000.
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Coping with Emigration in Baltic and East European 
Countries
The Baltic countries have experienced sustained emigration over the past decade, contributing to population 
decline and a loss of working-age population. The impact of this emigration is felt strongly in the labour 
market, the general economy and in social developments. How can countries deal with the impact of high 
levels of emigration? How to attract back emigrants? How best to benefit from the financial, social and human 
capital developed abroad? The Baltic countries are not alone in addressing these challenges, and this volume 
brings together the recent experience of Poland and Romania, as well as a wide range of OECD countries, in 
developing new policies to cope with emigration.
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